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Preface
Uncertainty about the future accompanies economic decisions every day. For instance,
managers in firms need to estimate the returns on new investments without knowing
the future demand for their products. Households may take into account the odds
of losing employment when considering the purchase of a car or real estate. The fact
that the future is uncertain raises a number of questions. Most importantly, does un-
certainty affect economic decisions, and if so, how? What are possible effects on the
aggregate economy? Research in this area faces the challenge that uncertainty is not
directly observable. Therefore, adequately capturing individuals’ beliefs is a key pre-
requisite for all further investigations.
This thesis addresses the measurement of firms’ subjective uncertainty and studies
its properties. Before further clarifying my contribution and summarizing the main
results, I provide an overview of the related literature.
Conceptually, uncertainty can either take the form of risk or of Knightian uncertainty,
which is also known as ambiguity. This distinction dates back to Frank Knight’s 1921
book “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit”. While, in his words, risk was a “quantity suscep-
tible to measurement”, ambiguity was “distinctly not of this character” (Knight, 1921).
In modern economics, risk refers to a situation in which an individual can form prob-
abilistic expectations about a set of future events. Ellsberg (1961) demonstrates that
there can be situations in which individuals are unable to provide a subjective proba-
bility distribution. This characterizes Knightian uncertainty in today’s understanding.
Due to its more tangible properties, the subsequent theoretical literature has mostly
modeled uncertainty as risk.
In an influential contribution, Bernanke (1983) connects uncertainty about investment
decisions to aggregate economic fluctuations. The underlying theoretical mechanism
is based on so-called “real options”: if it is costly to reverse decisions, uncertainty can
make it beneficial for investors to delay investments and pause hiring and firing un-
til more information is available. This exploits the option value of waiting (see also,
for instance, McDonald and Siegel 1986). Another classical channel that connects un-
1
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certainty to decisions that lead to a negative impact on the economy is precautionary
behavior. This can materialize in lower consumption spending by households and re-
duced investment by risk-averse managers. A third channel works via increased risk
premia, which increase the cost of finance and depress demand. Moreover, there are
two theoretical mechanisms that postulate an increase in (longer-run) growth as a re-
sult of increased uncertainty. Since losses are bounded, but gains are not, the theory of
“growth options” predicts higher investment as expected profits increase with higher
risk. Similarly, if profits are convex in demand or costs, a higher variance of future
outcomes may also incentivize investment according to the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect.
Bloom (2014) provides an overview of these channels.
After the experience of the Great Recession, there has been a surge in the interest to
study economic uncertainty and its effects on the business cycle. Motivated by the
Global Financial Crisis as well as earlier events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and
the OPEC I oil crisis, the notion of aggregate uncertainty shocks as potential drivers of
the business cycle gained momentum in macroeconomics. This is reflected in a num-
ber of theoretical and empirical contributions following the seminal work by Bloom
(2009).
On the theoretical side, canonical business cycle models were augmented to investi-
gate the effect of time-varying uncertainty. For instance, Basu and Bundick (2017) illus-
trate the dampening effect of uncertainty caused by a precautionary decrease in con-
sumption coupled with downward price rigidities. Some scholars study an increase in
the variance of technology shocks in combination with non-convex adjustment costs
and investigate the effects on the real economy and the labor market (Bloom et al.,
2018b; Schaal, 2017). Others point at financial distortions as a transmission channel
of uncertainty to output (see, for instance, Gilchrist et al. 2014). Most studies assume
that uncertainty shocks are exogenous. This is challenged by some scholars who lay
out theoretical feedback effects from lower growth to uncertainty, such as Fajgelbaum
et al. (2017). In most models uncertainty refers to risk, which is often equated with
volatility. A prominent exception is Ilut and Schneider (2014), who introduce Knigh-
tian uncertainty to this line of research. They explain aggregate fluctuations of the
economy using confidence shocks and behavioral insights about ambiguity aversion.
In the empirical literature, the notion of uncertainty shocks inspired the development
of various time series proxy measures of uncertainty. Popular examples include the
implied or realized volatility of stock prices (e.g. Bloom 2009), the cross-sectional
dispersion of firm variables (e.g. Bachmann et al. 2013), the conditional volatility of
macroeconomic forecast errors (Jurado et al., 2015), and count indices of uncertainty-
related keywords in newspapers (Baker et al., 2016). While all of these proxies refer
2
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to the concept of uncertainty, they are statistically quite distinct (Kozeniauskas et al.,
2018). A common stylized fact is that they are counter-cyclical: uncertainty is higher in
recessions. Using time series econometric methods, innovations in proxy measures of
uncertainty are generally found to have a negative effect on output. Based on proxies
derived from the stock market, Berger et al. (2020) show that realized volatility is as-
sociated with declines, while forward-looking conditional volatility is not. Ludvigson
et al. (2020) distinguish financial from macroeconomic uncertainty and find negative
effects on output only for shocks originating in the financial sector. They also empha-
size the difficulty to identify uncertainty shocks in time series models, as they may be
endogenous to first moment shocks.
In summary, the empirical evidence on the effects of uncertainty using macroeconomic
proxy measures remains suggestive. The two main obstacles to a clearer picture are
imprecise measurement and possible endogeneity of uncertainty and growth. Simul-
taneity and feedback effects are generally difficult to address and pose a big chal-
lenge to all analysis attempting to causally link uncertainty to outcomes. Concerning
measurement, a shortcoming of all macroeconomic proxies for uncertainty—and the
results of the analyses using them—is that they may differ from the perceived un-
certainty of individuals in the economy. When studying the effect of uncertainty on
outcomes, what should ultimately matter, besides a transmission via risk premia in
financial markets, is the subjective uncertainty of decision makers.
As an alternative to time series econometric analyses, micro data can be used to test the
theoretical channels that link uncertainty to economic decisions and outcomes. How-
ever, due to the scarcity of data on subjective uncertainty, this literature is small. One
rare example is Guiso and Parigi (1999). Based on a cross section of Italian firms, they
find that businesses that are more uncertain about their future sales growth plan to in-
vest less. Ben-David et al. (2018) present evidence that, when more uncertain, house-
holds exhibit precautionary behavior regarding consumption, credit, and investment.
One reason for the lack of micro data and time series of subjective uncertainty is the
rational expectations paradigm. It has dominated economists’ thinking since its pro-
motion in the 1970s. As a convenient feature in modeling, it entails that agents are
assumed to be fully informed and to hold rational expectations in accordance with
the model (Coibion et al., 2018a). Another reason for the lack of micro data on subjec-
tive uncertainty is the behaviorist tradition to only take into consideration individuals’
actions and outcomes, but not their intentions and perceptions (Bachmann, 2019).
With the rise of behavioral economics, psychological insights were introduced into
mainstream economics and weakened the paradigm of rational expectations. As a re-
sult, in the last decade there has been renewed interest in survey data about the expec-
3
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tations and uncertainty of households and firms. In fact, there exists a long tradition
of eliciting expectations in regular consumer and business surveys to inform macroe-
conomic forecasts. However, only in recent years researchers have started to system-
atically exploit this existing information, to design new surveys, and to add questions
about subjective uncertainty. Micro data on perceptions opens up new opportunities
to review model assumptions and to test the theoretical channels that describe effects
of uncertainty on economic outcomes. To date, we still know little about the deter-
minants and properties of subjective business uncertainty, and its effect on economic
decisions and the business cycle.
This dissertation addresses some of these gaps. It consists of three chapters—each
constitutes a self-contained research article and can be read independently. The pa-
pers that underlie chapters one and two are co-authored with Rüdiger Bachmann,
Kai Carstensen, and Martin Schneider. The third chapter is my own work. Based on
German firm-level survey data collected by the ifo Institute, this thesis extends the
literature by presenting three new measures of managers’ perceived business uncer-
tainty and by providing an extensive analysis of their properties. In particular, it ex-
amines the relation of firms’ subjective uncertainty to past growth, firm characteristics,
volatility, expectations, and corporate decisions. Moreover, it studies the prevalence
of Knightian thinking. Below, I briefly summarize the main findings of each chapter.
The first chapter examines the relationship between firms’ subjective uncertainty and
past change, and it compares subjective uncertainty to measures of realized and con-
ditional volatility in the cross section and the time series. We measure uncertainty
as the difference between managers’ expectations about quarterly sales growth in the
best and in the worst case. Our main finding is that uncertainty reflects change: firms
report more subjective uncertainty after either high or low growth realizations. In
the cross section of firms, subjective uncertainty differs from statistical measures of
uncertainty such as volatility: fast-growing and large firms report lower subjective
uncertainty than fast-shrinking and small firms, respectively, even if they face shocks
of similar size. By contrast, the substantial time variation in firm-specific subjective
uncertainty resembles that in conditional volatility: both measures of uncertainty are
mildly persistent and rise more when growth is temporarily low. These results high-
light the importance of idiosyncratic variation in uncertainty outside recessions and
provide micro evidence for feedback effects between uncertainty and growth. More-
over, they entail valuable insights for models of firm dynamics and those using condi-
tional volatility as a proxy for subjective uncertainty.
The second chapter investigates whether decision-makers in firms think about the fu-
ture in terms of probabilities. We ask German manufacturing executives about the
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likelihood of a sales increase. The key departure from existing business surveys is that
we do not force respondents to submit a single probability, but instead give a “Knight-
ian” option of answering with a probability interval. Our main result is that Knightian
responses are pervasive: 76% of firms choose a probability interval at least once in five
years. We further show that Knightian responses are motivated by a lack of clarity
about the future; they do not reflect a lack of sophistication. Over time, substantial
switching into and out of the Knightian state reflects both idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks. In particular, the share of Knightian responses spikes up sharply during the
Greek crisis in 2015, along with credit spreads. This chapter establishes new stylized
facts about the probabilistic beliefs of top-level managers in firms, as opposed to par-
ticipants in behavioral laboratory experiments. Given the common practice to elicit
subjective uncertainty using single probabilities—uncertainty is then measured, in ef-
fect, as risk—the new findings may contribute to adopt more flexible question types
that also incorporate Knightian thinking.
The third chapter presents a novel measure of subjective uncertainty and relates it to
business expectations and firm decisions. Uncertainty is measured by asking man-
agers directly how uncertain they are about their future business development. I
demonstrate that the relationship between perceived uncertainty and expectations is
strongly negative at the micro level and almost perfectly inverse in the aggregate. It is
also state-dependent: uncertainty co-moves less with expectations in bad times. These
stylized facts are manifest during the economic downturn of the COVID-19 crisis, but
also in the years before. They highlight the simultaneity of movements in subjective
uncertainty and expectations, which impedes the identification of uncertainty shocks
in time series econometric analyses. As an alternative approach, I use micro data to
evaluate the connection of subjective uncertainty and expectations to corporate de-
cisions about investment and employment. In particular, I exploit the between-firm
variation during the COVID-19 shock. In contrast to first moment changes, I find that
changes in uncertainty neither predict the postponement of investment nor a “freeze”
of employment. Averaging over all firms, these results are not in accordance with
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CHAPTER 1. UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGE
1.1 Introduction
A large theoretical literature studies how firms respond to time variation in uncer-
tainty. It has highlighted two key sources of variation. First, firms respond in the short
run to news about the business environment. For example, in recessions firms may
become less confident in their forecasts of future cost or demand. Heightened uncer-
tainty can then have a negative impact on their hiring and investment.1 Second, many
firms face longer term risks that they learn about over time: for example, expanding
firms find out gradually about demand in new markets. It makes sense for firms that
operate in unfamiliar territory to operate more cautiously; to an observer they may
then appear to adjust "too slowly".2
Yet, to date there is little direct evidence on how decision makers within businesses
perceive and process uncertainty. Instead, subjective uncertainty is often indirectly
inferred through the lens of a particular model: for example, if a model imposes ratio-
nal expectations, the realized volatility of shocks estimated by the modeler becomes a
measure of uncertainty perceived by the firms. However, since there is no consensus
on model structure, many open questions remain. In particular, how much does sub-
jective uncertainty fluctuate over time? How is it shaped by past firm performance,
both in the short run and the longer run? And how does it relate to realized volatility?
This paper provides survey evidence on firms’ perceived uncertainty about future
sales growth. We introduce a panel data set of firms’ subjective beliefs, characteristics
and performance for the German manufacturing sector. It is based on a new module
of the ifo Business Survey, a long-established survey used to develop business sen-
timent indicators. The survey is well regarded in the German business community:
questions are answered mostly by senior management and there is a high response
rate even from large firms.3 Our data set is based on 14 survey waves in consecutive
quarters from 2013 to 2016. We use it to document how subjective uncertainty varies
not only in the cross section of firms but also over time.
1 Bloom (2014) and Fernández-Villaverde and Guerrón-Quintana (2020) survey the macroeconomic
literature on fluctuations in uncertainty. One concrete workhorse model assumes that productivity
exhibits stochastic volatility that – exogenously or endogenously – increases at the beginning of re-
cessions.
2 Following the seminal work of Jovanovic (1982), a large literature on firm dynamics with learning
studies questions such as the contribution of young firms to growth and the role for subsidizing such
firms.
3 Research studies using the standard ifo expectation data are, for instance, Bachmann et al. (2013);
Buchheim and Link (2017); Massenot and Pettinicchi (2018); Bachmann et al. (2019); Enders et al.
(2019a,b).
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The new survey module asks firms for a forecast of one-quarter-ahead sales growth
together with two numbers for best and worst case sales growth scenarios. We then
define the difference, that is, span, between the best and worst case one-quarter-ahead
sales growth scenarios as our quantitative measure of subjective uncertainty. The idea
behind the survey design is that firms can directly report scenarios developed as part
of their regular planning process. Responses to a one-time meta survey we commis-
sioned show that a large majority of firms engages in scenario analysis and uses results
from routine quantitative planning when filling out the survey module. Since in addi-
tion to the forecast we also retrospectively ask for firms’ realized sales growth, we can
further compare subjective uncertainty to firms’ realized (subjective) forecast errors.
Our main finding is that uncertainty reflects change experienced by firms. This princi-
ple describes beliefs in both the short and longer run. On the one hand, subjective
uncertainty perceived by an individual firm varies substantially at the quarterly fre-
quency; in particular, it is high after both very good and very bad growth realizations.
This short run pattern is shared by the conditional volatility of firms’ forecast errors.
On the other hand, average subjective uncertainty over our four-year sample comoves
strongly with measures of change in a firm’s environment: it is higher for firms that
consistently grow or shrink, as well as for firms with more volatile sales growth. In
the cross section of firms, however, subjective uncertainty behaves differently from re-
alized volatility. In particular, large and growing firms report relatively low subjective
uncertainty even when they make large forecast errors.
Our results thus provide direct evidence for both types of time variation in uncertainty
emphasized in the literature. One key takeaway is the importance of short run idiosyn-
cratic variation. Mechanisms at work when uncertainty goes up in recessions could
therefore be relevant also for firm dynamics in normal times. Moreover, subjective
uncertainty is closely related in the short run to the (absolute) magnitude of past and
future shocks. A model of short term planning should therefore draw a connection be-
tween subjective uncertainty and conditional volatility, for which our results provide
an empirical basis. Traditionally, this connection was simply assumed through the ra-
tional expectations assumption. Firms’ planning under uncertainty appears to reflect
at least in part actual volatility, perhaps because managers are quite familiar with the
short run dynamics of their business.
At the same time, our results point to an important role for learning over the longer
run. Indeed, fast-growing and fast-shrinking firms not only perceive higher uncer-
tainty, but also make forecasts that are too conservative, that is, systematically biased
towards zero. This is true after controlling for firm size, suggesting that even large
firms sometimes enter unfamiliar territory where growth is uncertain and hard to fore-
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cast. While we document a connection between volatility and subjective uncertainty
also for longer term risk, there is an important second force: successful firms – ei-
ther growing or large – report lower uncertainty when faced with the same volatility.
This fact is consistent with mechanisms that make uncertainty matter more to decision
makers in bad times, so their planning considers a wider span of scenarios.
To provide an idea of magnitudes, the mean span between best and worst case sce-
narios is 12.1 percentage points (pp), slightly above the mean absolute forecast error.
Firms differ in average subjective uncertainty: the cross sectional standard deviation
of average span per firm is 7.4 pp. At the same time, we document large time varia-
tion in subjective uncertainty for individual firms: the cross sectional average of the
firm-level standard deviation of span is 5.9 pp. Time varying span is thus a volatile
component of firms’ planning process. In fact, it is almost as volatile as the usual driver
of firm planning in economic models, namely changes in conditional expectations: the
average firm-level time series standard deviation of growth forecasts is 7.4 pp. Most
of the time series variation in subjective uncertainty is firm-specific: time-sector fixed
effects explain only a negligible share.
Our cross-sectional results relate average firm-level subjective uncertainty to two mea-
sures of how a firm’s environment changes over the medium term. First, we define
trend as a firm’s unconditional mean growth rate over our four year sample. We show
that both high and low trend firms are significantly more uncertain. Span in the bot-
tom quartile by trend is 6pp higher than for the “normal” firms, that is, firms within
the interquartile range; it is 2pp higher in the top quartile. At the same time, high
and low trend firms’ forecasts are biased towards zero by about 5pp on average. Both
results are consistent with models of learning: fast expansion or shrinkage leads firms
to a less familiar, and hence more uncertain, state of business that is difficult to fore-
cast. They are not consistent with simple models of firm dynamics in which every firm
knows its trend growth.
Our second measure of medium term change is turbulence, defined as firms’ in-sample
sales growth volatility over time. High turbulence firms face larger (absolute) shocks
than the average firm, but do not make biased forecasts. Moreover, they not only
report higher subjective uncertainty on average, but also higher variation in subjective
uncertainty. Indeed, controlling for trend as well as size, the mean span in the top
quartile by turbulence is 10pp higher than in the bottom quartile, whereas the standard
deviation of span is 6pp higher. In other words, planning at firms that face larger
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shocks not only uses scenarios that are further apart but also varies those scenarios
more over time as shocks arrive.4
The short-run relationship between subjective uncertainty and past growth is V-shaped,
with a minimum close to zero. Firms thus become more uncertain after either negative
or positive growth. Bad quarters increase uncertainty by more: while a one percentage
point lower negative growth rate is followed by 30 basis points wider span between
firms’ best and worst case scenarios, a one percentage point higher positive growth
rate widens span by only 17 basis points; these numbers are robust to controlling for
firm heterogeneity. The V-shape is perhaps surprising in light of the negative comove-
ment between growth and uncertainty emphasized in the literature. It is nevertheless
consistent because this literature focuses on the behavior of uncertainty over the busi-
ness cycle, whereas most variation in our sample is idiosyncratic. Our results suggest
that individual firms’ uncertainty is shaped by its individual performance, and in-
creases when an unfamiliar event occurs, especially a bad one.
There are several candidate explanations for why uncertainty might reflect change in
the short run. One possibility is that the basic principle we have found in the cross
section – firms that operate in unfamiliar territory perceive more uncertainty – is also
at work in the short run. If this force were dominant, we should see that uncertainty
is particularly related to growth surprises. We indeed confirm a positive relationship
between lagged absolute forecast errors and span. However, we also show that, in
firm quarters with negative growth, the previous-quarter growth rate is a sufficient
statistic for predicting span given the previous-quarter growth rate and forecast error.
The reason behind this result is that predictable low growth realizations also increase
uncertainty, to a similar extent as low growth surprises. A possible explanation is that
planning takes into account state variables other than growth. For example, in a model
with customer capital, a shrinking firm might see the size and/or composition of its
future pool of customers become more uncertain in a predictable way.
How does firms’ subjective uncertainty compare to the volatility of their forecast er-
rors, a measure of uncertainty in many models? Our key cross sectional finding here is
that successful firms—defined as either large and fast-growing—plan with narrower
spans even when they face the same magnitude of forecast errors as less successful
firms. The result has two parts. First, controlling for firm size, the absolute forecast
4 This distinction matters because of its implication for behavior such as firm factor choice: in the
presence of adjustment costs or time to build, time variation in subjective uncertainty leads firms to
respond differently each period. If instead, high volatility firms simply faced larger iid shocks, they
might still behave different from low volatility firms, but that behavior would not vary over time.
Our results say that the theoretical mechanisms that make firms respond to uncertainty generate
both cross sectional and time series variation.
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error for growing firms is 2.5pp higher than for firms that are neither growing nor
shrinking, while span is not significantly different. By contrast, compared to stable
firms both the absolute forecast errors and span increase by about the same amount
of roughly 3pp for shrinking firms. While high and low trend firms are both in un-
familiar territory—in the sense of facing larger shocks—growing firms do not adjust
their planning. Second, large firms with more than 250 employees make similar abso-
lute forecast errors as smaller firms, yet plan with spans that are up to 5pp narrower,
controlling for trend and turbulence. Size by itself thus also leads firms to plan with
narrower spans.
How does time variation in subjective uncertainty compare to that in conditional
volatility? This question is more difficult to answer: it is no longer sufficient to com-
pare absolute forecast errors to a measure of subjective uncertainty, as we did when
examine the cross section. Indeed, computing the variance of forecast errors delivers
an unconditional measure of volatility. The relevant counterpart we are looking for here
is the predictable component of volatility. We want to establish whether conditional
volatility is persistent and related to past growth in a similar way to span. We thus
utilize the panel dimension of our data set to estimate dynamic panel regressions for
both our subjective uncertainty measure span as well as panel GARCH models for
firms’ subjective forecast errors.
The short-run dynamics of firm-specific subjective uncertainty closely resemble that
of the conditional volatility of shocks experienced by firms: both are mildly persistent,
increase with bad past growth and increase somewhat less with good past growth. We
take away that, at least in the short run, firms adjust their planning process based on
the experience that high and—even more so—low growth signals larger future sur-
prises. In applications that emphasize the short run, an approach that equates uncer-
tainty with conditional volatility thus describes actual firm planning quite well.
Our study is motivated by a large body of work on firm behavior under uncertainty.
Theory has proposed a number of mechanisms through which uncertainty impacts
input choices that have to be made before cost or demand is fully known. Examples
include wait-and-see effects or financial frictions that increase the cost of capital when
uncertainty is high. While the relevant theoretical concept is subjective uncertainty,
empirical tests have long had to rely on proxy measures.5 Following the pioneering
5 Empirical work with micro data on firms tends to rely on proxy measures for uncertainty such as the
volatility and dispersion of stock returns (Leahy and Whited, 1996; Campbell et al., 2001; Bloom et al.,
2007) or other firm-level outcomes (Bachmann and Bayer, 2013, 2014; Jurado et al., 2015; Bloom et al.,
2018b), implied options volatility (Bloom, 2009; Barrero et al., 2017), perceived political uncertainty
from quarterly earnings conference calls (Hassan et al., 2019), and qualitative (Bachmann et al., 2013)
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work of Guiso and Parigi (1999), a small number of studies have used survey mea-
sures of uncertainty to investigate its effects on economic activity (see in particular,
Bontempi et al., 2010; Dibiasi et al., 2018; Bloom et al., 2019). The goal of the present
paper is not to study the effect of uncertainty on outcomes, but instead to characterize
how uncertainty varies over time, and in particular how it relates to past outcomes.
In particular, our short run results provide new evidence to guide an active discussion
about the relationship between uncertainty and growth. Following Bloom (2009), a
growing literature has incorporated uncertainty shocks into macroeconomic models.6
Such shocks are often orthogonal to first moment shocks, for example, higher uncer-
tainty lower current growth even if it is unrelated to past growth. More recently, sev-
eral papers have considered feedback effects from growth to uncertainty (Bachmann
and Moscarini, 2012; Fajgelbaum et al., 2017; Ilut and Valchev, 2017; Ilut et al., 2018; Ba-
ley and Blanco, 2019; Berger and Vavra, 2019; Ludvigson et al., 2020). One of our main
results is the strong association of high uncertainty with low or high past growth. It
implies that feedback effects – or possibly correlated shocks – are particularly impor-
tant for understanding the comovement of growth and subjective uncertainty.
Firm-level idiosyncratic uncertainty is also a key building block for models of firm
dynamics that aim to explain the size distribution of firms, the (mis)allocation of fac-
tors of production and ultimately the level and growth rates of aggregate output (see
surveys by Luttmer 2010 or Hopenhayn 2014; for recent examples, see contributions
by Pugsley et al. 2018 and David and Venkateswaran 2019). Our direct evidence on
long-term risks is consistent with the mechanisms explored in quantitative models of
firm learning such as Abbring and Campbell (2003), Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout
(2012) or Arkolakis et al. (2018). Moreover, our results on high frequency variation
in subjective uncertainty suggest that even a short time-to-build friction could give
rise to effects of uncertainty on factor choice. Indeed, with any type of adjustment
cost, quarterly variation in uncertainty will work like a distortion—a wedge between
the marginal product and price of a factor (see, for example, Ilut and Saijo 2020 for a
model of firms facing idiosyncratic risk that clarifies this feature).
The new ifo survey module is one of a handful of data sources on expectations of
leading decision makers in firms about their own economic circumstances.7 Bloom
as well as quantitative (Bachmann et al., 2017, 2019; Altig et al., 2019; Bloom et al., 2019) firm-level
forecast errors obtained from surveys.
6 An incomplete list is: Christiano et al. (2014); Gilchrist et al. (2014); Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015);
Basu and Bundick (2017); Arellano et al. (2019).
7 There is also an active literature that studies firm expectations about aggregate variables, such as
inflation (see, for New Zealand, Kumar et al. 2015; Coibion et al. 2018b, and for Italy, Coibion et al.
2020) and GDP (see, for Japan, Tanaka et al. 2019).
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et al. (2017) and Altig et al. (2019) present results from a new business survey of top
managers in US businesses, administered by the Census at the annual frequency and
the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta at the monthly frequency. They also document
a V-shaped relationship between growth and uncertainty in the cross section. They
do not study time variation in subjective uncertainty, which is the main focus of our
paper. Another source of data is the panel of chief executives’ stock return expectations
assembled by John Graham and Campbell Harvey at Duke University. Ben-David
et al. (2013) show that managers are strongly miscalibrated in that their subjective
forecast densities are too narrow, thus questioning rational expectations as a modeling
assumption. Gennaioli et al. (2016) show that managers’ expectations are connected
to actual firms’ investment plans, thus showing that miscalibration has real effects.
Our results confirm the presence of systematic forecast errors by firms that experience
a lot of change. Moreover, the perception of uncertainty deviates from volatility for
successful firms.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains our new survey questions and
properties of the data. Section 3 introduces the raw relationship between uncertainty
and change and presents a simple organizing framework. Section 4 studies uncer-
tainty and change in the cross section, while Section 5 looks at time series variation
after controlling for fixed firm characteristics. Section 6 compares the dynamic prop-
erties of subjective uncertainty and statistical measures of uncertainty.
1.2 Data
The ifo Business Survey, run by the Munich-based ifo Institute, is a long-running sur-
vey of German businesses. Despite the occasional attrition, the ifo Institute maintains
a sample that is representative of the German manufacturing sector by replacing exit-
ing firms with new respondents (see Sauer and Wohlrabe 2020). The responses from
the survey provide input for a leading indicator of the German business cycle, the
ifo Business Climate Index. The latter is part of the EU-harmonized business surveys
commissioned by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the
European Commission.8
8 Aggregate survey results for Germany are presented at www.ifo.de/w/3fvxPxj2P, the har-
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In 2012, we designed an online module of quantitative questions to elicit subjective
firm uncertainty that were asked to all manufacturing firms in the main survey. An
initial pilot wave in December 2012 was met by strong interest. Analysis of text com-
ments submitted by firms further showed that firms had no trouble understanding
the questions. The module has now been in the field since 2013, with participation
remaining stable between 300 and 400 firms per wave.9
A firm in the survey is either a stand-alone firm or a division of a large conglomerate.
For simplicity, we refer to “firms” throughout this paper. The survey questions are
about growth in sales. The German term used in the questionnaire, “Umsatz”, is a
well-defined technical term in profit and loss accounting, translated into English as
“sales” or “total revenue.” It is commonly used as an accounting statistic at the levels
of both a division and an entire firm.
The survey is administered at the beginning of every quarter. Our current sample
uses 14 survey waves spanning 2013:Q2 through 2016:Q3. In addition, in fall 2018, the
roughly 400 firms from our baseline sample participated in a one-time meta survey
we fielded with questions on how firms collect information and arrive at the views ex-
pressed in our uncertainty module. 191 of these firms responded. Furthermore, Sauer
and Wohlrabe (2019) documents the identity of the respondents in the ifo Business
Survey. Finally, there was an additional meta survey administered by ifo in the fall
of 2019 and sent out to all the participants in the ifo main manufacturing survey. For
our purposes, this additional meta survey provides information on the regularity of
respondents in the survey.
The selection of participants in the uncertainty module is similar to that of the main
manufacturing survey (which is designed to be representative of the German man-
ufacturing sector). Indeed, Appendix 1.A shows that it is essentially impossible to
predict participation in the uncertainty module using information on firm size, sector,
and survey wave. In particular, our data contain a substantial number of large firms:
when we measure firm size by the number of employees, the 75th percentile is at about
250 employees. The median firm employs 100 workers while the 25th percentile is at
40.
9 The raw data can be found under IBS-IND (2016).
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1.2.1 Quality of Responses
In partnering with ifo, our goal was to develop a data set that reflects the assessment
of uncertainty by key decision makers in firms, and the use of quantitative analysis the
firm considers in their actual decision making. Our meta survey together with other
meta surveys provides evidence on the quality of the data along these dimensions.
Before turning to the results from our own meta survey, we note that Sauer and Wohlrabe
(2019) documents that, in the overwhelming majority of firms in the manufacturing
sector, 86%, the respondent is a member of top management: 73% of firms mention
the CEO, CFO or COO, whereas 13% of units surveyed refer to a “division head”, the
natural label for the top executive if the unit surveyed is not a stand-alone firm (see
Sauer and Wohlrabe 2019, Table 2). For very large firms with more than 500 employ-
ees, the share of responses from top management is only slightly lower than in the
population as a whole: a bit over 65% CEO, CFO or COO, and a bit over 15% the
division head (see Sauer and Wohlrabe 2019, Figure 1). These findings are consistent
with an earlier meta study conducted by ifo about the trade sector (see Abberger et al.,
2011). The additional meta survey commissioned by ifo in the fall 2019 further shows
that the identity of the responder within the firm changes rarely: 83% of firms indicate
the responder is “always the same person"”, 15% say “mostly the same person”, and
less than 2% mention a team of people or that the responder “changes frequently”.
Our meta survey from fall 2018 asks firms what type of information they use when
they fill out the questionnaire of our module. The questionnaire in the original Ger-
man is shown in Appendix 1.B. We first ask whether answers to our uncertainty ques-
tions are guided by numbers that the firm has already developed in house as part of a
regular quantitative planning process. The results are summarized in the top panel of
Table 1.1, both for all firms and broken down by size class. On average, 80% of firms
respond that they use results from its quantitative planning. The share is remarkably
stable across firms, only very small firms with less than 10 employees report a some-
what lower share.
We then add a follow-up question about alternative frameworks for quantitative plan-
ning under uncertainty.
If yes, how important were typically results from (i) a scenario analysis around a baseline
forecast (ii) statistical analysis (iii) other (please name).
For each of the options (i)-(iii), firms were asked to indicate importance on a four point
scale: not important, less important, important, very important. Firms which chose
option (iii) were able to fill in an alternative approach.
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One goal here was to learn about the use of statistical analysis. Moreover, we were
interested in the use of scenario analysis, that is, thinking about the future in terms of
a few concrete—often fairly detailed—scenarios without necessarily attaching proba-
bilities. A well-known example of scenario analysis is bank stress testing: banks are
asked to forecast losses given a detailed set of contingencies, but they are not asked
to assign probabilities to those contingencies. The literature suggests that scenario
analysis is common in German businesses.10
The middle panel of Table 1.1 summarizes how German manufacturing firms ap-
proach quantitative planning. Both scenario analysis and statistical analysis are pop-
ular: both methods are rated as at least important by more than half of the firms. We
again break down the answers by size. The share of firms that rates each method at
least important is increasing in size. Interestingly, large firms rely more heavily on sce-
nario analysis by a substantive margin of 20 percentage points. For firms that routinely
compute adverse and favorable scenarios as part of their planning process, filling out
the survey does not impose an additional forecasting task and is likely to generate
more thought-out answers.
The bottom panel of Table 1.1 speaks to what leaders in German manufacturing firms
think about the scenarios we ask them routinely in the main uncertainty module. We
gave them two options (plus a verbal other option): are these plausible scenarios that
may well occur, or are they scenarios that a possible but extraordinary. In technical
language, are these scenarios viewed as (close to) support bounds? The clear majority
of firms views scenarios as plausible scenarios rather than support bounds. At the
same time, the answers from the middle panel suggest that this is how firms actu-
ally think about there uncertain future. We thus view our approach of asking firms
about their subjective uncertainty through scenarios as both a flexible and adequate
elicitation method.
Finally, we find that conditional on using scenario analysis as “very important” or
“important”, a majority of firms (56%) values statistical analysis as “less important”
or “not important.” Conversely, conditional on valuing scenario analysis as “less im-
portant” or “not important,” 64% of firms are more keen on statistical analysis (“very
important” or “important”). This suggests a certain imperfect substitutability between
the two quantitative sales planning techniques. As for which firms tend to view sce-
narios as plausible a opposed to possible but extraordinary events, there does not seem
to be a difference between those firms which employ quantitative sales planning tech-
10 Mietzner (2009) provides an overview of the literature on strategic planning in German firms. In
many industries, the majority of firms engage in some sort of scenario analysis.
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Table 1.1: Meta Survey 2018 answers on quantitative planning
All obs. Tiny & Small Medium Large











































Notes: The numbers are from the fall 2018 meta survey on a sample of 191 firms. The top panel
presents the share of firms that report that their answers to our uncertainty questions are guided by
numbers that the firm has already developed in house as part of a regular quantitative planning pro-
cess. Column 1 reports the overall share, while columns 2 to 4 show the share by three size groups.
In line with the definition by the German Statistical Office, firms are “tiny” if the have less than 10
employees, “small” if the number of employees is between 10 and 50, “medium” if the number of
employees is between 50 and 250, and “large” if the number of employees exceeds 250. The middle
panel contains the results of two follow-up questions for firms that report engaging in regular scenario
planning. We present the shares of firms that consider scenario and statistical analysis, respectively,
as “very important” and “important” for their quantitative sales planning. The other answer options
were “less important” and “not important.” Column 2 to 4 shows the sum of the shares answering
with “very important” or “important” by size group. The bottom panel displays the results from a
question where we asked firms about how they think about the best and worst case scenarios when
answering them in our main survey; the options were plausible scenarios or possible but extraordi-
nary scenarios.
niques and those that do not. We find the same approximate independence for those
firms that view statistical analysis as “very important” or “important” versus those
that find them “less important” or “not important.” However, firms that find statistical
analysis as “very important” or “important” have a very high conditional probability
of viewing scenarios as plausible (80%), while those firms for which statistical analysis
is “less important” or “not important” this probability shrinks to 58%. This means, the
expert firms in scenario analysis are clearly not viewing them as support bounds.
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Figure 1.1: Original survey questionnaire in German
Notes: Original questionnaire from ifo’s online module on subjective uncertainty in German; screenshot
from April 2014.
1.2.2 Eliciting Subjective Uncertainty
The uncertainty module of the ifo Business Survey asks firms, at the beginning of a
quarter, a two-part question. Figure 1.1 displays the sample questionnaire for April
2014 in the original German. In English, the questionnaire reads:
The following questions refer to changes against the previous quarter.
1. By how much in percentage terms have your sales changed in the first quarter of 2014?
2. By how much in percentage terms will your sales change in the second quarter of 2014?
a. In the best possible case:
In the worst possible case:
b. Taking into account all contingencies and risks, I expect for the second quarter of
2014 all in all a change of :
The questionnaire form contains four boxes for respondents to provide their four nu-
merical answers. Next to every box, there is a reminder to provide positive or negative
integers. The default option is to skip the question by checking “don’t know” (“weiß
nicht” in German) behind the box, as shown in the empty form in the figure. Once
a respondent enters a number, the “don’t know”-option becomes unchecked. Finally,
underneath both questions 1 and 2, firms are invited to provide free text comments
(“Anmerkungen”).
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To clarify the timing, consider a firm responding in April 2014, that is, in the first two
and a half weeks of 2014:Q2. Question 1 asks for the change in sales between 2013:Q4
and 2014:Q1. This is the most recent sales growth realization that the firm has experi-
enced. Question 2 then asks for the firm’s outlook over the current quarter 2014:Q2, as
compared to the last quarter 2014:Q1. This is the next growth rate realization that the
firm expects.
Our quantitative measure of subjective uncertainty is the span between the best and
worst case scenarios for sales growth that firms provide in response to question 2.a.
A firm’s forecast error is the difference between its actual sales growth in the current
quarter and its expected growth rate at the beginning of that quarter, that is, its answer
to part 2.b. At the beginning of every quarter, firms cannot perfectly predict the flow of
sales over the entire quarter; the forecast errors thus captures the mistakes they make.
Sample construction
We describe the construction of our baseline sample, including all the data clean-
ing steps, in detail in Appendix 1.C. Briefly, in a first step, we focus on firms that
have at least five sensible firm-wave observations of the previous-quarter sales growth
rate (question 1). Text comments provided by firms are useful here both to assess
outliers and to drop firms unwilling or unable to provide quarterly forecasts. The
five-observations threshold allows us to compute meaningful time series means and
volatilities of sales growth rates for firms in this sample. We use both as important
firm-level control variables in our analyses.
Our baseline sample needs to have also consistent and realistic answers to the second
question in the survey about the sales growth scenarios and consists, in the end, of 400
firms and 2762 firm-wave observations from 14 quarters. We know each firm’s sector
at the two-digit manufacturing level and form 14 supersectors for which we have a
sufficiently large number of observations. Table 1.D.1 in Appendix 1.D presents the
distribution of firms across sectors.
Survey questions that ask about realized outcomes (such as production) explicitly ask
firms to ignore seasonal fluctuations. Consistent with this, we observe only negligible
seasonal effects in our data. Indeed, at the sectoral level, we can compare the sales
growth rates measured in our survey – and thus deseasonalized by the individual
firms – with a seasonally adjusted time series of manufacturing sales growth rates
measured by the Federal Statistical Office, Destatis, through an unrelated survey. The
time series correlation between the Destatis series and our series is 0.76. We thus treat
the variables below as seasonally adjusted at the individual firm level.
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1.2.3 Span as a Measure of Subjective Uncertainty
The premise behind our survey module is that when firms worry more about the
future, they contemplate positive and negative scenarios that are further apart, and
hence exhibit higher span. Movements in span can in principle reflect changes in ei-
ther beliefs or attitude towards uncertainty. On the one hand, a firm might worry
more about the future because it has less information and hence perceives a lot of
uncertainty. It might then modify its planning process to consider scenarios that are
further away from the baseline. Alternatively, the firm may worry more in the sense
that it becomes more cautious in its approach to planning under uncertainty. This
might lead it to alter scenarios even if beliefs are the same.
The metasurvey results provide further evidence on how firms choose the reported
scenarios. One question asks firms whether they view scenarios as "plausible" or "pos-
sible but exceptional". The third panel of Table 1.1 shows the results: an overwhelm-
ing majority of firms, 76%, respond "plausible", regardless of size class. In light of this
finding, we would expect that realized growth often falls outside the interval bounded
by the best and worst cases. This is indeed the case in our data. In a pooled sample of
firm-quarter observations, the share of instances where growth is outside the bounds
is 48% for firms that consider scenarios "plausible" and still 40% for those that consider
them "possible but exceptional". We conclude that firms generally like to think about
scenarios that are quite likely.11
The metasurvey also confirms that survey answers reflect both information and atti-
tude towards uncertainty to a significant extent. Indeed, we ask firms to rate, on a
four point scale, the importance of various determinants for their choice of scenarios.
The results are summarized in Table 1.2. They show that the most relevant factors
mentioned by firms are risk attitude, recent experience of own sales growth and news
about the future unrelated to past sales growth. In contrast, the typical firm does not
attribute an important role to sales growth more than two years in the past as well as
the observation of competitors. Again these results vary little across size classes.
These findings clarify that span is a measure of "worry" about future uncertainty that
guides firm planning, as opposed to, say, only a measure of perceived risk. Of course,
there are conditions under which worry and perceived risk are the same. To illustrate,
consider a firm with decision makers who think about risk and reward in terms of
mean and variance, and maximize a textbook objective that is linear in both moments,
11 This finding suggests that it is generally difficult to elicit support bounds and hence probability dis-
tributions in a survey when there are no prespecified bounds.
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Table 1.2: Meta Survey 2018 answers on determinants of scenarios
"Very important" or "Important"
Very
important Important Tiny & Small Medium Large
Sales changes last 1 to 2 years 0.21 0.37 0.58 0.71 0.40
Sales changes more than 2 years ago 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.06
Considerations independent of
past sales changes 0.41 0.49 0.85 0.93 0.91
Our risk attitude 0.19 0.57 0.78 0.86 0.60
Sales change we observe with
competitors 0.04 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.32
Notes: The numbers are from the fall 2018 meta survey on a sample of 191 firms. Respondents are
asked to assess the importance of several aspects for determining scenarios for sales growth in the best
and worst case. Columns 1 and 2 report the overall share, while columns 3 to 5 show the share by three
size groups. In line with the definition by the German Statistical Office, firms are “tiny” if the have less
than 10 employees, “small” if the number of employees is between 10 and 50, “medium” if the number
of employees is between 50 and 250, and “large” if the number of employees exceeds 250. We present
the shares of firms that consider the determinants, respectively, as “very important” and “important”
for the choice of scenarios. The other answer options were “less important” and “not important.”
Column 3 to 5 show the sum of the shares answering with “very important” or “important” by size
group.
with a fixed coefficient on variance capturing risk aversion. For such a firm, changes
in worry about the future that are relevant for actions come only from changes in
conditional variance. We would thus expect span to reflect the dispersion of the firm’s
subjective conditional distribution.
More generally, our focus on "worry" means that our measure reflects changes in per-
ceived risk only to the extent that they are actually relevant to the firm’s planning
process. For example, an increase in risk will have a smaller effect on firm planning if
the firm’s objective does not strongly respond to risk. We would thus expect a smaller
change in span. In fact, it is plausible to have two firms that face the same change in
risk, but see span move more for one of them because it plans more cautiously. Put
differently, span is best viewed as the outcome of a change in risk (or risk attitude): it
captures how the planning process of the firm changes.
How can span be used to quantify models of the firm? In economic models, "worry"
about uncertainty is usually captured by a certainty equivalent function. For exam-
ple, in a standard model of firm dynamics, we can use the value function of the firm
together with its conditional distribution of shocks to ask how much a firm would be
willing to pay to remove the uncertainty. The answer would generally depend not
only on the firm’s perceived risk, but also on the curvature of the objective function.
The latter might be driven by various features of the firm’s environment such as tech-
nology, managerial risk aversion, or financial frictions. Since planning for scenarios
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takes these features into account, we think of span as a proxy for worry that is mea-
sured using the certainty equivalent approach.
An additional advantage of our focus on "worry" as opposed to risk is that positive
and negative scenarios – and hence span – are meaningful numbers for a firm whether
or not it routinely reasons in terms of probabilities. As we have seen in Section 1.2.1,
more than half of firms consider statistical analysis as unimportant for answering our
survey. At the same time, 80% of firms routinely rely on some kind of quantitative
analysis, in particular scenario analysis. Our question is designed to make sense to
all firms and encourage them to use data from routine quantitative analysis. Firms
that develop probabilistic forecasts can provide quantiles from their subjective distri-
bution. Firms that only assess the effect of scenarios without assigning probabilities
can report what those scenarios are.12
1.2.4 Properties of Subjective Uncertainty
In this section, we present stylized facts on span and its relationship to volatility. De-
tailed tables of summary statistics for answers to the uncertainty module questions are
provided in Appendix 1.E.
Sales growth is hard to predict
Realized firm sales growth has a standard deviation close to 15 percentage points and
an interquartile (IQ) range from −5% to 10%. Relative to this variation, the distribu-
tion of forecasts is compressed, with an IQ range from zero to 5%. The variance of
forecasts is about half that of the realizations. Forecasts display little bias on average:
the average forecast is only slightly higher than the average realization. For an aver-
age firm, the standard deviation of forecast errors is 10.2pp, similar in magnitude to
volatility (standard deviation) of its sales growth of 11.4pp. Together, these moments
indicate that predicting sales growth is difficult: unpredictable variation is close to
total variation.
One might suspect that firms provide forecasts in a mechanical way by simply using
past growth or some constant baseline growth rate. In our data, both hypotheses are
false. Indeed, the difference between a firm’s forecast and its last realization of growth
12 The same connection to economic models applies for firms that do not think in terms of probabilities.
For example, firms might maximize an objective function that exhibits a concern for robustness or
aversion for Knightian uncertainty. It is still possible to compute a certainty equivalent and use data
on span to calibrate the model.
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has a standard deviation of 17.2 percentage points, larger than that of the forecast
itself. At the same time, the difference between a firm’s forecast and its firm level
mean growth rate has a standard deviation of 10.8 percentage points. The results show
that these simple models generate growth predictions that deviate substantially from
firms’ actual forecasts. We conclude that firms’ forecasts are nontrivial functions of
past growth.
Best and worst case scenarios and the magnitude of subjective uncertainty
Firms’ best and worst case scenarios bracket forecasts almost symmetrically. The av-
erage worst and best case bounds are −4.8% and 7.4%, respectively. The midpoint
between these bounds is 1.3% and hence less than one percentage point below the av-
erage forecast of 2.2%. Individual bounds have slightly higher standard deviations
and wider IQ ranges than forecasts. A key difference between the variables is that the
distribution of the lower (upper) bound is negatively (positively) skewed.
Our measure of subjective uncertainty is similar in magnitude to firm level uncondi-
tional volatility. Indeed, the mean span in the pooled sample is 12.1 percentage points,
while the cross sectional mean of firms’ time series standard deviation of growth rates
is 11.4%. Since growth is hard to predict, the span reported by the average firm is also
similar in magnitude to the typical absolute forecast error experienced by a firm, 9.4%
in the pooled sample.
Subjective uncertainty varies in cross section
To assess the variation of subjective uncertainty in the cross section, we compute the
average span for each firm. The cross sectional standard deviation of average span
is 7.4%. It is similar in magnitude to the cross sectional standard deviation of the
average absolute forecast error of 9.5%. Firms thus differ substantially in both the
size of the typical shock they experience and in the way their planning deals with
perceived uncertainty.
Subjective uncertainty varies in time series at firm level
Our data also show substantial time variation in subjective uncertainty at the firm
level. The sample standard deviation of span for the average firm in Figure 1.E.2 is 5.9
percentage points and hence more than half of the standard deviation of span in the
pooled sample. Time series variation in subjective uncertainty is also large compared
to other changes in firms’ beliefs. For example, the cross sectional mean of firms’ time
series standard deviation of forecasts is 7.2 percentage points and numbers for best and
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Notes: The figure illustrates how, on average, changes in the best and worst case scenarios generate
increases and decreases of subjective uncertainty (span). The plot shows the pooled averages of span as
well as the pooled averages of the best and worst case sales growth rates, which are denoted by b and
w, respectively. b∗ and w∗ are the best and worst case scenarios after the average changes of span.
worst scenarios are only slightly higher. A firm’s span usually changes together with
its forecast: only 13% of changes in span are not accompanied by a forecast revision.
What do changes in uncertainty look like? On average, they consist of moves in both
the best and worst case scenarios. In particular, for all instances where a firm increases
its span from one quarter to the next, the mean change in the worst case scenario is
−4.7% whereas the mean change in the best case scenario is +2.6%, see Figure 1.2. In
other words, the average increase in uncertainty thus consists of an outward expan-
sion of span that is slightly asymmetric. The average decrease in span is a symmetric
downward compression: conditional on a decrease in span, the worst case increases
by 3.8% and the best case decreases by 3.4%.
The variation of subjective uncertainty in both time series and cross section is over-
whelmingly firm-specific. Indeed, the R-squared of a regression of span on time fixed
effects is 0.006, on time and industry fixed effects 0.030, and on time-industry fixed
effects it is merely 0.084.13 This fact does not imply that we cannot uncover patterns
in the variation of span, as we will see below. It simply means that the cross sectional
13 The variation in firms’ forecast errors and absolute forecast errors is also overwhelmingly firm-
specific. For absolute forecast errors, a regression on time fixed effects yields a R-squared of 0.014, a
regression on time and industry effects a R-squared of 0.033, and a regression on time-industry fixed
effects a R-squared of 0.12.
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patterns are not driven by the industry, but rather by differences in firm perceptions
within industries. Similarly, the time series patterns are driven by individual firm
experiences as opposed to, say, the state of the business cycle.
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Sales growth rate in the previous quarter
Data Non-parametric reg.
Predicted by past sales growth
Notes: Every dot represents a firm-time observation. The solid line is the prediction from a non-
parametric kernel regression. The dashed line depicts the predicted values from a piecewise linear
regression of subjective uncertainty on past sales growth, with a break at zero. The thin vertical lines
mark the interdecile range that extends from −15% to 15%, see Tab. 1.E.1.
1.3 Uncertainty and Change
How does firm’s subjective uncertainty relate to their experience? In this section, we
first present a key stylized fact on subjective uncertainty and change. We then lay out
a simple organizing framework that guides our subsequent analysis.
1.3.1 Uncertainty and Past Growth: An Asymmetric V
Figure 1.3 displays a scatter plot of responses, with span at the beginning of quarter
t along the vertical axis and sales growth realized between quarters t − 2 and t − 1
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along the horizontal axis. The vertical gray lines indicate the interdecile range which
reaches from −15% to +15% as reported in Table 1.E.1.
Firms that have experienced larger changes are more uncertain. In particular, the re-
lationship between subjective uncertainty and past sales growth looks like the letter
V with a minimum at zero. This is illustrated in the figure by two lines. The solid
line is a nonparametric regression line.14 The dashed line is from a simple piecewise
linear regression with a breakpoint at zero.15 The two lines are very similar, and they
virtually coincide in the relevant range where most observations are located.
Firms perceive higher uncertainty after negative change than after positive change.
Indeed, the slope of the left hand branch of the letter V is about twice as large in
absolute value as the slope of the right hand branch. After a one percentage point
lower negative sales growth, next quarter’s span is half a percentage point wider. In
contrast, after one percentage point higher positive sales growth, span is wider by
slightly more then one quarter of a percentage point wider. The regression coefficients
are reported in column (2) of Table 1.5, discussed further below.
The V-shaped regression line relates uncertainty to change; it stands in contrast to the
simple linear relationship between uncertainty and growth often emphasized in the
literature. At the same time, asymmetry implies that uncertainty and growth are in
fact negatively correlated. Indeed, a linear regression returns a small but significantly
negative coefficient of -.06, shown below in column (1) of Table 1.5. However, ignoring
the V-shape drastically lowers explanatory power of past sales growth rate from 19%
for a piecewise linear regression to 1% for the simple linear regression.
1.3.2 Uncertainty and Change: An Organizing Framework
Our organizing framework relates a firm’s subjective uncertainty to the distribution
of growth measured by an econometrician. We use it in later sections to guide our
detailed discussion of uncertainty and change in both the cross section and the time
series. For simplicity, we assume that firms have probabilistic beliefs. As will become
14 We use a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression with a plugin estimator of the asymptotically
optimal constant bandwidth as described in Fan and Gijbels (1996). We report the results of a poly-
nomial of degree zero and Epanechnikov kernel. However, the shape of the regression line is robust
– except at the outer margins – to choosing a higher order polynomial or different kernels.
15 We have compared the in-sample fit of a piecewise linear regression model with breakpoint at zero
with a simple quadratic model. Both Akaike and Bayesian information criterion favor the piecewise
linear model.
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clear, this feature is not essential for the points we make here, but it allows us to express
those points in simple familiar notation.
Let git+1 denote firm i’s sales growth from quarter t to quarter t + 1, that is, the growth
rate that firm i forms beliefs about when it answers our survey questions at the begin-
ning of quarter t + 1. Firm i’s information set at that point in time includes git, the last
observed growth rate from quarter t − 1 to t. It may also include other signals that
represent news in quarter t, which we collect in a vector zit. We then use the vector s
i
t
to represent all information from past growth rates or other signals that is relevant for
forecasting the future dynamics of growth.






















where xi is a vector of fixed firm characteristics and εit is an error that has mean zero
and variance one under the firms’ subjective belief. The observation equation allows
firm i’s forecast f (sit, x
i) to depend on the state as well as its fixed characteristics. The




When firm i answers our survey questions at the beginning of quarter t + 1, it pro-
vides its forecast f (sit, x
i) as well as best and worst case scenarios. We also observe the
subsequent realization git+1 and hence the firm’s subjective forecast error. We further
identify span, the difference between firm i’s best and worst case scenarios, with firm
i’s subjective conditional volatility σ(sit, x
i). This connection is exact if firm i reports
quantiles as scenarios and appropriate distributional assumptions are in place. More
generally, we expect firm i’s answer to the survey question to reflect some measure of
dispersion in its forecast error, so σ serves as a concrete stand-in.
Examples
The state space system (1.1)-(1.2) nests many models used to describe firms’ subjective
uncertainty in economic models. As a simple example, consider the case of iid growth
together with an orthogonal uncertainty shock:
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Here the only relevant state is stochastic volatility σit . Rational expectations models
with uncertainty shocks often assume that σit is correlated across firms and high in re-
cessions, which helps generate observed dispersion in firm growth rates in bad times.
The system (1.1)-(1.2) also nests many popular learning rules. Examples include Bayesian
models where firms track some latent state such as a regime, or constant gains learning
where firms recursively estimate parameters of the one step ahead predictive distribu-
tion while downweighting past observations. The common denominator of all these
setups is that the state vector contains statistics of the empirical distribution that are
relevant for predicting the future dynamics of growth. A natural property in many
settings is that high growth git increases the forecast f and that a large absolute value
of the forecast error increases subjective uncertainty σ.
Comparing beliefs and the true data generating process
We would like to distinguish firms’ subjective uncertainty from actual volatility, as re-
flected in the size of innovations measured by an econometrician. We thus consider
a change of measure from the firm’s belief to the “econometrician’s belief”, that is,
the probability measure that characterizes the true data generating process. We as-


























where again the error has mean zero and variance one, now under the econometri-
cian’s belief.
The new observation equation allows for two key differences between firms’ belief and
the true data generating process. First, firms might have biased forecasts, represented
by the function b. Second, the size of the typical innovation σ̂ might be different from
firms’ subjective uncertainty captured by σ. Both differences may vary either in the
cross section with firms’ fixed characteristics xi or over time with the information set
captured by sit. In the special case of rational expectations, there is no bias (b = 0) and
subjective uncertainty mirrors actual volatility, that is, σ = σ̂.
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1.4 Uncertainty and Change in the Cross Section
In this section, we ask what type of firms perceive more subjective uncertainty on av-
erage. We thus compute, for each firm, its average span, that is, the time series mean
of all observations of span for the firm. We then regress average span on a number of
firm level characteristics. In terms of the framework of Section 1.3.2, we thus charac-
terize the dependence of subjective uncertainty σ on fixed characteristics xi, assuming
that time averaging removes the effects of information sit.
1.4.1 Change in Firms’ Environment
We define two variables that measure the medium term dynamics in a firm’s environ-
ment, based on its realized sales growth rates (that is, answers to part 1). We refer to a
firm’s sample average sales growth as its trend.16 Moreover, the turbulence experienced
by a firm is measured by the sample standard deviation of its sales growth rates. We
emphasize that turbulence differs from span for two reasons: First, it is purely statisti-
cal as it is based on realized growth rates. Second, it is an unconditional average over
three years, whereas span measures conditional uncertainty one quarter ahead.
To tractably account for nonlinear effects of firm characteristics on average span, we
code the firm characteristics as dummies. In particular, we use our turbulence dum-
mies that indicate quartiles of the distribution of firm level standard deviations in
Table 1.E.2, with the lowest quartile as the baseline. We proceed similarly for trend,
However, since the middle two quartiles for trend turn out to be very similar, we in-
troduce dummies only for a low trend (bottom 25%) as well as a high trend (top 25%),
treating the middle group as the baseline.
Finally, we divide firms into four size categories, with size measured as average em-
ployment over our sample. Here we follow the German Statistical Office in their defi-
nition of tiny, small, medium sized, and large firms; lower bounds for the latter three
16 We verify with the help of the general ifo Business Survey that growing firms tended to have good
business situations for several years before the start of our sample in 2013:Q2; and analogously for
shrinking firms and bad business situations. Specifically, we compute the firms’ average subjective
state of business assessments, elicited on a scale between 0 and 100, from January 2010 to July 2016
(monthly frequency). 52% of the firms on a good sales growth trend were, on average since 2010, also
in the best quartile of the state of business distribution across firms. Of the firms with a normal sales
growth trend, 55% were in the second or third quartile of the state of business distribution across
firms, and of the firms in the lowest quartile, 39% were also in the lowest quartile of the state of
business distribution across firms.
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groups are at 10, 50, and 250 employees, respectively. We work with three dummies,
with tiny firms as the baseline.
Figure 1.4 provides a scatter plot of trend and turbulence, defined above as the firm
level mean and standard deviation of sales growth, respectively. Every dot represents
a firm, and the color of the dot indicates firm size, as measured by the number of
employees. Size increases from light blue to pink according to the color bar provided
on the right hand side of the figure.
The main takeaway from Figure 1.4 is that while trend and turbulence vary substan-
tially – as Table 1.E.2 also shows –, they are not particularly correlated. Firms that
grow or shrink along strong trends need not typically experience large shocks and
vice versa. Moreover, the correlation of either environment variable with size is also
quite weak. While the very largest firms (identified by bright pink dots) do tend to
cluster at the bottom center where trend is small and turbulence is low, we observe
firms of all sizes spread out over the plane.
Figure 1.4: Trend and turbulence
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Notes: Every dot represents a firm identified by its trend (firm level mean sales growth) and turbulence
(standard deviation of mean sales growth). Color indicates number of employees according to color bar
on right hand side.
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1.4.2 Subjective Uncertainty, Size, Trend, and Turbulence
Table 1.3 presents regression results. The first three columns ask how much can be ex-
plained by each fixed characteristic – size, trend and turbulence – separately. All three
characteristics show a statistically and economically strong association with span. Col-
umn (1) says that larger firms perceive less uncertainty. Average span in the entire
population of firms is about 12 percentage points, and it falls monotonically from 18
percentage points for very small firms (the omitted category) to 10 percentage points
for large firms.
Columns (2) and (3) show that cross sectional variation in trend and turbulence – each
by itself – is enough to induce a V-shaped relationship between growth and uncer-
tainty, as observed in the pooled scatter plot. On the one hand, trend and span are
directly related by an asymmetric V: quickly shrinking or growing firms report higher
average spans than firms with normal growth, by 2 and 6 percentage points, respec-
tively. On the other hand, more turbulent firms also report monotonically higher
spans. Since more turbulent firms’ growth rate realizations fall more into the tails,
this effect also generates a V pattern.
Each of the three firm characteristics has independent effects on the average subjec-
tive uncertainty of firms. This is established in column (4) where we consider all three
in the same regression. The positive turbulence gradient is qualitatively and quanti-
tatively unchanged compared to the results in column (3). For trend, the interaction
with other characteristics is more subtle. In particular, once size and turbulence are
controlled for, growing firms no longer perceive higher uncertainty. At the same time,
the negative branch of the V remains large and statistically significant.
While trend and turbulence are correlated with size, controlling for them does not re-
move an independent role for size in explaining subjective uncertainty. Indeed, com-
paring columns (1) and (4), the negative size gradient is quantitatively reduced, but
remains in place qualitatively. Column (5) further shows that our three firm character-
istics are not simply reflective of industry characteristics: including industry dummies
neither changes significantly the R-squared of compared to column (4) nor the coeffi-
cient estimates.
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It is also interesting to consider firm age as a cross-sectional determinant of average
subjective uncertainty. While there is no age variable available in ifo’s Business Ten-
dency Survey, in September 2018 a special survey question asked firms for their found-
ing year. 274 of the firms in our baseline sample responded to this question. For those,
we can construct an age variable. To account for non-linear effects, we construct quar-
tile dummies for firm age. We regress the average span on these age dummies and
additionally include size, trend, and turbulence dummies. None of the coefficients
on the age dummies in this regression is statistically significant to the 10%-level. We
conclude that firm age cannot explain a firms’ average subjective uncertainty.
1.4.3 Subjective Uncertainty, Volatility, and Bias in the Cross Section
How does firms’ perceived uncertainty relate to the size of the fluctuations they ex-
perience? Column (6) of Table 1.3 reports a regression of firms’ average volatility on
fixed characteristics. Since span reflects perceived uncertainty conditional on informa-
tion at the beginning of the quarter, column (7) adds an analogous regression for the
average absolute value of the firm’s subjective forecast error, a measure of the size of
innovations experienced by the firm. The results in the two columns are quite similar.
Along all three cross sectional dimensions we consider, subjective uncertainty is sig-
nificantly different from the size of shocks experienced by the typical firm. First, for
both volatility and the absolute forecast error, there is no independent effect of size
once we control for trend and turbulence. It is true that unconditionally larger firms
experience smaller shocks. However, this relationship is entirely explained by their
trend and turbulence. We conclude that the additional effect of size on span is a sub-
jective phenomenon: large firms’ perceive lower uncertainty even if they face the same
size of shocks as smaller firms.
A second special feature of subjective uncertainty is its asymmetric dependence on
trend. While it is true that growing and shrinking firms also experience larger shocks,
this effect is symmetric. For the same shocks, shrinking firms thus perceive higher
subjective uncertainty. A final property concerns the turbulence gradient. While more
turbulent firms – who experience larger shocks by construction – also perceive higher
uncertainty, they are relatively much less uncertain than low turbulence firms.
As discussed in Section 1.3.2, forecast errors experienced by firms may in part reflect
systematic bias in firms’ forecasts. Column (7) of Table 1.3 shows a regression of the
mean forecast error on characteristics. For the size and turbulence categories, the co-
efficients on the dummies are not statistically significant. Consistent with this result,
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group means (not reported) are zero if firms are sorted into size or turbulence cate-
gories.
At the same time, there is strong evidence that firms on trends make biased forecasts.
In particular, growing firms make large positive forecast errors, defined above as re-
alized growth less forecast. In other words, growing firms are regularly positively
surprised; their forecasts are biased towards zero. Analogously, shrinking firms make
large negative forecast errors: again the forecast is biased towards zero – firms do not
sufficiently anticipate the trend they are on.
Table 1.4: Volatility of subjective uncertainty by firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: std. span std. span std. span std. span
Dummy small firms -3.053∗∗ -2.084∗
(1.485) (1.254)
Dummy medium sized firms -4.252∗∗∗ -2.655∗∗
(1.470) (1.292)
Dummy large firms -5.094∗∗∗ -2.798∗∗
(1.481) (1.294)
Dummy ’bad’ sales growth trend 3.603∗∗∗ 2.164∗∗∗
(0.802) (0.684)
Dummy ’good’ sales growth trend 1.672∗∗∗ 0.771∗
(0.475) (0.450)
Dummy medium low turbulence 1.254∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗
(0.384) (0.387)
Dummy medium high turbulence 2.907∗∗∗ 2.369∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.353)
Dummy high turbulence 6.364∗∗∗ 5.463∗∗∗
(0.797) (0.717)
Constant 9.767∗∗∗ 4.543∗∗∗ 3.237∗∗∗ 5.337∗∗∗
(1.415) (0.208) (0.184) (1.251)
No. of observations 397 397 397 397
No. of firms 397 397 397 397
No. of parameters (excl. intercept) 3 2 3 8
R-squared 0.052 0.086 0.22 0.27
Notes: Results from pooled OLS regressions. std. span denotes the time-series standard deviation of
firm-level span. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Size dummies are defined based on the firm-level average number of employees.
1.4.4 Heteroscedasticity and Firm Charateristics
In the previous section, we have shown that there is substantial heteroscedasticity in
firms’ subjective uncertainty along observable firm characteristics: size, trend growth,
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and turbulence, the latter two being measures of the intensity of change in the firm’s
environment. We have also shown that heteroscedasticity in firms’ subjective uncer-
tainty is substantially different from that in conditional and unconditional volatility.
In this section, we argue that subjective heteroscedasticity itself is related to firms’
characteristics in very similar ways as subjective uncertainty.
For example, column (1) of Table 1.4 shows that smaller firms are more different in
their subjective uncertainty. Column (2) finds that firms on a substantial positive or
negative trend have higher dispersion in average subjective uncertainty; and column
(3) shows a positive correlation between sample volatility and dispersion in subjective
uncertainty: firms in the most volatile environments are also the most different in
terms of their average perceived uncertainty. These results show that the structure
of uncertainty in the cross section of firms is at least somewhat predictable but also
complex, which requires a substantial amount of heterogeneity to be modeled in any
nonlinear model environment.
1.5 Uncertainty and Change Over Time
We have seen in the previous section that the V-shaped relationship between growth
and uncertainty in Figure 1.3 in part reflects fixed differences between firms. We now
turn to time series variation: we ask how much of a V remains once we control for
fixed characteristics. In terms of the organizing framework of Section 1.3.2, we ask
whether variation of span σ with firms’ information sit also contributes to the V-shape,
via the correlation of sit with past growth.
Formally, let ∆yi,t−1 denote firm i’s sales growth rate between quarters t− 2 and t− 1.
All our specifications take the form
spanit = β−∆y−i,t−1 + β
+∆y+i,t−1 + γ
′xi + εit,
where ∆y−i,t−1 = ∆yi,t−1 I(∆yi,t−1<0), ∆y
+
i,t−1 = ∆yi,t−1 I(∆yi,t−1 ≥ 0), I(·) is the indi-
cator function, and xi is a vector of fixed firm characteristics that do not depend on
time.
We include the three characteristics studied in the previous section: trend, turbulence
and size. Trend and turbulence are again coded as dummies. As the unit of obser-
vation is now a firm quarter pair, we measure the size of the firm as the number of
employees at the end of the previous calendar year. We then form three size dum-
mies: small firms have 10-50 employees, medium sized firms 51-250 employees and
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large firms more than 250 employees. The baseline “tiny” firm has fewer than 10 em-
ployees. While size therefore does vary over time, change is so slow such that the
size dummies are essentially time-invariant. We observe only 56 jumps from one size
category to another in our sample.
1.5.1 Time Variation in Subjective Uncertainty and Growth
Table 1.5 reports regression results. As a benchmark, we start in columns (1) and
(2) with a simple linear regression and a piecewise linear regression with a break at
zero, respectively. The two columns provide formal counterparts to the scatter plot
Figure 1.3. The next four columns augment the piecewise linear specification with
dummies for fixed characteristics, first adding size, trend and turbulence separately,
and then in column (6) adding all characteristics together.
The main result from Table 1.5 is that a strongly significant asymmetric V remains
even if we control for fixed characteristics. Indeed, the coefficients on both negative
and positive past sales growth are statistically significant in all specifications.17 Col-
umn (6) says that, holding fixed all characteristics, after one percent lower negative
sales growth, next quarter’s span is 30 basis points wider. Similarly, a one percent
higher positive sales growth is followed by a 18 bp wider span. To put these numbers
in perspective, note that the volatility of sales growth for the average firm is about
11 percentage points, whereas the volatility of span for the average firm is about 6.
Responses to past growth thus account for a considerable part of time variation in
subjective uncertainty.
The impact of firm characteristics is also significant. First, introducing firm character-
istics dummies improves the fit of the regression: for example, the R-squared improves
from 0.19 in column (2) to 0.29 in column (6). Coefficients on the dummies reproduce
the cross sectional effects discussed in the previous section. For example, firms with
more than 250 employees are more than 6 percentage points less uncertain on average
than very small firms. Firms that experience more than median turbulence are at least
4.5 percentage points more uncertain than those with low turbulence. The impact of
trend is asymmetric: firms on a bad trend are more than 2 percentage points more
uncertain than those on a normal trend, whereas a good trend has no significant effect
on span.
17 Appendix 1.G shows that this result is robust to re-estimating the regression using two alternative
sample definitions.
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CHAPTER 1. UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGE
It is natural to conjecture that fixed characteristics other than size, trend and turbulence
matter for subjective uncertainty. We thus rerun the regression in column (7) with
firm fixed effects. As expected, we find a large increase in R2. Remarkably, however,
there is virtually no change in the coefficients on past growth. We can thus conclude
that size, trend and turbulence dummies exhaustively control for the impact of firm
characteristics on the uncertainty-growth relationship.
In column (8), we include time-sector dummies. This neither alters our coefficient esti-
mates nor markedly improves the fit of the regression. This finding is consistent with
the fact that variation in subjective uncertainty is largely firm-specific. We conclude
that our results are neither driven by industry-composition effects, industry-specific
or aggregate trends and cycles.
1.5.2 Comparing Cross Section and Time Series Variation in Subjec-
tive Uncertainty
The coefficients on positive and negative growth in column (6) in Table 1.5 effectively
isolate large and asymmetric time series responses of firms to past growth. Perhaps
interestingly, the asymmetric V-shaped response induced by time series responses is
rather similar to that induced purely by cross sectional heterogeneity. To see this,
consider Figure 1.5, where we show the fitted line from before and several regression
lines to compare the two forces.
As a benchmark, the solid blue line is the nonparametric regression line fit to the data,
and the dotted red line is the fitted line from the regression model in column (2) of
Table 1.5, both already shown in Figure 1.3. The dashed yellow and the dash-dotted
green lines are fit not to the data, but to clouds of predicted values from two parametric
regressions.18 In particular, the dashed yellow line is fit through the predicted values
from the regression model in column (6) of Table 1.5. The dash-dotted green line is
fit through the predicted values from a model with only the three classes of dummies,
thus reflecting only cross sectional variation.
The main takeaway from Figure 1.5 is that all lines lie effectively on top of each other,
especially within the interdecile range. In other words, time series and cross sectional
variation induces the same V-shape, albeit through very different mechanisms. For the
18 The collection of precise values comprise a cloud rather than, say, a line because growth is not the
only regressor; there are also fixed firm characteristics. For example, for two firms that experienced
the same sales growth rate in the previous quarter, the model in column (6) of Table 1.5 will predict
different spans depending on the firms’ size, trend, and turbulence.
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time series response, the V follows directly from the difference in coefficients on posi-
tive and negative growth. For the cross section, the effect is more subtle and comes
from the comovement of span and volatility documented in Table 1.3: firms with
higher span also see higher absolute values of their growth rates (due to differences in
size, trend or turbulence).19





















-100 -50 -15 0 15 50 100
Sales growth rate in the previous quarter
Data Predicted, model (6)
Predicted, model (2) Predicted, model with dummies
Notes: Besides a linear fitted line with break at zero that corresponds to column (2) of Table 1.5 (dotted
red line), the chart presents three non-parametric regression lines. Respectively, the nonparametric
regression lines are based on the full sample (solid blue line), the cloud of predicted values of column
(6) of Table 1.5 (dashed yellow line), and the cloud of predicted values from a model with size, trend,
turbulence, and time-sector dummies as regressors (dash-dotted green line). The thin vertical lines
mark the interdecile range that extends from −15% to 15%, see Table 1.E.1.
1.5.3 Subjective Uncertainty and Volatility in the Time Series
Section 1.4.4 showed that subjective uncertainty and volatility vary differently in the
cross section of firms. How do subjective and statistical uncertainty compare in the
19 In Appendix 1.F we also show that the V-shaped relationship between sales growth and subjective
uncertainty holds separately, and in a quantitatively similar manner, for all firm-level subgroups: the
four firm size groups, the four turbulence groups, and the three growth trend groups.
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within-firm time series dimension? Table 1.6 compares our baseline regression of span
on past growth and fixed characteristics – column (1) here reproduces column (6) of
Table 1.5 – to an analogous regression for the absolute value of the firm’s subjective
forecast error, shown in column (2).
Table 1.6: Relation of subjective uncertainty and the absolute forecast error to past
sales growth, firm characteristics, and additional controls








Negative sales growth rate in quarter t− 1 -0.306∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
(0.0675) (0.0689) (0.0780) (0.0689) (0.0861) (0.0777)
Positive sales growth rate in quarter t− 1 0.180∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0529) (0.0323) (0.0506) (0.0351) (0.0483)
Dummy small firms -3.959∗ -0.632 -3.746∗∗ 0.396 -3.043 -0.631
(2.178) (1.545) (1.843) (1.511) (2.062) (1.626)
Dummy medium sized firms -5.452∗∗ -1.672 -5.821∗∗∗ -0.983 -5.788∗∗∗ -1.303
(2.141) (1.460) (1.942) (1.403) (2.171) (1.513)
Dummy large firms -6.295∗∗∗ -1.810 -6.619∗∗∗ -1.298 -6.428∗∗∗ -1.505
(2.170) (1.598) (1.956) (1.558) (2.171) (1.779)
Dummy ’bad’ sales growth trend 2.248∗∗∗ 1.340∗ 1.688∗∗ 0.589 0.891 0.731
(0.856) (0.811) (0.854) (0.942) (0.911) (0.923)
Dummy ’good’ sales growth trend -0.434 1.417∗ -0.440 1.722∗ -1.284 1.329
(0.645) (0.826) (0.680) (0.957) (0.817) (0.942)
Dummy medium low turbulence 1.388∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗ 1.458∗∗ 1.837∗∗∗ 0.427 1.811∗∗∗
(0.591) (0.356) (0.663) (0.491) (0.729) (0.501)
Dummy medium high turbulence 4.560∗∗∗ 4.160∗∗∗ 4.490∗∗∗ 4.069∗∗∗ 3.722∗∗∗ 3.694∗∗∗
(0.764) (0.472) (0.765) (0.505) (0.917) (0.616)
Dummy high turbulence 6.748∗∗∗ 9.161∗∗∗ 5.835∗∗∗ 8.236∗∗∗ 4.098∗∗∗ 7.429∗∗∗
(0.969) (0.953) (0.974) (0.994) (1.124) (1.038)
Expected sales growth rate for quarter t 0.0769∗∗ 0.0125 0.0849∗∗ 0.0276
(0.0323) (0.0517) (0.0387) (0.0480)
State of business (VAS) at the time of the survey -0.0591∗∗∗ 0.00362 -0.0428∗∗ 0.00865
(0.0185) (0.0254) (0.0215) (0.0266)
Capacity utilization rate 0.00716 0.0122 -0.0190 0.0189
(0.0265) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0256)
Absolute forecast error in quarter t 0.0574
(0.0556)
Span for quarter t 0.0764
(0.0756)
Constant 11.37∗∗∗ 3.782∗∗ 8.832 2.444 9.372∗∗ 5.066∗
(2.154) (1.484) (7.002) (5.952) (4.097) (2.917)
Other firm controls YES YES YES YES
Time-sector dummies YES YES YES YES
No. of observations 2762 1664 2561 1570 1533 1533
No. of firms 400 389 378 368 360 360
No. of parameters (excl. intercept) 10 10 218 203 205 204
R-squared 0.29 0.25 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.37
Notes: Results from pooled OLS regressions. span is our measure of subjective uncertainty and firms’
abs(FE) denotes firms’ absolute forecast error. The expected sales growth rate for quarter t is the answer
to question 2.b of the survey (see Section 1.2.2). Other firm controls include the capacity utilization rate
and dummies for the state of business, orders, stock of inventory, production changes, demand changes,
order changes, price changes, credit appraisal, capacity utilization, and constraints to production. See
Appendix 1.H for a detailed description. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Controlling for fixed characteristics, a firm that observes one percent worse negative
growth in the previous quarter not only increases its span by 31 basis points, but also
experiences, on average, a subjective forecast error that is 34 basis points higher in
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absolute value. In contrast, one percent higher positive growth increases span by 18 bp
and the absolute value of the forecast error by 12 bp. The asymmetric V that emerges in
the time series of firms’ uncertainty is thus also present in firms’ experience of shocks.
The differences between subjective uncertainty and volatility observed in the cross sec-
tion appear to be largely orthogonal to the time series dynamics of span and growth.
Indeed, the regression coefficients in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.6 display the same
patterns as columns (4) and (6) of Table 1.3: large firms and very turbulent firms are
less uncertain than one might expect given the size of the shocks they face, and the
asymmetric relationship between trend growth and uncertainty is a subjective phe-
nomenon.
1.5.4 Controlling for Firm Actions and Expectations
What mechanism is behind the within-firm time series relationship between uncer-
tainty and growth? One possible explanation is that uncertainty shocks are reflected
in firm actions and hence growth. In particular, it may be that we can simply extend
recent models of uncertainty-driven recessions to firm dynamics. The key feature of
such models is that the stochastic process driving uncertainty is orthogonal to innova-
tions to growth conditional on uncertainty, as in example (1.3)-(1.4) above.
An alternative interpretation of the data invokes learning or signal extraction on the
part of firms, another special case of our general model (1.1)-(1.2). Suppose firms
view growth itself as a signal of future business conditions. Many models of belief
updating imply that a more unusual realization should increase uncertainty. For a
concrete example, consider a regime switching model: the state of business follows a
finite state Markov chain, and growth is given by a regime-dependent mean plus iid
noise. A more unusual growth rate observation will typically lead the firm to perceive
more uncertainty about its current estimate of the regime.
The key difference between the two candidate mechanism is the role of firm actions
for growth. Under the uncertainty shock story, growth responds to persistent changes
in uncertainty. Comovement between current uncertainty and past growth is thus
induced by firms’ past responses to uncertainty. In (1.3)-(1.4), there is no additional
signal value to growth conditional on volatility last period. Under a learning story, in
contrast, there may be no effect of current uncertainty on past firm actions.
The different role of firm actions for the two stories suggests a simple check: if the
relationship between growth and uncertainty is induced by firms’ actions, then con-
trolling for firm actions in our regressions should alter the coefficients we find on past
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growth. We perform the check in column (3) of Table 1.6: here we augment the baseline
regression in column with (1) with both time sector dummies as well as an additional
set of controls that vary over time at the firm level.
The new controls are firms’ expectations about their future sales growth, their assess-
ment of the state of their business and their capacity utilization, as well as categorical
variables that report orders, the stock of inventory, demand, production, prices, and
credit conditions. The difference between these additional controls and the firm char-
acteristics already included above is that the former vary at high frequency at the firm
level. In particular, they capture actions the firm could have taken at the beginning or
during the course of the quarter such as scale down production or increasing prices.20
The main result from column (3) is that the coefficients on growth are virtually un-
changed, as predicted by a learning model. This is not because the new variables are
uncorrelated with subjective uncertainty: on the contrary, the R-squared improves by 8
percentage points between columns (1) and (3). About half of this improvement comes
from the inclusion of time varying firm level controls – this follows from a comparison
with column (8) of Table 1.5. Nevertheless, the impact of the new controls appears
to be orthogonal to the role of past growth in predicting subjective uncertainty. We
conclude that the timing of growth, uncertainty and firm actions favors a learning
interpretation of our time series facts, and provides little support for an uncertainty
shock mechanism.
1.6 The Dynamics of Subjective Uncertainty
In this section, we further explore the dynamics of subjective uncertainty. Our ap-
proach is motivated by two properties of many common learning rules: we would
expect higher forecast errors to increase uncertainty, and changes in uncertainty to
propagate over time. In principle, these properties alone could induce a V-shaped re-
lationship between uncertainty and growth. In Section 1.6.1 we therefore ask whether
controlling for lagged forecast errors as well as lagged uncertainty affects the relation-
ship between growth and uncertainty. The answer will help guide the choice among
alternative models of belief updating. In Section 1.6.2 we check whether replacing
forecast errors with an alternative measure of sales growth surprise changes our con-
clusions.
20 Appendix 1.H provides a detailed list of the additional firm-level controls and their timing relative
to quarter t, when span was uttered.
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1.6.1 What Moves Subjective Uncertainty?
Table 1.7 digs more deeply into firms’ time series response to growth. For the subsam-
ple of responses for which we observe a forecast for the previous quarter, we can de-
compose growth into forecast plus forecast error. We can therefore distinguish firms’
responses to unanticipated change – as captured by their forecast error – and antici-
pated change already captured by their forecast. Formally, we proceed by including
the forecast error of the previous quarter as an additional regressor.
Column (1) replicates column (6) of Table 1.5, our baseline result, now on the some-
what smaller sample for which we observe firm forecast errors: the V-shape of sub-
jective uncertainty in previous-quarter sales growth is again present. Then, in column
(2), we replace sales growth with previous-quarter forecast errors in sales growth: we
find again a V-shape with somewhat smaller coefficients. We note that the R-squared
of this regression declines slightly compared to column (1). Column (3) presents the
results from a regression specification where both sales growth and the forecast error,
in both cases allowing for asymmetry, are included. It is now the asymmetric V in
sales growth that wins the horse race between change and unanticipated change, the
latter losing asymmetry and statistical significance. Notice again that the R-squared in
column (3) hardly improves compared to column (1).
Columns (4) to (6) repeat the same steps, but this time with lagged span included in
the regression. We first note that subjective uncertainty displays a mild persistence
because it depends on its own lag in all three specifications. With respect to the rel-
evance of sales growth versus forecast error, the result is the same, even starker: in a
horse race between these two regressors to determine subjective uncertainty, it is sales
growth that enters with an asymmetric V, whereas the data do not ask for the forecast
error over and above sales growth.
To understand why past growth “drives out” the past forecast error in these regres-
sions, we compare group averages of span in a two-by-two table of high versus low
absolute growth rates and high versus low absolute forecast errors. We compute these
group averages as follows. To control for firm characteristics we first partial out the
size, trend and turbulence dummies from span, absolute growth and absolute forecast
errors leaving the conditional linear relationship between the latter three variables
unchanged.21 Since our partial-out regressions include an intercept, the resulting ad-
justed variables have mean zero.
21 Technically, we invoke the Frisch-Waugh theorem which says that there are two equivalent ways to
control for some variables z (here: the dummies) in an OLS regression of y (here: span) on x (here:
past sales growth and past forecast error). Either regress y on x and z and take the coefficient of x.
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Table 1.7: Relation of span to its own lag, past sales growth, and past forecast error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: span span span span span span
Subjective uncertainty in quarter t− 1 0.273∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.0706) (0.0748) (0.0695)
Negative sales growth rate in quarter t− 1 -0.358∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗
(0.0755) (0.0825) (0.0754) (0.0910)
Positive sales growth rate in quarter t− 1 0.148∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.0936∗
(0.0394) (0.0450) (0.0381) (0.0478)
Negative forecast error in quarter t− 1 -0.232∗∗∗ -0.0599 -0.166∗∗∗ 0.0167
(0.0573) (0.0567) (0.0586) (0.0607)
Positive forecast error in quarter t− 1 0.130∗∗∗ 0.0747 0.116∗∗∗ 0.0641
(0.0392) (0.0488) (0.0363) (0.0498)
Size, trend, and turbulence dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 11.70∗∗∗ 11.61∗∗∗ 11.48∗∗∗ 8.587∗∗∗ 8.719∗∗∗ 8.465∗∗∗
(2.562) (2.610) (2.544) (2.055) (2.039) (2.008)
No. of observations 1520 1520 1520 1489 1489 1489
No. of firms 373 373 373 367 367 367
No. of parameters (excl. intercept) 10 10 12 11 11 13
R-squared 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.41
Notes: Results from pooled OLS regressions. They are based on the sample of firms with at least
five answers to question 1. In addition, we require an answer to question 2.b to compute the firms’
forecast error for two adjacent observations of a firm. This results in the already familiar sample of 1,664
observations. We further need the lag of the forecast error, and hence, three consecutive observations
in a firms’ time series. Requiring span to be available as well, we are left with 1,520 observations. In
columns (4) to (6) we additionally require the lag of span and we arrive at 1,489 observations. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Subsequently, we split adjusted absolute growth and adjusted absolute forecast errors
into observations above and below their means, thereby defining the four quadrants
shown in the left panel of Table 1.8, respectively, and compute average span for each
quadrant. For example, the upper left value of -1.82 means that a firm which, after
controlling for firm characteristics, experience in period t − 1 a below-average abso-
lute growth rate and a below-average absolute forecast error, reports a 1.82 percentage
points smaller span than the average firm in period t. In addition, we count the num-
ber of observations that fall in each quadrant (in square brackets below average span).
The first takeaway from the upper left panel of Table 1.8 is that uncertainty as mea-
sured by span is relatively low (high) if both absolute growth and absolute forecast
errors are relatively low (high). Hence, a firm is relatively certain if it experiences
a small absolute growth rate near its expectations and it is relatively uncertain if it
experiences a large absolute growth rate far away from what it expected. Most obser-
vations (665+410=1075 of 1520 and thus 71%) fall in these two cells reflecting that sales
growth is difficult to predict, so that low (high) absolute forecast errors and low (high)
absolute growth go hand in hand.
Alternatively, first regress y on z and x on z and then regress the residuals of these two regressions
on each other.
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But what happens in the upper right and lower left cells? Concerning the upper right
cell, a small absolute growth rate that comes as a big surprise almost does not alter
span. This suggests that firms which incorrectly expected something “big” to happen
do not experience heightened uncertainty even though the size of their forecast error
is large because the signal they receive tells them that they are in calm territory. By
contrast, the lower left cell tells us that a large absolute growth rate increases uncer-
tainty to a noticeable, while not statistically significant, amount even if it comes largely
expectedly. Again, it thus appears to be the signal conveyed by the absolute growth
rate which shapes uncertainty and not the expectational error.22
Table 1.8: Two-by-two tables of span
Full sample Only neg. growth and neg. FE
low abs. FE high abs. FE low abs. FE high abs. FE
After partialling out size, trend, and turbulence dummies
















After partialling out size, trend, and turbulence dummies, and lagged span
















Notes: The cells show group-specific average span and, in brackets below, the number of observations
per cell. The upper panel of the table is based on the residuals from a regression of span on size, trend,
and turbulence dummies (1,520 observations). The lower panel is based on the residuals from regress-
ing span on size, trend, and turbulence dummies, and additionally on its own lag (1,489 observations).
These two parts refer to the samples used in columns (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) of table 1.7, respectively.
The table is split in two parts: the left part concerns the full sample, and the right part the subset of
firm-time observations, for which both sales growth and forecast error are negative. In each part, the
numbers in each panel refer to four quadrants. To define these quadrants, we first regress absolute sales
growth and absolute forecast error on size, trend, and turbulence dummies for the statistics in the upper
panel of the table, and on the same dummies and lagged span in the lower panel. The quadrants are
then defined by the mean values of the residuals of the absolute sales growth and the absolute forecast
error regressions.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
To better understand this finding, we next distinguish between positive and negative
growth. The upper right panel of Table 1.8 reports average span using only those
22 This interpretation is supported by comparing the fit of two simple models, after partialling out size,
trend and turbulence dummies from span, absolute growth and absolute forecast errors. Model 1 fits
two group means to span with groups being defined by low and high absolute forecast errors, while
model 2 fits two group means to span with groups being defined by low and high absolute growth.
Hence model 1 reflects the column dimension of the upper left quadrant of Table 1.8 while model
2 mirrors the row dimension. It turns out that the fit of model 1 is worse than the fit of model 2 in
all four quadrants, particularly so in the lower left cell. Overall, model 1 has an R-squared of 2.8%
whereas model 2 has an R-squared of 3.9%.
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observations falling into the respective quadrants that exhibit negative growth and
negative forecast error. By comparing the panels we can thus assess the asymmetry
of the relationships between span and its drivers. It turns out that the differences are
moderate in all cells but the lower left one where average span is much larger than
in the full sample: a large negative growth rate that is slightly larger than expected
entails a strong increase in span by 2 percentage points. Hence, it is firms in a gloom
situation–expecting an unusually bad outcome and experiencing and even slightly
worse realization–which drive the lower left cell.23
The lower panel of Table 1.8 shows that the preceding results are robust to including
lagged span in the set of controls. To summarize, we find that subjective forecast
errors are driven by past sales growth rather than past forecast errors. While these two
regressors are similar as sales forecasts appear difficult, there is a notable number of
observations exhibiting small (large) absolute sales growth and large (small) absolute
forecast error. In these cases, sales growth is a better predictor of span particularly for
firms in a gloomy situation.
What is the economic mechanism that makes firms more uncertain especially after a
negative previous-quarter sales growth rather than a negative sales growth surprise?
A possible interpretation is that negative sales growth indicates a loss of customers in
an environment where building up customer relationships is costly and not necessarily
successful. Hence, affected firms do not know whether and which new customers can
be found in the months going forward, making them more uncertain with respect to
future sales growth.
1.6.2 Another Surprise Measure
As a robustness check we ask whether the results remain unchanged if we replace
previous-quarter forecast error by an alternative measure of sales growth surprise. To
this end, we construct a variable that measures the distance of the previous-quarter
growth rate to the forecast interval stated one quarter before as follows: it takes the
value of zero if the growth rate falls into the interval, the distance of the growth rate to
the upper interval limit (the best case) if the growth rate falls above the interval, and
the distance to the lower interval limit (the worst case) if the growth rate falls below
the interval. Thereby, we measure the surprise intensity for those firms that see their
previous-quarter growth rate outside their forecast interval stated one quarter before.
23 In fact, the average span in the lower left cell of the complementary group of firms that do not ex-
hibit both negative growth and negative forecast error is 0.2 and thus almost indistinguishable to the
average of zero.
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Table 1.9 reports the results of regressions of span on the previous-quarter growth rate
and the previous-quarter surprise measure just defined. To account for asymmetry we
split both regressors into their positive and negative parts. Note that a positive (nega-
tive) surprise is the distance of the growth rate to the upper (lower) interval limit if the
growth rate falls above (below) the interval. A regression of span on the surprise mea-
sure without any controls shows there is again a highly significant, asymmetric V-type
relationship (column 1). Including size, trend, and turbulence dummies flattens the V
but leaves the negative arm significant (column 2). However, adding the sales growth
rate yields the same “driving out” result reported in Section 1.6.1: both parameters of
the surprise measure become quantitatively small and statistically insignificant while
the parameters of the sales growth rate exhibit the asymmetric V. Columns (4) to (6)
replicate this outcome when lagged span is included as an additional regressor.
Table 1.9: Relation of span to its own lag, past sales growth, and past outside deviation
from worst or best case
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: span span span span span span
Subjective uncertainty in quarter t− 1 0.460∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0786) (0.0743)
Negative sales growth rate in quarter t− 1 -0.574∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
(0.0789) (0.0687) (0.0778) (0.0741)
Positive sales growth rate in quarter t− 1 0.283∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.0461) (0.0460) (0.0527) (0.0500)
Deviation from worst case forecast in quarter t− 1 -0.529∗∗∗ -0.0600 -0.0659 -0.425∗∗∗ -0.137∗ -0.122
(0.107) (0.103) (0.107) (0.0817) (0.0778) (0.0839)
Deviation from best case forecast in quarter t− 1 0.191∗∗∗ -0.0305 -0.0355 0.188∗∗∗ 0.0777 0.0425
(0.0542) (0.0709) (0.0605) (0.0467) (0.0681) (0.0603)
Size, trend, and turbulence dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 10.70∗∗∗ 8.213∗∗∗ 11.89∗∗∗ 5.341∗∗∗ 4.721∗∗∗ 8.536∗∗∗
(0.476) (0.491) (2.627) (0.815) (0.669) (2.043)
No. of observations 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513
No. of firms 372 372 372 372 372 372
No. of parameters (excl. intercept) 2 4 12 3 5 13
R-squared 0.098 0.22 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.41
Notes: Results from pooled OLS regressions. They are based on the sample of firms with at least five
answers to question 1. In addition, we require an answer to question 2.a to compute the distance of
a firms’ realization from below the worst case or from above the best case forecast for two adjacent
observations of a firm. We further need the lag of this distance variable, and hence, three consecutive
observations in a firms’ time series. Requiring span to be available as well, we are left with 1,513
observations. The variable “Deviation from worst (best) case forecast in quarter t− 1” has value zero
if the past realized sales growth rate was inside the forecast interval. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by firm. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1.7 Volatility
The goal of this section is to compare the dynamics of “statistical” uncertainty experi-
enced by firms to that of subjective uncertainty perceived by firms. We have already
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seen in Section 1.5.3 that the projection of the absolute size of forecast errors on past
growth – controlling for fixed characteristics – yields coefficients that are quite similar
to the coefficients of our baseline span regression. We now ask to what extent firms’
updating of subjective uncertainty studied in the previous section resembles the dy-
namic behavior of the conditional volatility of shocks. In terms of the framework of
Section 1.3.2, how similar are the dynamics of the subjective and statistical uncertainty
measures σ and σ̂?
The section proceeds as follows. As a preliminary step, we distinguish between the
two sources of firm forecast errors discussed in Section 1.3.2: bias and conditional
volatility. In Section 1.7.1, we thus “clean” subjective forecast errors by removing firm
fixed effects of forecast bias already documented in Section 1.4.4. We also provide an
alternative benchmark set of forecast errors from a statistical model. That model is by
construction unbiased, although it may also be based on less information than what
is available to firms. Its purpose is to analyze whether firm’s subjective forecasts are
special, or whether they just reflect generic properties of the data.
We then estimate dynamic models of conditional volatility to provide a statistical
counterpart to the regressions of span on lagged span, past growth, past forecast er-
rors as well as fixed firm characteristics reported in Section 1.6.1. To this end, in Sec-
tion 1.7.2 we estimate models of conditional volatility for both the cleaned subjective
errors and for the statistical errors. Section 1.7.3 finally compares the dynamics of all
three measures of firm uncertainty. To preview the results, we show that the dynam-
ics of subjective uncertainty and “objective” conditional volatility are similar in some
dimensions but differ in others. Similarities exist mainly in the time series dimen-
sion. They include mild but statistically significant persistence, irrelevance of lagged
forecast errors, and importance of lagged absolute sales growth, especially if it is neg-
ative. Differences are pronounced in the cross section dimension. Indeed, volatile
and large firms are not uncertain enough—seem to underestimate the volatility they
face—, while firms on a bad sales growth trend are more uncertain than conditional
volatility suggests.
The sample used throughout this Section is composed such that we can estimate dy-
namic models of the conditional volatility of firms’ forecast errors. We start from the
forecast sample defined in Table 1.C.1 in Appendix 1.C which includes all quarter-
firm observations for which a forecast is available but not necessarily a span. Using
this sample we construct forecast errors. To model dynamics, we further require a
lagged forecast error and thus three adjacent observations. This reduces the sample
to 949 observations plus 380 pre-sample observations on which we condition in the
dynamic models. Hence, we use 1,329 observations altogether.
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1.7.1 Cleaned Subjective and Statistical Forecast Errors
In order to clean observed forecast errors of firm-specific bias, we estimate regressions
of survey-provided forecast errors on fixed characteristics and use the resulting resid-
uals as our cleaned errors. In terms of the representation (1.5), this removes the part
of the bias b(sit, x
i) that depends on the fixed characteristics xi. We do this in order
to focus on belief dynamics. In particular, we are interested in the response of span
to temporary surprises experienced by firms, not surprises they routinely experience
because they make biased forecasts.24
Table 1.10: Relation of sales growth to past sales growth and firm characteristics
Dep. variable: sales growth t to t + 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative sales growth in quarter t− 1 -0.269∗ -0.141 -0.130
(0.141) (0.145) (0.128)
Positive sales growth in quarter t− 1 -0.0357 0.0392 0.0495
(0.0907) (0.0978) (0.0856)
Dummy small firms 5.314∗∗∗ 7.798∗∗∗ 5.298∗∗∗ 7.776∗∗∗
(1.815) (2.255) (1.747) (2.192)
Dummy medium sized firms 4.996∗∗∗ 7.408∗∗∗ 5.082∗∗∗ 7.432∗∗∗
(1.669) (2.136) (1.607) (2.073)
Dummy large firms 5.000∗∗∗ 7.228∗∗∗ 5.013∗∗∗ 7.159∗∗∗
(1.689) (2.127) (1.632) (2.057)
Dummy ’bad’ sales growth trend -7.143∗∗∗ -6.726∗∗∗
(0.967) (0.936)
Dummy ’good’ sales growth trend 8.005∗∗∗ 8.253∗∗∗
(1.095) (1.112)
Dummy medium low turbulence -1.717∗∗∗ -2.068∗∗ -1.434∗∗∗ -1.827∗
(0.572) (0.959) (0.500) (0.929)
Dummy medium high turbulence 0.427 -0.882 0.973 -0.411
(0.833) (1.117) (0.642) (0.968)
Dummy high turbulence -0.143 -0.274 1.343 0.954
(1.561) (1.691) (1.149) (1.384)
Sales growth in quarter t− 1 -0.132∗∗∗ -0.0365 -0.0247
(0.0414) (0.0455) (0.0462)
Intercept -3.243∗∗ -5.059∗∗ 1.164 -2.881∗ -4.663∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗
(1.610) (2.092) (0.811) (1.534) (2.011) (0.439)
No. of observations 1329 1329 1329 1329 1329 1329
No. of firms 292 292 292 292 292 292
R-squared 0.12 0.021 0.0047 0.12 0.018 0.001
AIC 10696.7 10837.8 10848.1 10702.2 10839.9 10851.5
BIC 10753.8 10884.5 10863.7 10754.1 10881.5 10861.9
Notes: Results from pooled OLS regressions. They are based on the sample of firms with at least five
answers to question 1. In addition, we require an answer to question 2.b to compute the firms’ forecast
error for two adjacent observations of a firm. For comparability with the results of the power GARCH
models, we further need the lag of the forecast error, and hence, three consecutive observations in a
firms’ time series. This leaves us with 1329 observations. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
firm. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
24 The regressions are based on the sample of firms with at least five observations of sales growth. In
addition, to compute a forecast error we need two adjacent observations of a firm (a sales growth
forecast in quarter t − 1 followed by a sales growth rate in quarter t). For comparability with the
results of the GARCH models below, we further need the lag of the forecast error, and hence, three
consecutive observations in a firm’s time series. This leaves us with 1329 observations.
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Specifically, we regress the survey-provided forecast error on our previously defined
size, trend, and turbulence dummies as well as their pairwise interactions. To prevent
overfitting, we apply the LASSO estimator (Tibshirani, 1996) to select a subset of rele-
vant regressors.25 We choose the LASSO tuning parameter τ by minimizing Mallows’s
Cp statistic as suggested by Efron et al. (2004). The LASSO then selects 11 predictors.
In particular, denote the high and low growth dummies by gd1 and gd3, the medium
low, medium high and high volatility dummies by vd1, vd2, and vd3, and the small,
medium and large size dummies by sd1, sd2, and sd3, respectively. The selected predic-
tors are then gd1, gd3, as well as the interactions sd1 · gd1, sd2 · gd1, sd2 · gd3, sd1 · vd2,
sd1 · vd3, sd2 · vd4, sd3 · vd4, gd1 · vd4, gd3 · vd4.
To obtain a bias-adjusted forecast error we construct the OLS residuals of a regression
of the forecast error on these predictors. In doing so, we follow Belloni and Cher-
nozhukov (2013) who show that it is advantageous in terms of bias to let the LASSO
select the relevant regressors and subsequently apply OLS to estimate the regression
coefficients, see Lehrer and Xie (2017) for a related application. We find that the R-
squared of the OLS regression is 0.04 which indicates that biased forecasting is not
pervasive but rather an issue for small groups of firms.
To provide an alternative benchmark for firm-level forecast errors, we construct a set of
statistical forecast errors by using our own statistical forecasting models. In particular,
we regress sales growth on its own lag as well as size, growth, and turbulence dum-
mies. We allow for an asymmetric response to past growth, as in our span regressions.
We also note that since trend and turbulence are defined using sample moments, they
are, strictly speaking, not part of the information set of a firm. At the same time, firms
have longer samples than we have that speak to their trend growth and volatility. Our
assumption here is that trend and turbulence reflect medium term prospects known
to firms.
The regression coefficients are reported in column (1) of Table 1.10. For robustness, we
try a number of specifications. In column (2), we leave out the growth trend dummies
from the set of regressors as they might be very dominant. In column (3) and we also
estimate a simple asymmetric AR(1) model. In columns (4)-(6), we replicate the first
three specifications but restrict the effect of past sales growth to be symmetric. Forecast
errors from all six specifications are highly correlated, with correlation coefficients at
25 The LASSO is a standard shrinkage estimator popular in “big data” analysis (Varian, 2014) as it re-
covers the correct (sparse) model with high probability (Hastie et al., 2017). By requiring that the L1
norm of the coefficient vector does not exceed a certain threshold, say, τ, the LASSO restricts many
coefficients to zero and thereby helps to balance the bias-variance tradeoff seen in forecasting. This
is why the LASSO and related estimators are widely applied for economic forecasting in data-rich
environments (Bai and Ng, 2008; Manzan, 2015; Elliott and Timmermann, 2016).
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0.93 or above. Moreover, both AIC and BIC favor specification (1). In what follows,
we report only results based on that specification.
1.7.2 Measuring Conditional Volatility
How does subjective uncertainty compare to conditional volatility, or more generally,
uncertainty measured by an econometrician? We have identified subjective uncer-
tainty with span, the difference between best and worst case scenarios. A natural
“objective” counterpart is the length of a forecast interval constructed by the econo-
metrician, for example the difference between an upper and lower quantile of the
conditional distribution of forecast errors. In the broad class of distributions of the
location-scale family, that length is a multiple of the standard deviation which we
thus choose as our measure of volatility.
We study the conditional volatility of both types of forecast errors defined in Section
1.7.1. In both cases, we select and estimate a volatility model that optimally describes
the data as indicated by information criteria.
Let ẽit be the bias-adjusted forecast error of firm i in quarter t, and denote its condi-
tional standard deviation by σit. Our choice of functional form mirrors our analysis of
subjective uncertainty in Section 1.6.1: we write σit as a function of past growth, past
forecast errors and fixed firm characteristics. We thus use a restricted version of the
power GARCH model (Ding et al., 1993; Ding and Granger, 1996; Karanasos and Kim,
2006). While the unrestricted power GARCH model conditions σpit on past informa-
tion, Ii,t−1, where p is a power coefficient to be estimated, we impose the restriction
p = 1 and thus model the conditional standard deviation.
Our conditional volatility model then has the general form
ẽit = µ + εit, εit|Ii,t−1 ∼ N(0, σ2it) (1.7)
with a conditional standard deviation equation
σit = exp(β0 + β′1xit) + α1(|εi,t−1|+ γεi,t−1) + α2σi,t−1. (1.8)
The mean equation (1.7) includes an intercept to account for a nonzero sample mean
that arises because we apply the bias adjustment of the forecast error to all 1,329 ob-
servations but estimate the volatility model on an effective sample of those 949 obser-
vations for which a lag is available. The conditional volatility equation (1.8) allows for
an asymmetric effect of the past absolute forecast error measured by the coefficient γ,
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as asymmetry was found to be relevant in explaining subjective uncertainty. However,
we do not expect a strong effect here because the empirical unconditional distribution
of the bias-adjusted forecast errors is essentially symmetric with a sample skewness of
0.1.26
We add two types of explanatory variables contained in vector xit to the conditional
volatility equation. They enter the model through an exponential link function to en-
sure effects are always positive. The first type consists of size, trend, and turbulence
dummies which are essentially time-invariant and thus control for different levels of
conditional volatility for subgroups of firms. Our analysis above indicated that these
dummies are sufficient to capture the bulk of time-invariant heterogeneity in subjec-
tive uncertainty. The second type includes positive and negative sales growth in the
previous quarter which we found to be highly relevant to explain subjective uncer-
tainty.
To find a reliable parsimonious specification, we estimate several restricted versions
of (1.7)-(1.8) by maximum likelihood. Specification (1) adds no additional control vari-
ables (β1 = 0), specifications (2)-(4) allow only for size, trend and turbulence dummies,
respectively, specification (5) allows for only positive and negative sales growth rate
in the previous quarter, and (6) adds all variables together. All specifications are es-
timated either assuming symmetric effects of past forecast errors (γ = 0) or allowing
for asymmetry (γ unrestricted).
To select among these specifications, we use two information criteria, AIC and BIC,
which are commonly used in applied papers (Nelson, 1991; Zivot, 2009). In finite
samples the BIC typically favors overly sparse models, while the AIC picks models
with a more generous number of parameters, see Efron et al. (2004, pp. 230-235) for
a general discussion and Lütkepohl (2005) for asymptotic and simulation evidence in
a time series context. Hence, the models chosen by AIC and BIC may be thought of
giving upper and lower bounds in terms of richness of parametrization.
The results reported in Table 1.11 suggest that the inclusion of turbulence dummies,
whether by themselves in specification (4) or jointly with the other control variables
in specification (6), is essential for model fit: all other specifications generate much
larger information criteria. Deciding between specifications (4) and (6) is more tricky.
In both the symmetric and the asymmetric case, the AIC favors the inclusion of all
controls while the BIC picks the turbulence dummies alone. However, the differences
in terms of AIC are large (29.81 and 32.42) while the differences in terms of BIC are
small (4.19 and 1.57). Given that the BIC tends to select overly parsimonious models
26 A test of the null hypothesis that the population skewness is zero cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.2).
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Table 1.11: Model selection criteria for different specifications of the conditional
volatility model
Symmetric γ = 0 Asymmetric γ 6= 0
Specification k AIC BIC k AIC BIC
(1) no controls 4 7,256.39 7,275.81 5 7,253.13 7,277.41
(2) only size dummies 7 7,249.95 7,283.94 8 7,248.10 7,286.94
(3) only growth trend dummies 6 7,173.30 7,202.43 7 7,174.46 7,208.45
(4) only turbulence dummies 7 6,901.40 6,935.38 8 6,903.38 6,942.22
(5) only sales growth rate 6 7,106.90 7,136.03 7 7,104.63 7,138.62
(6) all controls 14 6,871.59 6,939.57 15 6,870.96 6,943.79
Notes: k denotes the number of parameters. Equations 1.7 and 1.8 describe the model of conditional
volatility. All specifications are estimated by maximum likelihood using 949 observations.
and based on the classification of Kass and Raftery (1995) that only BIC differences of
more than 6 are “strong”, on balance specification (6) is preferred.
Whether to allow for symmetric or asymmetric effects of past forecast errors is also
difficult to decide as the differences in AIC and BIC are small. We therefore report
the coefficient estimates of both specifications in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.12. It
turns out that the asymmetry parameter γ is not statistically different from zero while
the estimates of the other coefficients are largely unaffected by restricting it to zero.
This is not unexpected as the unconditional skewness is small. We thus conclude that
the symmetric specification (6) is a sufficient description of the conditional volatility
process that drives the data.
We refer to the OLS residuals from our preferred forecasting regression as “statistical”
forecast errors and fit the same symmetric and asymmetric volatility models as for
the firms’ forecast errors, see columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.12. Again, the asymme-
try parameter is not significantly different from zero, and restricting it to zero leaves
the other parameter estimates fairly unchanged. Therefore, we take the symmetric
specification—which is unanimously favored by the information criteria—as a suffi-
cient description of the conditional volatility process that characterizes the statistical
forecast errors.
1.7.3 Comparison of Subjective Uncertainty and Conditional
Volatility
We are now ready to compare subjective uncertainty as measured by the span between
the best case and worst case scenarios with our two statistical measures of conditional
volatility. For the latter, we use the predicted conditional standard deviation of our
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Table 1.12: Conditional volatility specification (1.8) estimated by maximum likelihood
Dependent variable: Firms’ forecast errors Statistical forecast errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean equation
Intercept (µ) 0.298 0.291 0.171 0.122
(0.252) (0.251) (0.270) (0.281)
Volatility equation: baseline parameters
Lagged absolute FE (α1) 0.0852∗ 0.102∗ 0.00830 0.00918
(0.0511) (0.0538) (0.0682) (0.0579)
Lagged volatility (α2) 0.235∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.0874) (0.0799) (0.0921) (0.0824)
Asymmetry (γ) 0 0.478 0 3.359
(.) (0.317) (.) (21.85)
Volatility equation: parameters of exogenous regressors
Negative sales growth in t− 1 -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗ -0.0278∗∗∗
(0.00910) (0.00879) (0.00792) (0.00801)
Positive sales growth in t− 1 0.0131∗∗ 0.0107∗ 0.00710 0.00468
(0.00515) (0.00576) (0.00522) (0.00605)
Dummy small firms -0.139 -0.138 -0.142 -0.127
(0.118) (0.119) (0.0867) (0.0884)
Dummy medium sized firms -0.223∗∗ -0.230∗∗ -0.182∗∗ -0.170∗∗
(0.105) (0.105) (0.0744) (0.0766)
Dummy large firms -0.248∗∗ -0.269∗∗ -0.170∗∗ -0.156∗
(0.111) (0.111) (0.0822) (0.0871)
Dummy ’bad’ sales growth trend 0.194∗∗ 0.167∗ -0.0281 -0.0456
(0.0882) (0.0858) (0.0652) (0.0673)
Dummy ’good’ sales growth trend 0.199∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.0648 0.0818
(0.0948) (0.0958) (0.0815) (0.0857)
Dummy medium low volatility 0.504∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.0867) (0.0886) (0.0725) (0.0708)
Dummy medium high volatility 0.794∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗
(0.0873) (0.0874) (0.0684) (0.0674)
Dummy high volatility 1.336∗∗∗ 1.322∗∗∗ 1.519∗∗∗ 1.520∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.111) (0.101) (0.0964)
Intercept (β0) 1.101∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.167) (0.151) (0.146)
No. of observations 949 949 949 949
No. of firms 292 292 292 292
Notes: Results from panel power GARCH models from equations 1.7 and 1.8 that describe the condi-
tional standard deviation of firms’ forecast errors in columns 1 and 2, and of statistical forecast errors
in columns 3 and 4. In contrast to the symmetric models in columns 1 and 3, columns 2 and 4 allow
for asymmetric effects. All specifications are estimated by maximum likelihood using 949 observations
and 380 pre-sample observations on which we condition as explained below Table 1.10. Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by firm. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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preferred symmetric specification (6). Descriptive statistics for all three measures are
displayed in Table 1.13. A first notable result is that the distributions of the predicted
conditional standard deviations of the firms’ and the statistical forecast errors are re-
markably similar. In fact, the correlation of the two volatility predictions is 0.97. Fur-
thermore, we find that the average subjective uncertainty as measured by span is only
25 percent larger than the average of the predicted conditional standard deviations.
Table 1.13: Summary statistics for measures of subjective uncertainty and conditional
volatility
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Span between worst and best case forecast 932 12.1 9.8 4 5 10 15 25
Predicted conditional volatility of
firms’ forecast errors
932 9.7 7.2 3.5 4.8 7.5 12.3 18.3
Predicted conditional volatility of
statistical forecast errors
932 9.7 7.3 3.4 4.2 7.2 12.2 19.8
Notes: The predicted conditional volatility of firms’ forecast errors and of statistical forecast errors
stem from the symmetric power GARCH specifications in columns 1 and 3 of table 1.12, respectively.
The number of usable observations shrinks from 949 as reported in Table 1.12 to 932 here because 17
quarter-firm observations we used to construct forecast errors have either a missing upper or lower
interval bound, or both, in the data, and thus we cannot compute a span for these observations.
In a final step, we compare the dynamics of subjective uncertainty to the dynamics of
conditional volatility. Since the volatility models link the conditional standard devi-
ation to past sales growth and the dummies via an exponential function that ensures
nonnegativity, we base our comparion on average partial effects. Formally, we com-








and report them in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.14 while column (1) replicates the co-
efficient estimates of the dynamic linear model for span reported in column (6) of Table
1.7 with the only difference that we replace the two insignificant regressors “positive
past forecast error” and “negative past forecast error” by the single regressor “abso-
lute forecast error” to conform with the specification of the volatility models.
The results indicate that the dynamics of subjective uncertainty and “objective” con-
ditional volatility are remarkably similar. There is mild but statistically significant
persistence; lagged forecast errors are largely irrelevant; and lagged absolute sales
growth has an asymmetric effect with large negative realizations being roughly twice
as important than large positive realizations. Hence, when forming uncertainty beliefs
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Uncertainty/volatility in t− 1 0.270∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.0699) (0.0874) (0.0921)
Absolute forecast error in t− 1 0.0373 0.085∗ 0.008
(0.0383) (0.051) (0.068)
Negative sales growth in t− 1 -0.285∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.0768) (0.073) (0.064)
Positive sales growth in t− 1 0.112∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.060
(0.0422) (0.043) (0.044)
Dummy small firms -3.507∗ -1.227 -1.316
(2.066) (1.068) (0.811)
Dummy medium sized firms -3.920∗ -1.891 -1.656∗∗
(2.056) (0.947) (0.709)
Dummy large firms -4.562∗∗ -2.073∗∗ -1.550∗
(2.022) (1.006) (0.790)
Dummy ’bad’ sales growth trend 2.219∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗ -0.234
(0.780) (0.706) (0.540)
Dummy ’good’ sales growth trend -0.432 1.542∗∗ 0.565
(0.530) (0.756) (0.727)
Dummy medium low turbulence 0.660 2.216∗∗∗ 2.294∗∗∗
(0.523) (0.459) (0.361)
Dummy medium high turbulence 3.714∗∗∗ 4.094∗∗∗ 4.714∗∗∗
(0.773) (0.634) (0.525)
Dummy high turbulence 4.528∗∗∗ 9.462∗∗∗ 12.057∗∗∗
(0.883) (1.314) (1.552)
No. of observations 1489 949 949
Notes: The first column displays pooled OLS regression coefficients, with clustered standard errors
listed below the coefficients. This regression is comparable to column (6) of Table 1.7. The predicted
conditional volatility of firms’ forecast errors and of statistical forecast errors stem from the symmet-
ric power GARCH specifications in columns 1 and 3 of table 1.12, respectively. The second and third
columns show average partial effects from equation 1.8, with standard errors listed below the coeffi-
cients. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
firms appear to have a pretty realistic impression of the dynamics that characterize the
underlying data.
In contrast, subjective uncertainty and conditional volatility differ markedly in some
cross sectional dimensions. Most importantly, firms operating in a highly turbulent
environment report, relative to firms operating in a calm environment, a subjective
uncertainty that is on average 4.5 percentage points higher while the difference in
terms of the conditional volatility of their forecast errors and the statistical forecast
errors amounts to 9.5 and 12.1 percentage points, respectively. Hence, volatile firms
are more uncertain than others but not quite enough—they seem to underestimate
the volatility they face. We also observe an opposite overestimation effect: firms on a
bad sales growth trend are more uncertain than conditional volatility suggests, while
larger firms feel more certain than justified by conditional volatility.
To summarize, an average firm’s updating of subjective uncertainty over time closely
resembles the dynamics of conditional volatility, while its level of uncertainty appears
to be fairly small on average being of roughly the same order of magnitude as the
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conditional standard deviation of their forecast error and in several cases fails to ade-
quately reflect the environment the firm is operating in.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper provides survey evidence on firms’ subjective uncertainty about future
sales growth from a new panel data set of the German manufacturing sector. In par-
ticular, we measure managers’ perceived uncertainty as the difference between their
best and worst case forecast of one-quarter-ahead sales growth. After documenting
that firms’ subjective uncertainty varies both over time and in the cross section, our
main result is that uncertainty reflects change. Firms perceive higher uncertainty after
larger negative and larger positive sales growth, with a stronger effect for negative
realizations. Moreover, firms that consistently grow or shrink and those with more
volatile sales growth are more uncertain.
Using firms’ forecast errors and predictions from a panel GARCH model, we com-
pare subjective uncertainty to realized and conditional volatility. In the cross section
of firms, subjective uncertainty differs from experienced volatility: fast-growing and
large firms perceive lower uncertainty than fast-shrinking and small firms, respec-
tively, even if they face shocks of similar size. However, conditional volatility is simi-
lar to subjective uncertainty in the time series: both are mildly persistent and increase
more after very low compared to very high sales growth realizations.
These findings highlight the importance of idiosyncratic variation in firms’ uncertainty
during normal times. They also contribute to a discussion in the time series literature
of uncertainty shocks by providing micro evidence for feedback effects between un-
certainty and growth. The comparison of managers’ subjective uncertainty with re-
alized volatility and model-based conditional uncertainty helps to better understand
firm behavior. Our results inform common assumptions in existing work and can be
incorporated into new models of firm dynamics.
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1.A Representativeness of the Sample
In this Appendix, we check whether participation in the uncertainty module is se-
lective conditional on participation in the main manufacturing survey. We base our
analysis on all 34,684 complete firm-quarter responses available in the main survey
for the months the uncertainty module was executed. We then ask whether firm size,
wave dummies, sector dummies, and interacted wave-sector dummies are able to pre-
dict participation in the uncertainty module. To this end, we run a probit regression of
a participation dummy that is 1 for the 5,564 observations of the uncertainty module
and zero otherwise, on these predictors and report the estimated coefficients in col-
umn (1) of Table 1.A.1. We find that there is no statistically significant selectivity with
respect to wave and sector suggesting that the uncertainty sample does not misrepre-
sent specific quarters or sectors. While firm size turns out to be significantly negative
indicating that large firms are slightly underrepresented in the uncertainty module
compared to the main manufacturing survey, the pseudo R-squared of 0.016 shows
that this selectivity is quantitatively barely relevant. This is also reflected by a ROC
curve which differs only slightly from the diagonal that indicates no discriminatory
power, see Figure 1.A.1.27
We repeat the analysis starting from the subset of 23,486 complete firm-quarter re-
sponses available in the online part of the main survey. We thus account for the fact
that some firms reply by fax and thus cannot participate in the uncertainty module
which is solely implemented online. The results of an analogous probit regression are
27 The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) visualizes the discriminatory power of a binary classifier
as follows: By varying the classification threshold—here: the probability above which an observation
is predicted to participate in the uncertainty module—the classifier can produce any true positive rate
(type II error). The ROC curve plots the true positive rate so obtained against its corresponding false
positive rate (type I error). In the case of no discriminatory power, true and false positive rates are
always the same, the ROC curve equals the diagonal, and the area under the ROC curve (AUC) is 0.5.
A good classifier has a ROC curve well above the diagonal and an AUC that is near the maximum of
1.0.
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Table 1.A.1: Representativeness of special survey sample
(1) (2)
ifo all ifo online
Log of number of employees -0.0753∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0139)
Dummy survey wave 1 -0.0441 0.0707
(0.221) (0.242)
Dummy survey wave 2 0.0647 0.235
(0.260) (0.289)
Dummy survey wave 3 0.248 0.452∗
(0.232) (0.258)
Dummy survey wave 4 0.276 0.439∗
(0.217) (0.240)
Dummy survey wave 5 0.126 0.253
(0.204) (0.225)
Dummy survey wave 6 0.317 0.490∗∗
(0.195) (0.211)
Dummy survey wave 7 0.224 0.387∗
(0.206) (0.225)
Dummy survey wave 8 -0.244 -0.150
(0.247) (0.268)
Dummy survey wave 9 0.110 0.228
(0.235) (0.255)
Dummy survey wave 10 0.224 0.361∗
(0.186) (0.201)
Dummy survey wave 11 -0.0333 0.0732
(0.179) (0.196)
Dummy survey wave 12 0.154 0.275
(0.182) (0.202)
Dummy survey wave 13 0.321 0.334
(0.218) (0.232)
Dummy supersector 1 0.130 0.415
(0.245) (0.262)
Dummy supersector 2 -0.301 -0.153
(0.271) (0.289)
Dummy supersector 3 -0.0686 0.154
(0.229) (0.242)
Dummy supersector 4 -0.0697 0.0116
(0.250) (0.264)
Dummy supersector 5 0.136 0.335
(0.237) (0.250)
Dummy supersector 6 -0.129 0.000307
(0.240) (0.253)
Dummy supersector 7 -0.0828 0.185
(0.250) (0.267)
Dummy supersector 8 0.109 0.379
(0.257) (0.275)
Dummy supersector 9 -0.360 -0.184
(0.232) (0.245)
Dummy supersector 10 0.120 0.282
(0.259) (0.276)
Dummy supersector 11 -0.0901 0.0704
(0.240) (0.254)
Dummy supersector 12 -0.0935 0.0302
(0.222) (0.232)




Additional wave-supersector dummies YES YES
No. of observations 34684 23486
No. of firms 3428 2416
No. of parameters (excl. intercept) 196 196
Pseudo R-squared 0.016 0.030
Notes: Results from probit regressions. The dependent variable in column 1 and 2 is a dummy indicat-
ing special survey participation. In column 1 the dummy is of value zero for all other participants of
the ifo survey, in column 2 the dummy of value zero for all other online participants. Standard errors in
parentheses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
60
CHAPTER 1. UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGE
reported in column (2) of Table 1.A.1. Again, the very low pseudo R-squared suggests
that selectivity is not a relevant issue for the uncertainty module. This conclusion is
supported by a largely unaltered ROC curve near the non-discriminatory diagonal,
see Figure 1.A.1.
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Note: The two plots depict ROC curves that correspond to the probit estimations in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 1.A.1, respectively.
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1.B Questionnaire for the One-Time Meta-Survey From
Fall 2018
Figure 1.B.1: Original meta survey questionnaire in German, part 1
 
 
Note: Original questionnaire from ifo’s one-time online meta survey on its "uncertainty module" in
German, from fall 2018.
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Note: Original questionnaire from ifo’s one-time online meta survey on its "uncertainty module" in
German, from fall 2018.
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Note: Original questionnaire from ifo’s one-time online meta survey on its "uncertainty module" in
German, from fall 2018.
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1.C Sample Creation
In this Section, we describe the construction of our baseline sample and also explain
the number of observations from specific regressions in this paper. The numbers of
observations that remain after each step are listed in Table 1.C.1. Our starting sample
from 14 survey waves consists of 5,564 firm-wave observations.
Table 1.C.1: Sample creation
firm-wave obs. firm-wave obs. firms firms
in sample excluded in sample excluded
Original sample 5,564 1,426
Require response to Q1
Response to Q1 exists 5,194 370 1,378 48
Text comment
Wrong reference time excluded 5,095 99 1,368 10
Uncertain data quality excluded 5,067 28 1,367 1
Outliers to Q1
Outliers in Q1 responses excluded 5,045 22 1,365 2
Number of observations by firm
At least 5 clean responses to Q1 3,094 1,951 401 964
Outliers and inconsistencies to Q2
Inconsistent & outlier responses to Q2 excluded 2,945 149 401 0
Require responses to Q2a
Baseline sample span: Responses to Q2a both exist 2,762 183 400 1
Lag of forecast error exists 1,520 1,242 373 27
Lag of forecast error and lag of span exist 1,489 31 367 6
Lag of span exists 1,513 1,249 372 28
Require response to Q2b
Baseline sample forecast: Response to Q2b exists 2,778 167 400 1
Forecast error exists 1,664 1,114 389 11
Lag of forecast error exists 949 715 292 97
Lag of forecast error, and span exist 932 17 289 3
We start by excluding 370 firm-wave observations that were lacking an answer to Q1,
realized sales growth. Then we carefully read the free text comments respondents can
give below each of the questions, see Figure 1.1 in the main text for the questionnaire.
We exclude 99 observations for which a comment indicates that the respondent was
not able to calculate sales growth rates on a quarterly basis. For example, some firms
stated that they use annual growth rates instead. Moreover, we drop 28 observations
for which the comment raises doubts about the validity and quality of the answer.
For example, some firms were not able to state realized past growth rates and used
estimates instead. Overall, we exclude 497 firm-wave observations based on missing
or low-quality answers to Q1, leaving us with 5,067 firm-wave observations.
Next, we exclude 22 firm-wave observations, when the growth rate in the previous
quarter elicited in Q1 lies outside the interval [-100, 100]. We set the upper bounds
quite high because large (two-digit) growth rates typically appear to be deliberate
responses as many text comments reveal. Firms give explanations such as “Many
projects were moved into this quarter” and “Invoice of a major project.” This leaves
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us with 5,045 firm-wave observations. After these cleaning steps we require for the
firm-wave observations of a firm to remain in the sample that it have at least five
clean firm-wave observations on Q1, leaving us with 3,094 firm-wave of 401 firm ob-
servations. It is this sample that we base the calculation of the trend and turbulence
dummies on.
Subsequently, we exclude, respectively, outliers and inconsistencies related to Q2. Q2-
outliers were excluded according to the following two criteria:
1. The best case and worst case sales growth rates elicited in Q2.a lie outside the
intervals [-100; 300] and [-100; 100], respectively.
2. The expected growth rate elicited in Q2.b lies outside the interval [-100; 100].
Then we check whether respondents order the numbers in Q2 consistently, that is, as
worst case < forecast < best case. We exclude firm-wave observations with the order-
ings worst case ≥ forecast ≤ best case or worst case ≤ forecast ≥ best case because
it is unclear what the respondents had in mind with these answers. However, we
kept those firm-wave observations with the inverse ordering worst case ≥ forecast ≥
best case and simply swap the worst case and best case numbers; we do this for 76
firm-wave observations. Most likely inverse orderings were not intended by the re-
spondent and rather a simple clerical error. Altogether, we eliminate 149 firm-wave
observations in this step.
In a final step, we eliminate those 183 firm-wave observations which do not have an-
swers to Q2a, the best or worst case scenarios for sales growth, leaving us with our
baseline sample of 2,762 of firm-wave observations for 400 firms (“baseline sample
span”). For some other exercises, for which we do not need span observations but the
answer to Q2.b, that is, the expected growth rate, we use a slightly bigger sample of
2,778 firm-wave observations (“baseline sample forecast”).
Starting from the baseline sample span, for some further exercises we additionally
need a lag of the forecast error, which leaves us with 1,520 firm-time observations.
For the subsample of 1,489 observations, we also have the lag of span. For another
exercise, we again start from the baseline sample span and require a lag of span. This
subsample contains 1,513 firm-time observations.
Finally, we use the slightly larger baseline sample forecast to analyze forecast errors,
which is possible for 1,664 firm-time observations. For some exercises, we use con-
secutive forecast errors. This reduces the sample to 1,329 firm-wave observations of
which 380 are used as lagged “pre-sample” observations so that an effective sample
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size of 949 firm-wave observations remains. For 932 of these observations we also
have span.
1.D Definition of Supersectors
Table 1.D.1 presents our definition of 14 supersectors. They are based on the 24 two-
digit manufacturing sectors, which are defined by the WZ08 code of the German Statis-
tical Office. This code is closely related to the European industry classification system
NACE Rev. 2. The column with the number of observations by supersector refers to
our baseline sample of 2,762 observations.
Table 1.D.1: Definition of supersectors
Supersector Sector WZ08 Sector WZ08 name No. of obs.
1 10, 11, 12 Food products; Beverages; Tobacco products 184
2 13, 14, 15 Textiles; Wearing apparel;
Leather and related products
66
3 16, 17, 31 Wood, products of wood and cork except fur-
niture, articles of straw and plaiting materials;
Paper and paper products; Furniture
286
4 18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 191
5 19, 20, 21 Coke and refined petroleum products;
Chemicals and chemical support;
Basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations
262
6 22 Rubber and plastic products 228
7 23 Other non-metallic mineral products 133
8 24 Basic metals 120
9 25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery
and equipment
324
10 26 Computer, electronic and optical products 102
11 27 Electrical equipment 201
12 28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 445
13 29, 30 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers;
Other transport equipment
116
14 32, 33 Other manufacturing; Repair and installation
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1.E Detailed Summary Statistics
In this Appendix we report summary statistics for the answers to the questions in
our survey module. Table 1.E.1 pools all firm-quarter observations and reports mean,
standard deviation, and key quantiles for this pooled sample. The numbers here re-
flect variation both in the time series and in the cross section of firms. For Table 1.E.2,
we compute, for each individual firm, the time series mean and standard deviations.
The panel reports mean, standard deviation and quantiles of the cross sectional distri-
butions of firm-level statistics. The number of observations for (functions of) forecast
errors naturally drops because, in order to compute firm-level forecast errors, we need
to observe the expected sales growth rate and the realized sales growth rate of a firm
in two consecutive quarters.
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CHAPTER 1. UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGE
1.F Uncertainty and Change by Firm Characteristics
In this Section we show that the V-shaped relationship between sales growth and sub-
jective uncertainty holds separately, and in a quantitatively similar manner, for all
firm-level subgroups: the four firm size groups, the four turbulence groups, and the
three growth trend groups.
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Sales growth rate in the previous quarter
Full sample Non-param. full sample
Subsample large firms Non-param. subsample
Large firms
Notes: Relationship between subjective uncertainty (span) and sales growth in the previous quarter for
four different firm size groups based on their number of employees: tiny, small, medium, and large
firms. Scatter points and non-parametric kernel regression line of degree zero for the full sample of
firm-time observations in blue, and for the subsample of the size group in red.
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Sales growth rate in the previous quarter
Full sample Non-param. full sample
Subsample 'good' growth trend Non-param. subsample
'Good' growth trend
Notes: Relationship between subjective uncertainty (span) and sales growth in the previous quarter
for three different groups of firms that are defined based on their growth trend (mean of a firms’ sales
growth). Scatter points and non-parametric kernel regression line of degree zero for the full sample of
firm-time observations in blue, and for the subsample of the trend group in red.
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Full sample Non-param. full sample
Subsample high tubulence Non-param. subsample
High tubulence
Notes: Relationship between subjective uncertainty (span) and sales growth in the previous quarter
for four different groups of firms that are defined based on their turbulence of sales growth (standard
deviation of a firms’ sales growth). Scatter points and non-parametric kernel regression line of degree
zero for the full sample of firm-time observations in blue, and for the subsample of the turbulence group
in red.
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1.G Robustness of Uncertainty and Change in the Time
Series
In order to test the robustness of our results, we replicate the regressions in Table 1.5
with the relationship between subjective uncertainty and past sales growth for two
different samples.
In Table 1.G.1 we use a smaller sample, for which sales growth rates are not in the
interval (-100,100), but in the interval (-15,15). This is the interdecile range of sales
growth as depicted in table 1.E.1. The number of observations reduces from 2,762 to
2,316. Table 1.G.2 presents estimation results for a larger sample: unlike in the baseline
sample, we do not require firms to have five observations with a sales growth rates,
but we include all firms with at least two of such observations. This increases the
sample from 2,762 to 4,120 observations. Our results are robust to these alternative
sample definitions.
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CHAPTER 1. UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGE
1.H List of Firm-Level Controls
The “additional firm controls” include the following variables from the ifo Business
Survey:
• Capacity utilization: capacity utilization at the time of the survey, between 30%
and 100% in pre-determined bins provided in the questionnaire; for a capacity
utilization of more than 100% a free text answer is possible (in the sample, the
maximum reported capacity utilization is 120%).
• State of business: state of business at the time of survey, coded between 0 and
100.
• State of business dummies: state of business at the time of survey, reported on
a three-point scale. The options are “good”, “satisfactory”, or “bad”. We define
two dummies, for a good and a bad state of business.
• Orders dummies: order book level at the time of the survey, reported on a three-
point scale. The options are “relatively high”, “sufficient (for the season)”, or
“too low”. We define two dummies, for a relatively high and a too low order
book level.
• Stock of inventory dummies: Stock of inventories at the time of the survey,
reported on a four-point scale. The options are “too big”, “sufficient (for the
season)”, “too small”, or “no stock-keeping”. We define three dummies, for a
too big and a too small stock of inventory, and for the case of no stock-keeping.
• Production change dummies: Change in production in the previous month, re-
ported on a four-point scale. The options are “increased”, “roughly unchanged”,
“decreased”, or “no production”. We define three dummies, for an increased and
a decreased production, and for the case of no production.
• Demand change dummies: Change of the demand for a certain product of the
firm in the previous month, reported on a three-point scale. The options are
“improved”, “unchanged”, or “deteriorated” . We define two dummies, for im-
proved and deteriorated demand.
• Orders change dummies: Change of the order book level in the previous month,
reported on a three-point scale. The options are “increased”, “roughly unchanged”,
or “decreased”. We define two dummies, for the cases of increased and de-
creased order book levels.
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• Price change dummies: Change of the price for a certain product of the firm in
the previous month, reported on a three-point scale. The options are “increased”,
“unchanged”, or “decreased”. We define two dummies, for the cases of increased
and decreased prices.
• Credit appraisal dummies: Willingness of banks to give credits to firms at the
time of the survey, reported on a three-point scale. The options are “accommo-
dating”, “normal”, or “restrictive”. We define two dummies, for the cases of
accommodating and restrictive prices.
• Capacity utilization change dummies: evaluation of the remaining technical ca-
pacity at the time of the survey, given the current order book level and expected
new orders in the next 12 months, reported on a three-point scale. The options
are “more than sufficient”, “sufficient”, or “not sufficient”. We define two dum-
mies, for the cases of a more than sufficient and an insufficient remaining techni-
cal capacity.
• Constraints to production dummies: firms report if their domestic production
activity is constraint at the time of the survey. The answer options are “ yes” or




Uncertainty is More Than Risk –
Survey Evidence on Knightian and
Bayesian Firms*
* This chapter is based on joint work with Kai Carstensen, Rüdiger Bachmann, and Martin Schneider.
CHAPTER 2. UNCERTAINTY IS MORE THAN RISK
2.1 Introduction
There has been a lot of recent progress in measuring subjective beliefs of decision mak-
ers in firms. A number of surveys now elicit quantitative information about firms’ per-
ception of the future. Such information includes not only forecasts of firm outcomes
such as sales or profits, but also measures of firm-level subjective uncertainty. How-
ever, quantitative questions about uncertainty in firm surveys usually ask for probabil-
ities, much like those in household surveys. As a result, uncertainty is identified with
risk: firms are assumed to express their views of the future in terms of probabilities,
as would be natural for a textbook Bayesian decision maker.
This paper takes a new approach to eliciting firms’ perception of uncertainty. We ask a
simple question: what is the likelihood of a sales increase? However, rather than forc-
ing firms to submit a single probability, we give them the option of answering with a
probability interval. While Bayesian decision makers are thus free to report their sub-
jective probability, others who may not feel confident to commit to a single probability
can express that lack of confidence by responding with an interval – we refer to such
responses as Knightian. Our data come from a new module in an established survey
of German manufacturing firms that is known for high quality answers from top level
management; we work with a five-year panel from 2013-2017.
Our main result is that Knightian perception of the future is prevalent among firms: in
our five-year sample, 76% of firms choose a probability interval at least once. We fur-
ther establish three sets of stylized facts about Knightian responses. First, firms report
that Knightian responses are motivated by a lack of clarity about the future, and this
motivation is consistent with other forecasts they make. Second, we document fre-
quent switching between Knightian and Bayesian responses that reflects both idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate shocks. In particular, the share of Knightian responses spikes up
sharply during the Greek crisis in 2015, along with credit spreads. Finally, we show
that Knightian responses do not reflect a lack of sophistication: they are also prevalent
among large firms, as well as firms that use statistical analysis as a routine component
of their planning process. Moreover, while we confirm existing evidence on miscal-
ibration of firms’ beliefs, we find that there is little difference between Bayesian and
Knightian response on that score.
We work with data from the ifo Institute, a leading German research institute that
is heavily involved in business cycle forecasting. The ifo Business Survey was intro-
duced in 1949 and now serves as a key input to the EU-harmonized business survey.
In 2012, we proposed a new quarterly survey module on uncertainty. After initial
testing in 2012, the module has been in the field since early 2013, with participation
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stable at 300-400 firms per wave. In addition, ifo has occasionally performed meta-
surveys to assess data quality and query firms for their motivation and methods when
answering survey questions. We thus know that the responder within a firm changes
infrequently and typically uses the results from routine quantitative planning proce-
dures when filling out the questionnaire. We also draw on a 2018 meta-survey on
uncertainty that deals specifically with Knightian responses.
We characterize responses both at the extensive margin – Bayesian or Knightian –
and at the intensive margin, the actual probability forecasts. At the extensive margin,
Knightian responses are a tool used by managers to express uncertainty in particular
quarters; they do not reflect a constant trait of a firm. Indeed, the share of Knightian
responses in a given quarter fluctuates between 20% and 35% over our sample, with a
mean of 28%. It is much smaller than the 76% share of ever-Knightian firms: those that
give a Knightian response at least once in our sample. The panel dimension of our
data is thus key to assessing the propensity to respond in a Knightian fashion. Switch-
ing between responses is such that firms occasionally enter persistent Knightian spells:
the typical firm switches to a Knightian response roughly once every 5 quarters, and it
remains Knightian for 1.8 quarters on average; the probability of remaining Knightian
is a little less than one half.
The distribution of both probabilities in Bayesian responses and probability inter-
vals in Knightian responses shows large heterogeneity over time and across firms.
Bayesian responses are close to uniformly distributed across the interval zero one – as
one might expect when managers respond to high frequency information about their
environment. The average probability interval in a Knightian response has a maxi-
mum probability that is also uniform, and an average width of 20pp. Average width
varies little with the location of the interval, which we measure by the midpoint prob-
ability. This result shows that Knightian behavior is prevalent even among managers
who are optimistic about sales growth. At the same time, the average Knightian inter-
val has a midpoint about 10pp below the average Bayesian point probability. In this
sense, Knightian responses are unconditionally correlated with pessimism about the
future.
Why do managers give Knightian responses? We answer this question in two steps.
We first explore firms’ self-assessment: the fall 2018 meta-survey asks firms to indi-
cate the importance of different candidate reasons for Knightian responses. The most
important reason firms report is that business is expected to be, or has recently been
"unusual". Remarkably, these reasons are cited equally frequently by always-Bayesian
firms that have never chosen a probability in our sample. The propensity to engage
in Knightian reasoning is thus likely to be positive even among this group. Two other
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candidate reasons are a lack of information and cautious planning. Both are consid-
ered less important by the average firm – they are cited by only 40% – but are em-
phasized especially by often-Knightian firms – those with a particularly high in-sample
share of Knightian responses.
If Knightian responses are part of a thought-out planning process, as firms’ self-assessment
suggests, they should be systematically related to other numbers used in planning.
Our second step in exploring managers’ motivation thus draws on another part of the
survey that asks firms for a forecast of one-quarter-ahead sales growth, along with best
and worst case scenarios. We show that Knightian responses are more frequent when
their forecast is close to zero and when the best and worst case scenarios bracket zero
– that is, when one would expect a lack of clarity about the event "sales increase". At
the same time, the share of Knightian responses is higher when the manager’s outlook
on the future is more pessimistic, as measured for example by its forecast. This is also
plausible if managers become more cautious in bad times. We conclude that firms’
self-assessment in the 2018 meta-survey fits well with their actual forecasting practice
observed in earlier years.
Are Knightian responses given by unsophisticated decision-makers who do not un-
derstand probabilities? Or do they come from managers who are good with numbers,
but simply choose to express uncertainty differently? We again provide a two-step
answer: we begin with self-assessment and then study forecasting performance. The
meta-survey asks firms a number of questions about their planning process. The main
takeaway is that there is no relationship between the frequency of Knightian responses
and firms’ planning tools. In particular, roughly equal shares of ever-Knightian and
always-Bayesian firms engage in (i) routine quantitative planning (about 80%), (ii) sta-
tistical analysis (57%) and (iii) scenario analysis (67%). The latter is a popular business
planning approach that explores scenarios around a baseline forecast, without neces-
sarily attaching probabilities; a key example is stress testing in banks.
What about actual forecasting performance? We show that Knightian responses are
about as bad as Bayesian responses in predicting the event of a sales increase. A
standard performance measure for Bayesian forecasters is the difference between the
probability forecast of an event and its conditional empirical frequency. Our Bayesian
responses reflect the familiar property of "miscalibration due to overprecision": man-
agers who submit small (large) probabilities underpredict (overpredict) the occurrence
of the event. Knightian responses share this property: Knightian midpoint proba-
bilities are miscalibrated to essentially the same extent as Bayesian responses. Since
Knightian responses consist of intervals, we also consider a second measure of mis-
calibration: a Knightian forecasters is well-calibrated if the conditional empirical fre-
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quency of the event falls inside the interval. According to this weaker criterion, only
a moderate share of Knightian responses that provide fairly high intervals are in fact
well calibrated.
How does Knightian reasoning vary over time? We show there is both a sizeable
aggregate component and a large idiosyncratic component. We define the aggregate
component as the quarterly Knightian response share. Its movement can be divided
into three phases. The Knightian share declines during the recovery from the Euro-
pean crisis in 2013 and late 2014, then spikes up sharply during the Greek crisis in
the first half of 2015, and finally declines again as the recovery continues. In fact, the
Knightian share closely tracks movements in the spread between Greek and German
government bonds, a proxy for macroeconomic risk in the Eurozone during this time
period. This finding lines up well with macro-finance models of Knightian uncer-
tainty that predict joint movements in perceived Knightian uncertainty and measured
risk premia, such as those present in credit spreads.1
Idiosyncratic variation in Knightian uncertainty depends on firm characteristics in a
limited way. We show that it is quite difficult to predict when firms switch from
Bayesian to Knightian responses using fixed characteristics. Regardless of whether
firms are large or small and what sector they are in, they enter a Knightian spell about
once every five quarters. This result underscores that Knightian responses do not re-
flect a fixed trait of a firm, but are instead a tool used by its managers at certain times
when they lack clarity about the future. At the same time, we do see systematic differ-
ences across firms in the duration of Knightian spells. We show in particular that small
firms, firms who do not export and firms that grow more slowly experience more per-
sistent Knightian spells, and hence give Knightian responses overall more frequently.
This finding squares well with our finding on motivation above: often-Knightian firms
cite "caution" as a particularly important reason for Knightian responses.
The global nature of the macro event in our sample – the Greek crisis – creates an
interesting connection between idiosyncratic and aggregate dynamics. Indeed, we
would expect that small firms and in particular those who do not export should be
less affected by news about Greece than large exporting firms. We find that this is
indeed the case: we show in an accounting exercise that the increase of the Knightian
response share in 2015 is driven mostly by firms entering Knightian spells. Moreover,
the Knightian share spikes much more strongly in 2015 among large firms as well as
exporters, two groups that unconditionally exhibit below average Knightian shares.
1 Knightian uncertainty has been found to help account for asset pricing (Epstein and Wang, 1994),
banking crises (Caballero and Simsek, 2013), business cycles (Ilut and Schneider, 2014) and the joint
determination of output, firm financing and risk premia (Bianchi et al., 2017).
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By contrast, the Knightian share for small firms rises with a delay and peaks only in
2016. In fact, it comoves much more strongly with the spread on investment grade
debt – a measure of funding cost for firms – than with the spread between Greek and
German bonds. In line with our general theme, Knightian responses are a tool to
express uncertainty and hence respond to what source of uncertainty firms care about
most.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the growing
body of work on quantitative (as opposed to categorical) survey measures of uncer-
tainty. Following the early contribution of Juster (1966), most of the literature has
focused on households. There are now many household surveys that measure uncer-
tainty, see for example papers based on the Health and Retirement Study (Juster and
Suzman, 1995; Hurd and McGarry, 2002), the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household In-
come and Wealth (Guiso et al., 1992, 2002), the Survey of Economic Expectations (Do-
minitz and Manski, 1997), the Michigan Survey of Consumers (Dominitz and Manski,
2004) and the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (Armantier et al.,
2015). However, most uncertainty-related questions attempt to elicit probabilistic be-
liefs.
A smaller literature studies survey measures of uncertainty in firms. Guiso and Pa-
rigi (1999) pioneered this line of research using data from the Bank of Italy (see also
Bontempi et al., 2010); their focus was on the effect of sales growth uncertainty on in-
vestment. Ben-David et al. (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2016) investigate executives’
stock return expectations while Coibion et al. (2018b) are interested in uncertainty per-
ceived about aggregate outcomes. Bloom et al. (2017) designed a new survey of US
firms that measures sales growth uncertainty (see also Altig et al., 2019). All of these
studies identify uncertainty with risk: they construct measures of uncertainty from
elicited probabilities. Our earlier paper Bachmann et al. (2018) proposed an alterna-
tive measure based on best and worst case scenario forecasts that makes sense for both
Bayesian and Knightian respondents. What is new in the present paper is that we use
probability forecasts and explicitly distinguish Bayesian from Knightian responses.
Frank Knight introduced the distinction between risk and what is now called Knigh-
tian uncertainty (or "ambiguity") in his 1921 book, "Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit". A
decision-theoretic literature on ambiguity began with Ellsberg (1961), who showed
that the distinction between risk and ambiguity is behaviorally meaningful. Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) proposed a popular axiomatic model of decision making that
represents utility using a convex set of probabilities. There have been some attempts
to measure attitude towards Knightian uncertainty in the lab or in surveys using a
revealed preference approach closely tied to theory – typically subjects are asked how
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they rank bets on uncertain events (for example, Asparouhova et al. 2015, Dimmock
et al. 2016). In this paper, we instead directly ask survey respondents to provide prob-
ability intervals or single probabilities. We therefore do not take a stand on a particular
model of decision making – what we are interested in is only in whether people think
in terms of probabilities or not.
Our approach is thus closer to a small literature that elicits imprecise probabilities in
household surveys, pioneered by Manski and Molinari (2010). The typical survey de-
sign uses a multi-part question: after first asking for the probability of an event, a
follow up question allows respondents who are not sure about their answer to spec-
ify a probability interval. This approach has been used to measure uncertainty about
schooling (Giustinelli and Pavoni, 2017), health outcomes (Giustinelli et al., 2019) or
households’ financial situation (Delavande et al., 2019). Our survey design is differ-
ent since we ask every respondent directly about a probability or probability interval.
Moreover, our data set is unique in that it comes from a business survey and consists
of a multi-year panel of probability interval responses that we can use to study the
dynamics of Knightian responses and their relationship to macroeconomic events.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces our data and pro-
vides a first set of summary statistics about Knightian responses. Section 2.3 reports
results from firms’ self-assessment that speak to both motivation and sophistication
and compares them to their forecast and forecasting performance. Finally, Section 2.4
studies the aggregate and idiosyncratic movements in Knightian responses.
2.2 Data
Our data come from an “uncertainty module” for manufacturing firms in the ifo Busi-
ness Survey, designed in 2012 and first described in Bachmann et al. (2018).2 The main
ifo survey has been run in Germany since 1949; it provides input for a leading indi-
cator of the German business cycle, the ifo Business Climate Index. Moreover, the ifo
Business Survey elicits data that feed into the European Economic Sentiment Indica-
tor published by the European Commission. The uncertainty module is administered
at the beginning of every quarter. In addition, in fall 2018, a one-time meta-survey
asked firms how they collect information and arrive at the views expressed in our
uncertainty module.
2 The raw data can be found under IBS-IND (2017).
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The uncertainty module has been in the field every quarter since 2013, the current
sample consists of 19 survey waves spanning 2013:Q2 through 2017:Q4. Participation
has been stable at 300-400 firms per wave; more than 500 firms participated in the
meta-survey. Throughout this paper, "firm" refers to either a stand-alone business or
a division of a large conglomerate. Survey questions ask about uncertainty in sales
growth. The German term used in the questionnaire, “Umsatz”, is a well-defined
technical term in profit and loss accounting, translated into English as “sales” or “total
revenue.” It is commonly used as an accounting statistic at the levels of both a division
and an entire firm.
Our earlier paper (Bachmann et al., 2018) contains more detailed information about
survey design, representativeness and quality of the responses. We emphasize in par-
ticular that (i) the identity of the responder within a given firm changes infrequently,
(ii) the typical responder holds a leading position in their firm, and (iii) responses typ-
ically incorporate results from routine quantitative planning. These findings are ro-
bust to firm size – they hold, in particular, also for large firms (or divisions).3 Finally,
questions in the main survey that ask about realized outcomes (such as production)
explicitly ask firms to ignore seasonal fluctuations. Consistent with this, we observe
only negligible seasonal effects in our data.
2.2.1 The Subjective Likelihood of a Sales Increase
Figure 2.1 displays an excerpt from the questionnaire for April 2014 in the original
German. In English, the question reads:
3. You can either answer with a probability or a probability interval:
(a) how do you assess the probability (in percentage terms) that your sales will increase in the
second quarter of 2014?
• Probability is % (please insert integers)
• Probability lies between % and % (please insert integers)
• don’t know
Parts (b) and (c) of the question are structured and phrased identically, except that the
word “increase” is replaced by “stay the same” and “decrease”, respectively. The ques-
tionnaire form contains boxes for respondents to provide their numerical answers. It
also features a third option “don’t know” (“weiss nicht” in German); it is checked in
3 The median firm in our sample has 100 employees, while the 75th percentile is at 250.
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the screenshot. A final box underneath part (c) allows firms to provide free-form text
comments (“Anmerkungen”).
Figure 2.1: Original survey questionnaire in German
Notes: Original questionnaire from ifo’s online module on subjective uncertainty in German; screenshot
from April 2014.
To clarify the timing, consider a firm responding in early April 2014, that is, at the
beginning of 2014:Q2. The probability, or probability interval, we ask for is then about
the percentage change in sales between 2014:Q1 and 2014:Q2. In other words, we elicit
subjective beliefs about the current quarter at the beginning of that quarter, at a point
in time when sales of the previous quarter are already known.
Our baseline sample consists of 569 firms and 4646 firm-quarter observations from 19
quarters. It is derived from the raw data in two steps. First, we check for consistency
of answers, such as whether the upper bound of the probability interval is above its
lower bound and percentages are between 0 and 100. We also use text comments to
drop firms unwilling or unable to provide sensible numerical answers. Second, some
of our analysis requires that an individual firm shows up in the panel sufficiently often.
We thus restrict attention to firms that respond at least five times.
2.2.2 Summary Statistics: The Prevalence of Knightian Responses
We divide responses about the likelihood of a sales increases into three groups: Bayesian,
Knightian and Certain. Our survey asks about a particular event, a sales increase. Dis-
cussing differences in attitudes towards uncertainty makes sense only for those firms
that actually perceive uncertainty about the event. We thus separately consider cer-
tain responses that are equal to zero or one. The remaining uncertain responses are
then divided into Bayesian responses that consist of a single probability and Knight-
ian responses that consist of a probability interval. The Knightian share is the ratio of
Knightian to uncertain responses.
In our pooled sample of over 4500 firm-quarter observations, the Knightian share
among uncertain firms is 28%. Indeed, the 82% uncertain responses consist of 59%
Bayesian and 23% Knightian responses. The Knightian share varies over time, but
quarterly shares remain between 20% and 35% – we return to this variation in Section
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2.4.2 below. The share of certain responses in the pooled sample is 18%. Certainty
is more prevalent when the outlook for sales is bad: in about 13% of firm quarters,
management believed that there is no chance of a sales increase, whereas in 5% of firm
quarters they were sure an increase would occur.
Is a Knightian response a trait of a small share of firms, or is it instead a choice some-
times made in most firms? The panel dimension of our data allows us to measure how
many firms have ever made use of the probability interval option in our sample. We
define an ever-Knightian firm as one that provides a Knightian response at least once.
An always-Bayesian firm never gives a Knightian response. For some of the results
below we further split ever-Knightians into two subsets by the frequency of Knight-
ian responses: sometimes-Knightians are ever-Knightians with a frequency less than or
equal to the median – which is equal to one third –, whereas often-Knightians are those
with a frequency above the median.
For the 422 firms in our sample that provided at least five responses, the share of ever-
Knightian firms is 76%. In other words, the overwhelming majority of firms makes use
of the probability interval option at least once. The large difference between the share
of ever-Knightian firms and the quarterly Knightian response share underscores the
importance of the panel dimension to assess the incidence of Knightian attitudes: any
single snapshot quarter would severely underestimate the propensity to give Knigh-
tian responses. Since the identity of the decision maker who fills out the question-
naire changes infrequently, we can conclude that most decision makers in firms rely
on Knightian responses to express uncertainty.
The discrepancy between shares of ever-Knightian firms and Knightian responses also
implies that there must be substantial switching between responses – firms switch
back and forth between the two modes of expressing uncertainty. Table 2.1 describes
churn with a simple empirical transition matrix. Here we restrict attention to the sub-
sample of firm-quarters such that we observe the firm to be uncertain also in the sub-
sequent quarter. Unconditional moments from this subsample are essentially the same
as for the main sample, and the transition to certainty is close to independent.
The key property of the transition matrix is that firms occasionally enter persistent
Knightian spells. Indeed, the probability of switching from a Bayesian to a Knightian
response is .19; it is below the unconditional probability of a Knightian response un-
der the stationary distribution of .26. At the same time, the probability of remaining
Knightian for one more period is .45. Under the stationary distribution, firms spend on
average one out of every four quarters as Knightians, the typical firm enters a Knigh-
tian spell about once every five quarters, and the duration of the typical spell is 1.8
quarters.
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Table 2.1: Transition matrix for Knightian and Bayesian responses
Knightian in t Bayesian in t








Notes: Transition matrix for Knightian and Bayesian re-
sponses between two subsequent quarters, based on 1790
firm-time observations.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of probabilities submitted by firms. The distri-
bution of probabilities in Bayesian responses is basically uniform, with a mean of .5.
For Knightian responses, we use the midpoint of the probability interval as a measure
of location. The average interval is centered around .39. The distribution of midpoints
is still fairly close to uniform, although it is shifted to the left: the typical Knightian
interval reflects more pessimism than the typical (degenerate) Bayesian interval.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for Bayesian and Knightian probabilities
Mean SE(Mean) P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Bayesian probability 0.50 0.01 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Knightian midpoint probability 0.39 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.35 0.60 0.80
minimum probability 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.70
maximum probability 0.47 0.01 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.70 0.90
Notes: We define the Knightian midpoint probability as the midpoint between the upper and lower
bound of the probability interval of a Knightian response. We label these bounds minimum and maxi-
mum probability.
The distribution of the maximum probability in Knightian responses, that is, the upper
bound of the probability interval, is very similar to that of the Bayesian probabilities.
By contrast, the density of the minimum probabilities is shifted to the left by roughly
20pp; the mean width of a probability interval is 17pp. At the intensive margin, that
is, interval width, uncertainty expressed via Knightian responses is therefore on aver-
age similar regardless of the location of the interval, as captured for example by the
midpoint.
2.3 Why Knightian Responses?
In this section, we characterize the circumstances under which firms choose Knightian
responses. We begin with firms’ self-assessment of their planning process as well as
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their choice of response when uncertain. We then check how Knightian responses
relate to other statistics relevant for planning elicited by the survey, including forecasts
and best and worst case scenarios. Finally, we compare the calibration of Knightian
and Bayesian responses.
The main takeaway is that there is no relationship between the frequency of Knightian
responses and firms’ planning tools: Knightian responses occur also in firms that have
a sophisticated sales planning procedure in place. Knightian responses are, however,
prevalent in firms where business is expected to be, or has recently been "unusual".
Knightian responses also correspond in meaningful ways to other relevant planning
statistics: they are more frequent when firms’ sales forecast is close to zero, and when
their best and worst case sales growth scenarios bracket zero growth. Finally, we find
that Bayesian and Knightian responses reflect similarly miscalibrated beliefs.
2.3.1 How Firms View Their Survey Responses
Results in this section rely on the one-time meta-survey conducted in the fall of 2018.
We can match 221 of these firms to respondents of earlier waves; due to item nonre-
sponse the usable number of observations varies slightly across questions. The ques-
tionnaire in the original German is shown in Appendix 2.A. We describe the relevant
questions in the text below.
Quantitative Planning Tools and Knightian Responses. We first check whether the
frequency of Knightian responses is explained by the nature of firms’ planning pro-
cess. For example, do some firms provide Knightian responses because they take a less
sophisticated or more informal approach to planning? We use a meta-survey question
that elicits what type of information firms use when they fill out our survey questions
about forecasting in the quarterly questionnaire. On average, 81% of firms state that
they are guided by numbers the firm has already developed in house as part of a “reg-
ular quantitative planning process”. Moreover, that share is remarkably stable across
firms with different Knightian response shares: it is 78% for always-Bayesians, 82%
for sometimes-Knightians, and 82% for often-Knightians.
We further explore whether the similarity between firms with different Knightian re-
sponse shares extends to the use of specific planning tools. The meta-survey asks those
firms that report the use of quantitative planning tools follow-up questions about the
importance of prominent approaches. In particular, the question elicits the importance
of statistical analysis. It also asks about the use of scenario analysis, that is, thinking
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about the future in terms of a few concrete, and possibly fairly detailed scenarios with-
out necessarily attaching probabilities. A well-known example of scenario analysis is
bank stress testing: banks are asked to forecast losses given a detailed set of contin-
gencies, but they are not asked to assign probabilities to those contingencies.
Concretely, the follow-up question is:
For the typical survey answer, how important were results from
(i) a scenario analysis around a baseline forecast
(ii) statistical analysis
(iii) other (please name).
For each of the options (i)-(iii), firms were asked to rate importance on a four point
scale: not important, less important, important or very important. Firms who chose
case (iii) were further given the option to list an alternative approach as a free text
comment. Results are presented in Fig. 2.1.
Scenario analysis is very important or important for almost a two thirds majority of all
firms, as shown in the left panel of the figure. This is in line with previous findings that
scenario analysis is common in German businesses.4 Again, distinguishing between
different subgroups of firms reveals remarkable similarity: scenario analysis is at least
important for 61% of always-Bayesians, 62% of sometimes-Knightians, and 67% of
often-Knightians.
The results for statistical analysis are shown in the right panel of Fig. 2.1. On average
57% of all firms indicate that statistical analysis is important or very important for their
planning process. Again, heterogeneity between always-Bayesian and ever-Knightian
firms is small. Statistical analysis is considered to be at least important by 59% of
always-Bayesians, 49% of sometimes-Knightians and 64% of often-Knightians. We
conclude that differences in planning technology do not push firms towards either a
probability value or a probability interval. In particular, we do not find evidence for
the view that the choice of a probability interval simply reflects lack of sophistication
in firms’ quantitative planning.
Motivation for Knightian Responses. Why would a firm prefer a probability inter-
val over a single probability value when expressing uncertainty about a sales increase?
The meta-survey includes the following direct question:
4 Mietzner (2009) provides an overview of the literature on strategic planning in German firms. In
many industries, the majority of firms engage in some sort of scenario analysis.
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Figure 2.1: Importance of scenario analysis and statistical analysis
 Scenario analysis

































Notes: Data from fall 2018 meta-survey. Multiple choice questions elicit importance of scenario analysis
(result in left panel) and statistical analysis (right panel); candidate answers are shown along horizontal
axis. Height of colored bars measures share of firms that chose each importance level, out of total of all
firms of the same type. Colors indicate firm types: Always-Bayesian = never gave a Knightian response
(used a nondegenerate probability interval) in the 2013-17 sample; Ever-Knightian = gave a Knightian
response at least once; Sometimes-Knightian = ever-Knightian that gave a Knightian response less or
equally often as the median ever-Knightian; often-Knightian = ever-Knightian that gave a Knightian
response more often than the median firm ever-Knightian. Gray whiskers indicate ±1.96 standard
error bands.
We choose a probability interval when...
...our business environment has changed a lot in recent years.
...we expect an unusual sales development in the current quarter.
...we are missing an important piece of information.
...we are particularly cautious for the current quarter.
For each candidate answer firms may state “applies”, “applies somewhat”, “does not
really apply”, and “does not apply at all”. Firms can thus provide multiple reasons for
choosing Knightian responses.
Fig. 2.2 reports shares of firms that state “applies” or “applies somewhat”, again by
type of firm. For each candidate answer, we present three bars, one for each of the
subgroups that reflect frequency of Knightian responses. One interesting takeaway
here is that even firms in our always-Bayesian group engage with the question and
provide motivation for a Knightian response, even though at the time of the meta-
survey they had never actually provided one. This result suggests that the share of
firms that contemplates Knightian responses, and hence views them as a useful tool to
express uncertainty is even larger than the 76% of ever-Knightian firms.
What specifically motivates firms to give Knightian responses? To create the figure,
we have ordered answers by importance. Nearly two thirds of all firms choose a prob-
92
CHAPTER 2. UNCERTAINTY IS MORE THAN RISK
Figure 2.2: Motivation for stating a probability interval













Notes: Data from fall 2018 meta-survey. Question elicits importance of candidate motivations for
Knightian responses shown along the horizontal axis. Height of colored bars measures share of firms
that labeled the candidate motivation "very important" or "important", out of total number firms of the
same type. Colors indicate firm types defined as in Figure 2.1. Gray whiskers indicate ±1.96 standard
error bands.
ability interval when they expect an unusual sales development in the future and there
is essentially no difference across groups. The second most important reason for re-
sponding in a Knightian fashion is large changes in the business environment, cited by
51% of always-Bayesians, 49% of often-Knightians and 60% of sometimes-Knightians.
The latter may assign greater importance to this motive because large changes happen
infrequently. Firms that use a Knightian response mostly as a reaction to exceptional
changes naturally end up in the sometimes-Knightian group.
Caution is cited as a reason for a Knightian response by about 40% of all firms. This is
an important result since it indicates that Knightian responses can reflect the firm’s ob-
jective function, and not only its views of the variable "sales increase" that is being pre-
dicted. Interestingly, this reason is mentioned more frequently by the often-Knightian
group of firms than by the other groups. The least important motive is lack of an im-
portant piece of information. However, it is cited by 44% of often-Knightian firms,
again much more so than by other firms. We conclude that there is some evidence of
heterogeneous motives: firms who give Knightian responses more often tend to do so
more out of caution or a lack of information.
2.3.2 Relationship With Other Planning Output
Firms’ self-assessment in the previous section suggested that Knightian responses rep-
resent an expression of uncertainty that reflects mainly an unusual business environ-
ment and, to a lesser extent, caution. We now investigate whether these motives are
corroborated by the relationship between answers to our main question and other in-
formation we have about firms’ beliefs. In particular, if beliefs about the environment
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matter, then we would expect that there are more Knightian responses when firms’
forecasts suggest that the event "sales increase" is more uncertain. Moreover, if we
postulate that firms become more cautious when business is weak, then we would
expect more Knightian responses when the outlook on the future is worse.
The results of this section make use of another part of the uncertainty module, ded-
icated to quantitative forecasting performance, also described in detail in Bachmann
et al. (2018). In particular, the module elicits sales growth realized over the last quarter
and the firm’s forecast for sales growth for the current quarter. Moreover, it asks firms
to provide best case and worst case scenarios for sales growth for the current quarter.
The idea behind this design was to exploit the widespread use of scenario analysis
in German firms to measure subjective uncertainty. Bachmann et al. (2018) propose
to use the difference, or span, between best and worst case scenarios as a measure of
subjective uncertainty. Meta-survey answers show that firms indeed report plausible,
as opposed to extreme, scenarios when filling out the questionnaire.
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Notes: Data: pooled responses for all firm quarters 2013-17. Solid lines are fitted values from kernel-
weighted local polynomial regressions, shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. All regressions use
polynomials of degree zero and Epanechnikov kernels with bandwidths given by the rule-of-thumb
bandwidth estimator. Independent variable on horizontal axis is always one quarter-ahead sales growth
forecast at beginning of quarter. Dependent variables are: in left panel, share of certain responses in all
responses (blue) and share of Knightian responses in all responses (red), bandwidths are h = .92 and
h = 2.67, respectively; in right panel: Knightian responses as a share of uncertain responses, bandwidth
is h = 1.52.
We show first that firms tend to give more Knightian responses when their forecast is
closer to zero. This is exactly when we would expect the event "sales increase" to be
more uncertain: firms with very high or low forecasts are presumably more confident
about whether the event will occur or not. The left panel of Figure 2.3 measures the
sales forecast along the horizontal axis and displays shares of certain and Knightian
responses as a share of all responses. Here we report fitted values from a kernel-
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weighted local polynomial regression together with shaded 95% confidence intervals.5
The key result is the inverse U-shape in the share of Knightian responses, with a peak
close to zero. In contrast, firms that predict very high or low growth, tend to be sure
about the path of future sales, especially when that path is going down.
Figure 2.3 further shows that uncertain firms tend to give more Knightian responses
when their predicted sales growth is lower. Indeed, the right panel shows the Knigh-
tian share out of uncertain firms: it is a downward sloping function of the forecast.
While the Knightian share at a forecast of zero is about the average share of 28%, it
increases to close to 40% for forecasts below negative 5%; it is fairly flat for positive
forecasts except that it drops below 20% for very high forecasts. The shape suggests
some correlation between news that leads firms to pessimistic forecasts and those that
change the nature of uncertainty perceived by firms.
Figure 2.4 relates the Knightian share to best and worst case scenarios contemplated
by the firms. This relationship reinforces the two themes seen already: Knightian
responses increase with uncertainty and in bad times. The horizontal axis in the fig-
ure measures the location of a firm’s probability interval, defined as the midpoint for
Knightian responses and the single probability in the Bayesian case. For all regres-
sions in this figure, we use an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.078. This
choice is motivated by the empirical distribution of midpoint probabilities: although
they are continuous choice variables, firms tend to cluster their answers on multiples
of 5% and 10%. The choice of bandwidth is thus effectively a choice of how many such
“gridpoints” we include in the neighbourhood of each point. In particular, the smallest
bandwidth that includes three (four) neighbour gridpoints to each side is 0.067 (0.089).
Our choice of 0.078 sits in the middle between these options.6
The top left panel clarifies that the midpoint probability as a measure of location is
highly correlated with the sales forecast, for both Bayesian and Knightian responses.
The top right panel plots the Knightian share: we again have a downward sloping
relationship with a flat middle section. We note also the kink at zero – the share of
Knightian responses rises sharply once forecasts turn negative. The panels together
5 We use a polynomial of degree zero and an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth h that is chosen for
each regression separately by the rule-of-thumb bandwidth estimator.
6 To see how our choice weights neighboring gridpoints, consider the following example. Suppose a
target point x0 has exactly three neighbours to the left at gridpoints x0 − 0.15, x0 − 0.1, and x0 − 0.05
and three neighbours to the right at gridpoints x0 + 0.05, x0 + 0.10, and x0 + 0.15. The Epanechnikov
kernel is defined as Kh(zi) = 34
√
5h
(1− 0.2(zi/h)2) if |zi| ≤
√
5h and zero otherwise, where zi denotes
the distance of a grid point to x0. By choosing h = 0.078, the smoothing window thus extends
from x0 − 0.175 to x0 + 0.175. The smoothed value at x0 is the weighted average ∑i wixi, where xi =
x0− 0.15, x0− 0.10, . . . , x0 + 0.15. The weights wi = Kh(zi)/ ∑i Kh(zi) generated by the Epanechnikov
kernel are then 0.056, 0.143, 0.195, 0.212, 0.195, 0.143 and 0.056.
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Share worst case < 0 < best case
Notes: Data: pooled responses for all firm quarters 2013-17. Solid lines in all panels show fitted values
of kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions; shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. All regres-
sions use polynomial of degree zero & Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth h = 0.078. Independent
variable along horizontal axis in all panels is midpoint of probability interval for sales increase over cur-
rent quarter from survey wave at beginning of quarter, with Bayesian responses coded as degenerate
intervals (that is, single probabilities). Dependent variables, all from same survey wave as probability
intervals are: in top left panel, sales growth forecast for current quarter; in top right panel, share of
Knightian responses in uncertain responses in current quarter; in bottom left panel: best and worst case
scenarios for current quarter; in bottom right: share of responses s.t. the worst case scenario < 0 < best
case scenario.
clarify in what sense the average Knightian response is more pessimistic than the av-
erage Bayesian response. Indeed, we can decompose the average (midpoint) forecast
of Bayesians and Knightians into two components: the distribution of midpoint be-
liefs reported in Table 2.2 and implicit in the right panel, and the forecast conditional
on that midpoint belief shown in the left panel. The results show that average pes-
simism is driven exclusively by the former.
Figure 2.4 also points out that, in good times, firms give more Knightian responses when
their best and worst case scenarios contain zero. Whether the scenarios bracket zero is
another natural sense in which firms perceive the event “sales increase” as uncertain.
We show the fact in two ways. First, the left hand panel displays the average best and
worst case scenarios together with the forecast. The worst case scenario crosses zero
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at a probability of 67%, right when the Knightian share in the top right panel shows a
sharp downward turn. Second, the right hand panel of the figure displays the share of
responses such that zero is in between the best and worst cases. Again the dropoff on
the right aligns clearly with the dropoff in the Knightian share.
The results of this section are interesting for an ongoing debate on how to interpret
survey forecast data. One view holds that respondents who perceive greater uncer-
tainty tend to “shade” their forecasts towards outcomes that are worse for them. For
example, risk averse agents might report forecasts derived from a "risk neutral" prob-
ability that places more mass on bad events. Similarly, one might suspect that agents
who give Knightian responses align their forecasts with their minimum probabilities,
and therefore produce more pessimistic forecasts than Bayesians. Our findings instead
show that firms with the same midpoint probability - whether Bayesian or Knightian –
make similar forecasts.
2.3.3 Calibration
Our results on firms’ self assessment in Section 2.3.1 do not suggest that Knightian
responses are due to lack of sophistication. However, firms’ subjective view of their
planning might not be backed up by their forecasting performance. In this section, we
assess that performance by asking how well calibrated firms are as predictors of their
own sales growth, and whether there are important differences between Bayesian and
Knightian responses. We emphasize that the analysis again takes places at the level of
responses, so the question is whether firms forecast systematically worse in quarters
when they express their uncertainty in a Knightian fashion.
Our tool to measure calibration is a standard calibration plot, shown in Figure 2.5. For
the Bayesian case, the horizontal axis measures the predicted probability whereas the
vertical axis measures the frequency with which the predicted event occurred in the
data. Well-calibrated forecasters should locate along the 45 degree line: while forecasts
are not perfect (away from the endpoints), the realizations of the random variable be-
ing forecasted exactly reflect the predicted distribution. A forecaster above (below) the
diagonal systematically underpredicts (overpredicts) the event. This graphical analy-
sis has a long history in measuring forecaster performance.
We produce the graph with our pooled sample of forecasts: formally, we run a kernel
regression of a dummy indicating a sales increase on the predicted probability. We
thus assess the average degree of calibration for groups of firm decision makers that
provide the same probability. To extend the analysis to Knightian responses, we use
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again the midpoint probability as a measure of location of the probability interval. In
the top left panel of Figure 2.5, the blue line represents Bayesian responses and the red
line represents Knightian responses. The endpoints, that is, the certain responses of
zero or one, are plotted separately, that is, they do not inform the kernel regression.







0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1









0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1










0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1








0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
maximum probability of sales increase
Knightian maximum
Notes: Data: pooled responses for all firm quarters 2013-17. Solid lines in all panels show fitted val-
ues of kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions; shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. All
regressions use polynomial of degree zero and Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth h = 0.078. Top
left panel shows separate regressions for Bayesian and Knightian responses in blue and red, respec-
tively. Independent variable on horizontal axis is midpoint of probability interval for sales increase,
with Bayesian responses coded as degenerate intervals (= point probabilities). Dependent variable is
dummy for occurrence of a sales increase in quarter for which probability forecast is made. Top right
panel shows Knightian responses only: red line is same as in top left panel. Green and purple lines
are fitted values from regressions of maximum and minimum probabilities on midpoint probability,
respectively. Bottom panels show Knightian responses only: dependent variable is dummy for occur-
rence of a sales increase in quarter for which probability forecast is made; independent variables along
horizontal axis are minimum and maximum probabilities in left and right panels, respectively.
The main result is that both Bayesian and Knightian responses are miscalibrated in
a very similar fashion: both strongly underestimate the likelihood of a sales increase
when their outlook on the future is bad (that is, when their probability of a sales in-
crease is low), and both overestimate it when the outlook is good (that is, when their
probability of a sales increase is high). Indeed, both kernel regression lines are much
flatter than the 45-degree-line, with an intercept above .4 and an average slope of about
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.35. According to the fitted values, Knightians’ midpoints imply a larger forecast error
when they are between .5 and .7, as well as when they are larger than .8. However,
gaps are typically below 10pp and not significantly different from zero. For Bayesians,
the pattern is familiar from earlier studies. It is consisted with a simple model of
Bayesian updating when agents receive unbiased signals but overestimate their preci-
sion: agents then "overreact" to both positive and negative signals.
The other panels of Figure 2.5 focus on Knightian responses only and show that our
conclusion is robust to alternative ways of measuring miscalibration. Since Knightian
responses consist of an entire probability interval, focusing on the midpoint is only
one way to assess calibration, albeit a convenient one that allows familiar graphical
analysis. More generally, we would like to know whether the empirical frequency of
the forecasted event is contained in the Knightian forecaster’s interval. If we had long
panel data on each forecaster, this question could be answered directly. Here we draw
on the pooled sample to obtain two partial answers.
The top right panel of Figure 2.5 assesses whether the empirical frequency of a sales in-
creases for Knightians with a given midpoint probability is located within the average
probability interval predicted by those firms. Formally, we compare fitted values from
three kernel regressions on the midpoint probability: a red line for the dummy for a
sales increases as in the top left panel, and purple and green lines for the lower and
upper of the interval, respectively. If all Knightians were well calibrated, we would
see the frequency lie in between the upper and lower bound. We find that Knight-
ian responses are well calibrated in this sense for a range of relatively high midpoint
probabilities between 60 and 80 percent. However, for low midpoints the empirical
frequency is well above the maximum probability. We can conclude that the typical
firm with a bad outlook is also miscalibrated according to this less stringent criterion.
There is also some evidence of miscalibration at the very top: here the empirical fre-
quency is below the average minimum probability, that is, the average interval lies
entirely above the frequency.
The bottom panels of Figure 2.5 assess miscalibration by directly comparing the empir-
ical frequency to minimum and maximum probabilities: we plot fitted values of kernel
regressions of a sales increase dummy on the minimum and maximum probabilities.
The panels thus differ from those in the top row in that the horizontal axis no longer
measures location but instead interval bounds. This approach avoids averaging the
interval bounds across responses with the same midpoint. At the same time, each plot
only checks miscalibration in one direction: if Knightian responses are well-calibrated
then the empirical frequency lies above the diagonal in the left panel and below the
diagonal in the right panel.
99
CHAPTER 2. UNCERTAINTY IS MORE THAN RISK
The bottom left panel zeros in on miscalibration due to overestimation: a frequency of
sales increases below the 45-degree line means that the average interval of a firm with
this minimum probability is strictly above the empirical frequency. We see this only
for the highest minimum probabilities. In contrast, the right panel is set up to uncover
miscalibration due to underestimation: a frequency of sales increase above the 45-
degree line means that the average interval of a firm with this maximum probability
is strictly below the frequency. There is again strong evidence of underestimation.
2.4 Dynamics of Knightian Responses
In this section, we study the evolution of Knightian responses over time. Figure 2.1
displays the evolution of the Knightian share over our sample period, together with
shaded 95% confidence bounds. There are two key takeaways. First, the share of ever-
Knightian firms that give a Knightian response in any given quarter lies between 20 and
35 percent, far below the 76% of firms that give a Knightian response at least once. It
follows that firms must frequently switch between Bayesian and Knightian responses.
Section 2.4.1 explores whether firm characteristics can predict the frequency of such
switches.
Figure 2.1: Time-variation of Knightian share
Syriza wins elections
Greece defaults










1/1/2013 1/1/2014 1/1/2015 1/1/2016 1/1/2017 1/1/2018
Knightian Share
Notes: Time series of the fraction of Knightian responses by survey wave from 2013Q2 through 2017Q4.
Rectangular markers indicate survey periods during the first month of each quarter. The shaded area
represents 95% confidence intervals. The vertical lines indicate three important dates of the Greek
sovereign debt crisis in 2015.
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The second takeaway from Figure 2.1 is that time series movement in the Knight-
ian share appears to reflect macroeconomic risk. In the beginning of the sample, the
Knightian share declines as the European debt crisis becomes more distant. It then
spikes sharply in early 2015 when the Greek crisis worsens, only to again resume its
downward trend later that year. Greek elections on January 25, 2015 saw the victory
of the Syriza party that had promised substantial debt write-offs during the campaign.
In subsequent months, tensions with Greek’s creditors, the so-called Troika, amplified
and peaked when Greece, after announcing bank holidays and imposing capital con-
trols, did not repay an IMF loan on June 30. In July, the German minister of finance
advocated a temporary exit of Greece from the euro area. On August 14, after more
than a month of negotiations, the Greek parliament approved the final of three new
bailout programs that gradually allayed financial market fears. Section 2.4.2 compares
movement in the Knightian share to other measures of macroeconomic risk and also
computes the contribution of firms with a plausibly different exposure to aggregate
conditions, e.g., exporting versus non-exporting firms.
2.4.1 The Persistence of Knightian Spells in the Cross Section
Table 2.1 provides an overview of Knightian shares and the dynamics of responses for
different classes of firms. The first column lists the Knightian share, that is, Knightian
responses as a share of all uncertain responses. The second and third columns mea-
sure the frequency of switching to and away from a Knightian response, respectively:
we compute empirical conditional probabilities of responses for firms that we observe
to be uncertain in two consecutive quarters. These numbers can also be interpreted
in terms of duration: assuming a Markovian evolution of the response type, the in-
verse of the numbers in the second and third column represent the average duration
of Bayesian and Knightian spells, respectively. Finally, the fourth column shows the
share of ever-Knightian firms that provide a Knightian response at least once in the
sample.
We measure firm size by the number of employees, and report results for large firms
with more than 250 workers as well as small firms with 50 or less workers. The ifo
survey also indicates whether the firm exports. When asked for their expectations
about export business in the next three months, respondents can either choose from
the three categories “increase”, “unchanged”, or “decrease”, or tick the option “we
do not export”. We define firms to be exporters if they always respond with one of
the three directional answer options in our sample. The average share of exporting
firms is 82%. Finally, we distinguish firms by their average growth rate over the en-
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Table 2.1: Knightian (K) and Bayesian (B) responses for different groups of firms
K share Prob(K|B) Prob(B|K) ever-K share

























































Notes: Column 1 shows share of Knightian responses in pooled sample of 4646
firm quarters. Columns 2 & 3 show empirical transition probabilities in subsam-
ple of 1790 firm-quarters such that each firm is represented in quarters t and t + 1.
Column 2 (3) shows firm date pairs such that Bayesian (Knightian) response at
t is followed by a Knightian (Bayesian) response at t + 1, as a share of firm date
pairs with Bayesian (Knightian) responses at t. Column 4 shows share of ever-
Knightian firms that respond at least once as Knightian, based on 422 firms with
at least five uncertain responses. Rows refer to full sample as well as subsample
averages. Small firms have 50 or less employees, large firms have more than 250
employees, exporter firms report they export in every quarter they appear in the
sample, while non-exporter do not, low and high trend growth firms are defined
as bottom and top quartile of the firm-average sales growth distribution.
tire five year sample. The idea here is that beliefs about sales growth may not only
depend on size but also on the firm’s trajectory. We form four quartiles of firms by
average growth rate and report here the top and bottom quartiles, labeled high and
low growth, respectively. Average growth rates over the sample within these groups
are -4.8% and 9.6%, respectively.
The first result from the table is that there are statistically significant, if economically
moderate, differences in the Knightian shares across firms. In particular, Knightian
responses are more prevalent among small firms, firms that do not export as well as
firms with low growth trends. While there is correlation between these characteristics
– in particular large firms tend to be exporters – separate regressions (not reported)
show that each characteristic has an independent impact on the frequency of Knightian
responses.
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The second result is that firms in groups with large fractions of Knightian responses
experience longer Knightian spells, but do not necessarily start more of those spells.
This is apparent from the second column: for size and export share, the probabilities
of switching to Knightian are all very close to 20%. At the same time, probabilities in
the third column reveal large differences in the duration of Knightian spells: while it
is only 1.52 quarters for large as well as for exporting firms, it rises to 1.72 quarters for
non-exporting firms and to 2.32 quarters for small firms. For both of those groups the
larger share of ever-Knightian firms in the fourth column is thus explained largely by
longer Knightian spells.
The groups of high and low trend firms behave differently. Here we do see a sig-
nificantly lower probability of switching to a Knightian response for firms that grow
faster on average. Moreover, while Knightian spells are longer for low growth firms,
the cross group difference in probabilities in the third column is much smaller than for
the other pairs of groups. We can conclude that growth trend also helps predict the
frequency of Knightian responses. In contrast to the other characteristics, however,
this is not only because the duration of Knightian spells is predictable. In addition, it
is actually possible to predict the frequency of switches to Knightian responses.
2.4.2 Knightian Responses and Macroeconomic Risk
We now return to the time series evolution of the Knightian share in Figure 2.1. To fur-
ther understand this evolution, Figure 2.2 plots Knightian shares for different groups
of firms, and also overlays it with two types of credit spreads, key measures of macroe-
conomic risk during recent boom bust episodes. Theories of Knightian uncertainty
tend to emphasize that it should be reflected jointly in firm planning and observed
risk premia in financial markets. In each panel, Knightian shares are presented with
95% confidence intervals and measured along the left vertical axis. Credit spreads are
measured along the right vertical axis.
The top left panel compares the overall Knightian share with the spread between
Greek and German bonds. The co-movement is striking: like the Knightian share, the
sovereign risk spread goes through the three phases of initial decline, upward spike,
and recovery. As the Greek crisis unfolds, the spread leads the Knightian share by two
quarters: we observe an elevated Knightian share only at the beginning of the third
quarter of 2015, that is, in early July. The top right panel shows that the Knightian
share for large firms – which are presumably more connected to international markets
– ticks up already 6 months earlier, at the same time when spreads widen.
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The bottom left and right panels look at exporting firms – likely more exposed to an in-
ternational event – and small firms, respectively. Much like large firms, exporters give
fewer Knightian responses most of the time, but experience a notable spike right at
the peak of the Greek crisis. A key difference to large firms is that their reaction comes
with a lag. Small firms differ from both the other groups in that the 2015 increase in
the Knightian share is rather mild, but builds up to a protracted increase. This fact is
connected to the longer duration of Knightian spells experienced by the typical small
firm. As a result, the path of average Knightian uncertainty experienced by small firms
resembles less the Greek spread, a measure of financial stability in Europe, but instead
a high yield spread, often taken as a measure of financial frictions.
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Below Inv. Grade EA Corp. Debt Yield
Knightian Share
Small firms
Notes: Time series of the fraction of Knightian responses by survey wave from 2013Q2 through 2017Q4.
We show this series for all firms, as well as for the subsamples of large firms with more than 250 em-
ployees, exporting firms defined as firms that always reported to export in our sample, and small firms
with 50 employees or less. The rectangular markers illustrate the survey periods in the first month of
a quarter. The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals. We plot the Knightian share series
against financial series: the 10-year Greek government bond spread against the 10-year German gov-
ernment bond (top row of plots and bottom left) and the yield of below investment grade euro area
corporate debt. The former is retrieved from Macrobond, the latter is taken from the FRED data base
(FRED identifier: BAMLHE00EHYIEY).
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2.4.3 Transition Dynamics Between Bayesian and Knightian Responses
We have shown above that the share of Knightian responses varies over time and is
meaningfully related to macroeconomic events. We now study how switching be-
tween Bayesian and Knightian states contribute to changes in the Knightian share. To
this end, we estimate a two-state Markov chain that takes on the values "Bayes" or
"Knight". We allow transition probabilities to depend on calendar time. We handle
missing values in our unbalanced panel of firms by taking as observables all realized
transitions between states by firms, possibly more than one quarter apart. We estimate
the sequence of transition matrices by maximum likelihood; details are contained in
Appendix 2.B for details.
The estimated switching probabilities are displayed in Figure 2.3. They are character-
ized by substantial time-variation: The probability of switching from a Knightian to a
Bayesian response – that is, exiting a Knightian spell – varies between 40 and 70 per-
cent, whereas the probability of entering a Knightian spell varies between 10 and 30
percent. Time variation in both types of transition thus contributes to fluctuations in
the Knightian share in Figure 2.1. At the same time, some movements in the Knightian
share are not associated with changes in transition probabilities.
Consider in more detail the dynamics of beliefs at the beginning of our sample, that
is, the back end of the European debt crisis. The summer of 2013 marked a renewed
increase in many risky borrowing rates, including the low quality yield in the bottom
right panel of Figure 2.2. The transition matrix from July to October then saw a one
time spike in the probability of switching from a Bayesian to a Knightian response.
Over the next year and a half, transition probabilities remained essentially constant,
which led to a steady exit from Knightian spells. After the ECB’s introduction of its QE
programs – first announced in September 2014 and extended in January 2015 – there is
a large spike in switches from Knightian to Bayesian responses. Finally, the widening
of spreads in summer 2015 again coincides with a spike in the probability of entering
a Knightian spell.
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Figure 2.3: Time varying transition probabilities












Syriza wins elections 
Greece defaults on IMF loan 
 Parliament approves
     final bailout package
Bayes to Knight
Knight to Bayes
Notes: Estimated time-varying transition probabilities from Bayesian to Knightian responses and from
Knightian to Bayesian responses 2013Q3 through 2017Q4. Probabilities for quarter t represent transition
probabilities from quarter t − 1 to quarter t. The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.
Vertical lines indicate three important dates for the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2015.
2.5 Conclusion
Using survey data from German firms, this paper studies whether executives think
about future sales growth in terms of probabilities. In a question about the likeli-
hood of a sales increase we innovate by letting respondents freely decide to submit
either a single probability or a “Knightian” probability interval. Our main result is
that “Knightian” responses are pervasive: three quarters of the firms in our sample
choose a probability interval at least once in five years. Using results from a meta sur-
vey and information on their other forecasts, we show that managers use probability
intervals to express their lack of clarity about the future; they do not reflect a lack of so-
phistication. Moreover, responses with probability intervals are equally miscalibrated
compared to “Bayesian” responses with single probabilities.
We further document that respondents switch between the “Knightian” and “Bayesian”
answer options: they occasionally enter persistent “‘Knightian” spells. This behavior
seems to reflect both idiosyncratic and aggregate events. During the Greek debt crisis
in 2015, the share of “Knightian” responses spikes up in parallel with bond spreads.
This is most pronounced for large and exporting firms that would have been most af-
fected – directly or indirectly – by a default or a possible exit of Greece from the euro
area.
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Quantitative survey question often elicit subjective beliefs of households and decision
makers in firms using single probabilities. This equates uncertainty with risk. Our
results suggest that a more flexible survey technique can collect richer information
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2.B Estimation of Transition Matrices
To model the dynamics of the choice between a probability interval ("Knightian" an-
swer) and a point probability ("Bayesian" answer) for the event of a sales increase, we
use a discrete Markov chain with two states. To this end, we define the variable yit
that can take values (states) 1=Knightian and 2=Bayesian. To save notation, we first
describe the construction of the likelihood function for the time-invariant case. The
objective is to estimate the parameters of the time-invariant transition matrix


























We have an unbalanced panel of i = 1, . . . , N firms. The maximum sample is t =
1, . . . , T but firms do not respond every period. We assume that each firm i is observed
5 ≤ ki ≤ T times in periods ti1, . . . , tiki , where 1 ≤ tij ≤ T. Hence, the vector yi of all
observations of firm i is
yi = (yiti1 , . . . , yitiki )
′.
To write down the likelihood function that includes all relevant information, we fac-
torize the joint pmf into observed conditionals. The Markov property implies that,
e.g.,
f (yit|yit−h) = p
(h)
yit−h,yit .
Using this result, we write the joint distribution of the observations of firm i as









Assuming cross-sectional independence of firms, the log-likelihood function is
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Since it includes the parameters of h-step transition matrices, it is highly nonlinear and
needs to be maximized numerically.
We now turn to the case of time-varying transition matrices considered in the text.





, t = 1, . . . , T,
where pt,11 + pt,12 = 1 and pt,21 + pt,22 = 1. The h-step transition matrix for transition
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CHAPTER 3. UNCERTAINTY, EXPECTATIONS, AND FIRM BEHAVIOR
3.1 Introduction
An active literature is interested in understanding how uncertainty affects individual
economic decisions, and as a result, business cycle fluctuations. Similar to expecta-
tions, uncertainty is inherently subjective. Thus, a good starting point to analyze how
uncertainty affects outcomes are the beliefs of decision makers in firms and house-
holds. To guide their actions, individuals form expectations in the presence of uncer-
tainty. Hence, conceptually expectations and subjective uncertainty are closely related.
Yet, due to a lack of adequate measures, little is known about their empirical relation-
ship and their relative importance for economic decisions.
This paper presents a new measure of managers’ perceived uncertainty and relates it to
their expectations and corporate decisions. In particular, I use the results from a novel
survey question that asks firms directly how uncertain they are about the development
of their business. This question is part of the ifo Business Survey, a representative Ger-
man business survey that covers roughly 9,000 firms each month. Both at the micro
level and in the time series, it allows me to develop stylized facts about the relation-
ship between managers’ subjective uncertainty vis-à-vis their business expectations
over the next six months and their assessment of their current business situation. All
three variables are reported on visual analogue scales, which are essentially more dif-
ferentiated versions of Likert scales. To establish my baseline results, I focus on the
manufacturing sector from 2017 to 2019: during this time, it slipped from a boom to a
moderate recession. To verify my findings, I extend the analysis to other sectors and
to fluctuations of the economy during the subsequent COVID-19 crisis. Exploiting
firm heterogeneity and the large aggregate variation in the onset of this crisis, I relate
uncertainty and expectations to firms’ investment and employment decisions.
My main findings are fourfold. First, asking managers directly about their uncertainty
seems to be a sensible method to elicit beliefs. Second, firms’ perceived uncertainty
about their future business development is strongly negatively related to their busi-
ness expectations. This stylized fact is manifest both at the micro level and in the time
series. Third, I find that this relationship is weaker in bad times. Managers perceive
high uncertainty in a period of low economic activity even if expectations improve.
Fourth, in contrast to first moment changes, changes in uncertainty neither predict the
postponement of investment projects nor a “freeze” of the number of employees in
the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. This is not in line with the theoretical mechanism of
“wait and see” behavior.
Regarding the measurement of subjective business uncertainty, my first result is that
managers have a good understanding of the term “uncertainty”—in the sense of “dif-
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ficult to predict”. This is based on a comparison of the answers to two questions: one
that asks respondents directly how uncertain they are about their business develop-
ment and a second one that asks them for an assessment of the difficulty to predict this
development. I document that the responses to the two questions essentially contain
the same information. Conceptually, both questions are holistic and able to capture
not only risk, but also Knightian uncertainty.1 In case of risk, the second question is a
measure of variance. In sum, this suggests that a direct question can be a sensible tool
to measure firms’ subjective uncertainty.
Using firm-level data from the manufacturing sector, my second result is that per-
ceived uncertainty is strongly negatively related to business expectations and respon-
dents’ assessment of the current business situation. Based on bivariate relationships,
the more pessimistic a respondent or the worse her assessment of the business situa-
tion, the more uncertain she is. This holds true both for the pooled sample and within
firms. However, the relationships are not linear. The negative relationship is stronger
when firms are pessimistic compared to when they are optimistic. These findings re-
call the inverse relationship of expected returns and volatility observed in equity mar-
kets (see, for instance, Bekaert and Wu 2000). Managers’ expectations and subjective
uncertainty seem to behave similarly to these financial market outcomes.
Next, I study how perceived uncertainty is related to combinations of the assessment
of the business situation and expectations. Two cases are of particular interest: a good
business situation combined with unfavorable expectations, and a bad business sit-
uation combined with favorable expectations. From an aggregate view, many such
instances might correspond to business cycle turning points. Based on the micro data,
I find that uncertainty is high in both cases. Overall, it emerges as a stylized fact that
managers are highly uncertain if either the situation is assessed as poor or expecta-
tions are unfavorable, or both. Since in a bad situation uncertainty is always high,
the relationship between uncertainty and expectations is weaker in bad times. These
findings suggest that managers’ uncertainty increases when expectations deteriorate,
it stays high in a bad business situation, and it only decreases when the business situ-
ation normalizes. Further below, I provide a tentative intuition for this pattern based
on the negatively skewed distribution of firms’ growth rates.
The stylized facts from the micro level carry over to the time series for the manufactur-
ing sector. The central and novel result is that perceived uncertainty and expectations
are almost perfectly inversely correlated in the aggregate. The same is true for the re-
1 The categorization of uncertainty in risk and Knightian uncertainty (or “ambiguity”) dates back to
Knight (1921). In today’s understanding, risk refers to a situation in which individuals can assign
probabilities to a set of future events, while this is not possible in the case of Knightian uncertainty.
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lationship between uncertainty and the business situation. This confirms the stylized
fact from proxy measures which indicate that uncertainty is counter-cyclical. More-
over, in line with the micro evidence, the relationship between uncertainty and expec-
tations appears to be state-dependent: uncertainty correlates less with expectations if
the average business situation in unfavorable.
I demonstrate the validity of these time series results along several dimensions. First,
the inverse relation between uncertainty and expectations holds for all major sectors—
namely manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, and services—and
the German economy as a whole. Moreover, it becomes especially apparent during
the COVID-19 crisis in the first half of 2020. By mid-2020, expectations improve, but
uncertainty persists, as the economy stays weak. These stylized facts hold true for
three different measures of subjective uncertainty. Data from the Survey of Business
Uncertainty administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta displays a similar
pattern for the US.
The simultaneity of aggregate movements in subjective uncertainty and expectations
challenges traditional recursive identification schemes in vector-autoregressive frame-
works that attempt to causally link uncertainty to outcomes. Due to possible endo-
geneity of uncertainty and growth, Ludvigson et al. (2020) also view other identifica-
tion strategies used in time-series econometrics as problematic. This applies in partic-
ular to recessions, when uncertainty fluctuates the most. Using micro data offers an
alternative way to learn about the effect of uncertainty on outcomes. It has two advan-
tages. First, besides time-series variation, also differences in the cross section can be
exploited. Second, it provides the opportunity to directly test theoretical channels that
connect uncertainty to outcomes: most mechanisms rely on the behavior of individu-
als. This motivates me to use firm-level data to study the role of subjective uncertainty
and expectations for corporate decisions.
In particular, I conduct a case study focusing on the onset of the COVID-19 crisis.
The aim is to empirically examine the theoretical “real options” channel. Its idea is
that high uncertainty can make it rational for firms to delay (partially) irreversible
investments and to “freeze” hiring. Decision makers “wait and see” until more in-
formation is available (Bernanke, 1983; Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; McDonald and
Siegel, 1986). In the case of an aggregate downturn, uncertainty increases. At the same
time, managers’ expectations deteriorate, which may let them defer investments and
reduce employment. To better understand the importance of uncertainty and expecta-
tions for firm behavior, I exploit the between-firm variation of these perceptions dur-
ing the COVID-19 shock. I find that firms’ decisions to postpone investment projects
and to reduce the number of employees are related to first moment changes, but not
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to changes in uncertainty. While “wait and see” may describe some firms’ behavior,
the results from averaging over all firms are not in line with the predictions from the
“real options” channel.
This paper contributes to several strands of the empirical literature about uncertainty,
firms, and business cycles. First, it is part of the literature concerned with the measure-
ment and analysis of subjective business uncertainty. Over the last decade, a handful
of surveys have started to elicit the subjective uncertainty of businesses with respect
to their own future development. For the US, Altig et al. (2019) have developed the
monthly Survey of Business Uncertainty for quantitative one-year ahead expectations
and uncertainty regarding a firm’s growth of sales, investment, and employment.2
Respondents are asked for five scenarios from best to worst of the outcome variable.
Subsequently, the survey elicits probabilities for these scenarios. Uncertainty is then
calculated as a measure of variance of these probability distributions.3 Bachmann et al.
(2018) present an alternative approach for a quarterly supplement to the ifo Business
Survey for Germany. They measure subjective uncertainty as the difference between
sales growth expectations in the best and in the worst case. Both Altig et al. (2019)
and Bachmann et al. (2018) relate uncertainty to past growth and forecast errors at the
micro level. I extend this growing strand of literature in three ways. First, I present a
new direct and holistic measure of managers’ perceived uncertainty. Second, I focus
on the relationship between uncertainty and expectations. Third, by considering the
business situation, I add a new dimension to the analysis: the relative level position of
a firm in its cycle.
Due to the absence of survey-based measures of subjective uncertainty, almost all time-
series studies in the literature on uncertainty shocks rely on proxy measures.4 For a
recent comprehensive overview, see Cascaldi-Garcia et al. (2020). A common finding
from these time-series measures is that they are counter-cyclical. This paper differs
from the literature on proxy measures by presenting aggregate time series of man-
2 The resulting time series are available online at https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/surveys/business-
uncertainty.
3 Similarly, Bloom et al. (2017) describe quantitative questions on sales growth uncertainty in the Man-
agement and Organizational Practices Survey administered by the Census in 2015. For the UK, the
Decision Maker Panel also includes questions that follow this methodology (Bloom et al., 2018a).
4 Popular approaches include indices of implied or realized volatility of stock market returns (Bloom,
2009; Barrero et al., 2017), the cross-sectional dispersion of firm-level outcomes, expectations, or fore-
cast errors (Bachmann and Bayer, 2013, 2014; Bloom et al., 2018b; Bachmann et al., 2013), the con-
ditional volatility of statistical forecast errors from macro time series (Jurado et al., 2015), counts
of uncertainty-related keywords in news publications (Baker et al., 2016), and time devoted to
uncertainty-related topics in quarterly earnings conference calls (Hassan et al., 2019).
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agers’ subjective uncertainty about their firms’ business development—jointly with
their expectations and an assessment of their business situation.5
This paper also contributes to the survey-based micro-econometric literature that links
the subjective uncertainty of economic decision makers to outcomes. Due to the scarcity
of data on subjective uncertainty, the literature for households is small. In a recent con-
tribution, Ben-David et al. (2018) relate households’ expectations and subjective uncer-
tainty about their personal income to economic decisions. They find that individuals
with more uncertain expectations exhibit more precaution in their consumption and
investment behavior.6 The first contribution concerning firms stems from Guiso and
Parigi (1999) who measure the uncertainty of managers about future sales growth.
Based on a cross section of Italian firms, they find that businesses with similar ex-
pectations about sales growth, but higher uncertainty, invest less.7 In the same spirit,
Dibiasi et al. (2018) study the investment response of a small share of firms that were
exposed to an uncertainty-inducing referendum in Switzerland. Their result is that
uncertain firms with a high degree of irreversibility lower investment. My analysis
during the COVID-19 shock differs from previous work due to the focus on corporate
decisions on investment and employment and since I exploit the variation of uncer-
tainty in an aggregate downturn.
Furthermore, this paper is part of the growing literature on uncertainty and expecta-
tions during the COVID-19 crisis. For the US and the UK, Altig et al. (2020) and Baker
et al. (2020) document large increases in both proxy measures of uncertainty and sub-
jective business uncertainty. Using proxy measures, Baker et al. (2020) estimate that
half of the aggregate drop in output can be related to second moment effects. Based
on data of the ifo Business Survey, Buchheim et al. (2020a) study corporate mitigation
strategies in the face of the COVID-19 shock. They highlight the relation of firms’ ac-
tions with pre-existing business conditions and with expectations about the duration
of the crisis. My analysis differs in that I focus on individual changes of uncertainty
and expectations that constitute the aggregate variation in the onset of the COVID-19
recession.
5 To the best of my knowledge, to date there exists only one study that conducts econometric analyses
with an aggregate time series of firms’ subjective uncertainty. It is based on an Austrian business
survey (Glocker and Hölzl, 2019).
6 Other household studies that relate measures of subjective uncertainty to outcomes include Guiso
et al. 1992, Guiso et al. 2002, and Leduc and Liu 2016.
7 Bontempi et al. 2010 examine the same relationship for a panel of Italian firms from 1996 to 2004
and show that the relationship between uncertainty and investment varies over time and can become
insignificant, which they attribute to changes in the competitive landscape.
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My case study that examines firms’ “wait and see” behavior is also reminiscent of
the literature that studies the impact of uncertainty shocks on the aggregate economy
using real business cycle models. As a prominent example, Bloom et al. (2018b) gen-
erate drops of 2.5% of GDP with a model that uses nonconvex adjustment costs and
the variance of productivity shocks as a measure of risk. Bachmann and Bayer (2013)
specifically study the impact of uncertainty on business cycle fluctuations through the
“real options” channel. In line with the results from my case study at the onset of the
COVID-19 crisis, they find rather small effects.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the data and the survey ques-
tions. Section 3 compares two measures of perceived uncertainty. Section 4 analyzes
the relationship between subjective uncertainty, business expectations, and managers’
assessment of the business situation at the micro level. Section 5 presents time series
of these variables for the manufacturing sector. Section 6 shows additional time series
evidence that also covers the COVID-19 crisis. Moreover, it presents a micro-level case
study at the onset of this crisis that relates uncertainty and expectations to corporate
decisions about investment and employment.
3.2 Data
This paper is based on data from the monthly ifo Business Survey that currently cov-
ers roughly 9,000 German firms. The survey is conducted by the ifo Institute. Data
in processible form is available since the German unification in 1990 (since 1980 for
West Germany). The sample of firms is maintained to be representative of the German
economy. To deal with attrition, ifo adds new respondents to the survey (see Sauer
and Wohlrabe 2020). The survey covers firms in manufacturing (IBS-IND, 2020), con-
struction (IBS-CON, 2020), retail and wholesale trade (IBS-TRA, 2020), and services
(IBS-SERV, 2020). Its data on the firms’ assessment of their business situation and
business expectations form the basis of the ifo Business Climate Index, a leading in-
dicator of the German business cycle. As a widely respected measure of business
sentiment, it attracts considerable attention from the general public, practitioners, and
policy makers. Moreover, ifo Institute is responsible for collecting data according to a
set of EU-harmonized business survey questions. They feed into the EU-wide business
sentiment index composed by the European Commission.8
8 Aggregate survey results for Germany are presented at www.ifo.de/w/3fvxPxj2P, the har-
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A business participating in the survey can be a stand-alone firm or a division of a large
conglomerate. The position of the personnel within the firms who fill out the question-
naire is high: Sauer and Wohlrabe (2019) find that more than 90% of the respondents
are top-level managers, such as CEOs, CFOs, or department heads. Furthermore, the
results from a meta survey from fall 2019 suggest that the respondents within a firm
rarely change. Altogether, this ensures very high quality data.
3.2.1 Two Samples for the Micro Analysis
Besides the presentation of aggregate time series, I draw on two main samples of micro
data for this paper. The first sample uses data from the manufacturing sector. It starts
with the introduction of the direct question for firms’ subjective uncertainty in the
online part of the survey in July 2017 and ranges until January 2020. In contrast to
the other major sectors, namely construction, wholesale and retail trade, and services,
the manufacturing sector went through half a business cycle in this period: from a
boom in 2017 to a recession that started in the third quarter of 2018. This makes it
particularly interesting when studying fluctuations in uncertainty. The main analyses
are based on the subsample of manufacturing firms that responded to the online part
of the survey, as opposed to paper-based participation. In the sample period, roughly
three quarters of all survey participants responded online. This is equivalent to about
1.500 manufacturing firms each month.9 The manufacturing sample ends in January
2020 to exclude the COVID-19 crisis. I study it in a separate section of this paper.
The second sample is comprised of data from manufacturing, construction, retail and
wholesale trade, and services.10 I use it for a case study at the onset of the COVID-19
crisis. The survey waves of interest range from January to April 2020. The baseline
analysis only takes onto account the observations from online participants, but a ro-
bustness test also includes other respondents.
9 Appendix 3.A shows that there are almost no differences between the answers of online participants
compared to those who participated paper-based. There is only one notable difference: online par-
ticipants are more frequently representing large firms (250 or more employees), and somewhat less
frequently small firms (less than 50 employees). However, there is no significant difference in the
variables capturing the respondents’ the assessment of the current business situation and business
expectations, which form the core of the analysis in the subsequent sections.
10 I follow the data cleaning and harmonization procedure described in Link (2020). This involves the
assignment of industry codes of the WZ08 classification to all observations and in some cases the
aggregation of responses of subsidiaries to the entity level of firms. The German WZ08 classifica-
tion, short for “Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige 2008” is closely related to the European industry
classification system NACE Rev. 2.
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3.2.2 Survey Questions
The basis for this paper is a novel direct survey question on subjective business un-
certainty. I compare the responses of this question to the answers of a second new
question on subjective uncertainty. Moreover, I relate them to business expectations
and an assessment of the business situation. This section explains the survey method-
ology and the exact wordings of the relevant questions.
In 2005, ifo introduced a new question design to capture firms’ assessment of their
current business situation and their expectations for the business development in the
subsequent six months. Respondents of the online questionnaires provide their an-
swer by clicking on a visual analogue scale with underlying values that range from 0
to 100.11 In 2017, ifo started to elicit subjective uncertainty using the same technology.
Visual analogue scales are essentially continuous versions of the well-known Likert
scales. As such, they are qualitative in nature, and are used, for instance, in medi-
cal research to assess feelings and pain intensity (Jensen et al., 2003). Visual analogue
scales are easy to understand and, in contrast to trichotomous questions, allow for a
differentiated assessment of a respondent’s beliefs.
Appendix 3.A shows a screenshot of the original questions regarding the perceived
business situation, expectations, and uncertainty from ifo’s online questionnaire in
the manufacturing survey. Translated into English, the questions are as follows:
1. We assess our current state of business as
Respondents can click a the visual analogue scale that is labeled “bad” and “good” at its
ends, respectively, and “satisfactory” at the center.
2. In the next 6 months, our state of business is likely to
Respondents can click on a visual analogue scale that is labeled “become rather more
unfavorable” and “become rather more favorable” at its ends, respectively, and “roughly
stay the same” at the center.
3. We assess the uncertainty w.r.t. our business development in the next 6 months
as:
Respondents can click on a visual analogue scale that is labeled “low” and “high” at its
ends, respectively, and “average / usual for the season” at the center.
In addition to eliciting firms’ perceived business situation and expectations using vi-
sual analogue scales, ifo has continued to apply its more traditional trichotomous
11 See Stangl (2009) for details on the design and a comparison to the traditional trichotomous questions.
123
CHAPTER 3. UNCERTAINTY, EXPECTATIONS, AND FIRM BEHAVIOR
questions for these variables. These traditional questions on the business situation
and expectations, in their English translation, read: 1) We assess our current state of
business as (a) good (b) satisfactory (c) bad, and 2) Our state of business is likely to (a)
become more favourable (b) stay more or less unchanged (c) become less favorable.
Question 1) appears in the section with headline “Current situation” and question 2)
in the section with headline “Expectations for the next 6 months”. I will occasionally
use its responses in the subsequent analyses when categorization is helpful.12
Following a proposal from the EU Commission’s unit for “Economic Situation, Fore-
casts, Business and Consumer Surveys”, ifo implemented a second question regarding
uncertainty in April 2019. This question is going to become part of the set of EU-
harmonized business survey questions in 2021. Hence, it is going to be available for
all countries in the EU. It is based on a similar question included in the business sur-
vey of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, which has been asked in different
versions since the 1980s (Glocker and Hölzl, 2019). The second question dealing with
uncertainty is part of the survey’s section titled “Expectations for the next 6 months”.
It is asked both online and using paper questionnaires. Translated into English, the
question reads:
4. The future development of our business situation is currently
2 easy to predict
2 rather easy to predict
2 rather difficult to predict
2 difficult to predict
The responses to questions 3 and 4 yield two separate measures of subjective uncer-
tainty. Let unc denote the uncertainty measure based on the responses to question 3
and diff_pred be the variable that captures the responses to question 4.
3.3 Comparing Two Measures of Subjective Uncertainty
When characterizing and comparing the two measures of uncertainty unc and diff_pred,
we note similarities and differences in the underlying questions. Conceptually, we
12 The responses to the visual analogue scale questions seem to measure essentially the same as the
trichotomous questions: the two unweighted aggregate monthly time series for situation and expec-
tations from 2005 to 2020, respectively, are highly correlated with correlation coefficients of 99% and
86%.
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can compare three dimensions. First, any uncertainty measure is characterized by its
“object”–the variable over which an individual is uncertain. Second, since uncertainty
is forward-looking, the time horizon matters. Third, the way we ask for uncertainty
can differ.
Both unc and diff_pred have essentially the same object and the same time horizon
of uncertainty: the “business development” and the “development of the business
situation” over the subsequent six months. The survey deliberately uses the holistic
object of “business development”. It can be understood as an umbrella term for all
relevant firm-specific variables that affect the future path of the business. A meta
survey conducted in the fall of 2019 sheds light on the variables that the respondents
of the ifo Business Survey consider most important for their assessment of the business
situation and expectations. The five factors most important to manufacturing firms are
profits, turnover, demand, the stock of orders, and costs (see Appendix 3.B). To further
investigate the factors feeding into the holistic measures of business expectations and
the business situation, in Appendix 3.B I relate both variables in separate regressions
to other variables from the ifo Business Survey. The main findings are that the highest
share of the variation of the business situation is explained by the assessments of the
profit and order situation, respectively, and by the capacity utilization at the time of
the survey. Business expectations are most closely related to production expectations
according to the R-squared metric.
Hence, unc and diff_pred are comprehensive uncertainty measures. By capturing a
wide range of aspects in managers’ information set, they differ from measures that
focus on the uncertainty concerning the development of one particular firm variable,
such as sales or employment, as in the surveys presented by Altig et al. (2019) and
Bachmann et al. (2018). Advantages of the comprehensive approach are its brevity
and universality. A wide range of sources of uncertainty is covered. Moreover, unc
and diff_pred capture both risk and Knightian uncertainty. However, this comes at the
cost of a lack of transparency regarding the exact source of the uncertainty.
The main difference between unc and diff_pred, in addition to the mode of delivery, is
the way they ask for uncertainty. Question 3 asks respondents directly how uncertain
they are, while question 4 asks indirectly by inquiring about the degree of difficulty that
respondents perceive in predicting the future business development. The responses to
the indirect question 4 may either reflect uncertainty as risk, that is, a second moment,
or as Knightian uncertainty. In the direct question, it is less clear a priori what respon-
dents think when they are asked for their “uncertainty”. Thus, by comparing unc and
diff_pred, I analyze the influence that the type of question has on the responses, and
whether managers in firms have a good understanding of the term “uncertainty”.
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Appendix 3.B presents summary statistics of the variables unc and diff_pred. Most
importantly, I find that unc covers the entire range of values between 0 and 100, and
that the answer category “rather difficult to predict” is the clear mode of diff_pred,
while only very few respondents choose the category “easy to predict”.13 Figure 3.1
presents the mean values of the responses from the direct uncertainty question 3, unc,
for each of the categories of the indirect uncertainty question 4, diff_pred. The bar chart
is based on the subsample covering the period from April 2019 to January 2020 for
which both variables are available.

























Easy Rather easy Rather difficult Difficult
indirect uncertainty question (diff_pred)
Notes: The figure illustrates the mean values of subjective uncertainty (unc), the responses to the direct
uncertainty question 3 in Section 3.2.2, for each of the categorical answer options of the indirect un-
certainty question 4 (diff_pred) in Section 3.2.2 (blue bars). The orange whiskers denote ±1.96 standard
error bands for the mean values.
The main result is that the two variables are almost perfectly aligned: advancement
by one category in the perceived difficulty of predicting the future development of
the firms’ business situation corresponds to a mean of unc that is roughly 20 points
higher. In other words, the more difficult respondents perceive the prediction of the
future development of their business situation, the more uncertain they report to be
on the visual analogue scale. Appendix 3.B presents a box plot instead of the bar chart
and demonstrates that this finding is robust to using medians instead of means.
The fact that unc and diff_pred are very similar implies that respondents have a good
understanding of the term “uncertainty” when they are directly asked for it. Hence,
13 One reason for few responses with the category “easy to predict” may be the stylized fact, based on
proxy measures, that uncertainty behaves counter-cyclically (Bloom, 2014). In the period for which
diff_pred is available, namely from April 2019 to January 2020, the manufacturing sector was in a
recession. Thus, uncertainty is likely to be above a longer-term average at this time.
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a direct question for managers’ uncertainty appears to be an easy and sensible way
to elicit firms’ subjective beliefs. The remainder of the paper focuses on the direct
uncertainty measure unc. It is available for a longer period of time than diff_pred, and
it has advantage of being a near-continuous variable. However, I replicate most results
using diff_pred for robustness.
3.4 Subjective Uncertainty at the Micro Level
Using survey data from businesses allows me to study the properties of uncertainty at
the micro level. Moreover, it enables me to study the relationship between perceived
uncertainty and expectations from the same respondent. In addition, I can relate sub-
jective uncertainty to the self-assessed business situation of a firm. Given the stylized
fact that proxy measures of uncertainty are counter-cyclical, I expect a negative rela-
tionship between uncertainty and the business situation. The panel dimension of the
sample offers ample variation in the cross section and the time series.
This section has three parts. I start by examining the bivariate relationships between
perceived uncertainty vis-à-vis expectations and the business situation, respectively.
Second, I study the uncertainty of respondents for combination of these variables.
Third, I relate uncertainty to other variables of business activity that are likely to feed
into managers’ assessment of the business situation and expectations.
3.4.1 Uncertainty vs. Expectations and the Business Situation
Figure 3.1 illustrates two relationships in the pooled sample of manufacturing firms:
the relationship between business uncertainty (unc) and business expectations in the
left plot, and the relationship between business uncertainty (unc) and the firms’ assess-
ment of their business situation in the right plot. Based on roughly 46,000 firm-time
observations, I present non-parametric regression lines and linear fitted lines.
First, I observe a very strong negative and near-linear relationship between subjective
uncertainty and expectations. Hence, the more pessimistic respondents are about the
development of their business situation over the next six months, the more uncertain
they are about it. Moreover, subjective uncertainty is strongly negatively related to
the respondents’ assessment of the business situation, which indicates the position of
a firm in its cycle. Managers perceive higher uncertainty the worse they assess the
state of business of their firm. The raw correlations of both relationships in the pooled
sample are -0.34.
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Notes: This figure shows non-parametric kernel regression lines of degree zero with shaded 95% confi-
dence bands as well as fitted linear regression lines for the relationship between uncertainty (unc) and
business expectations in the left plot, and between uncertainty (unc) and the business situation in the
right plot. The non-parametric lines use an epanechnikov kernel and the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth
(Silverman, 1986). The assessment of the business situation, expectations, and uncertainty are based
on questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. Responses are elicited using visual analogue scales that range
from 0 to 100, respectively.
I formalize this descriptive evidence by means of regressions. In doing so, I add signif-
icance levels and I further check for the asymmetries in high and low expectations and
in good and bad business situations. I also specifically examine the within-firm time
variation.14 This can lead to a better understanding of the time variation in aggregate
uncertainty, which is at the center of a large body of the literature on uncertainty and
business cycle fluctuations.
Table 3.1 presents pooled ordinary least squares regressions of uncertainty (unc) on
expectations and the business situation. The negative estimates in columns 1 and 2
correspond to the slopes of the linear predicted lines in figure 3.1. Both coefficients
are highly significant. If expectations are 10 points lower on the visual analogue scale,
uncertainty is 4.1 points higher on average. For a 10 point lower situation, on aver-
age, the uncertainty differential is 3.3 points. This captures both the variation between
and within firms. The R-squared values of 0.11 and 0.12 in columns 1 and 2, respec-
tively, indicate the presence of ample variation that is not captured by the bivariate
relationships.
14 I note that the visual analogue scale is identical for all firms and, hence, is designed to show time-
variation within businesses. However, due to the rather short period of time of the sample of less
than three years, some firms might be above or below their longer-run average expectations or their
“normal” business situation in most or all of the sample horizon.
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To detect asymmetries, I split the sample into high and low expectations, and into high
and low values of the assessment of the business situation. I define numbers on the
visual analogue scale of 50 or above as “high” and all others as “‘low”. In columns
3 and 4, I then regress uncertainty (unc) on expectations and the business situation,
respectively, using piecewise linear models with a break at 50. Formally,







where xli,t = xi,t I(xi,t<50), x
h
i,t = xi,t I(xi,t ≥ 50), I(·) is the indicator function, and xi,t
denotes either expectations or the business situation of firm i at time t.
Column 3 demonstrates that the coefficients αl1 for low and α
h
1 for high expectations are
both negative and highly significant. Moreover, uncertainty appears to correlate more
strongly with low expectations than with high expectations. A Wald test clearly re-
jects the null hypothesis at the 1%-significance level that the two coefficients are equal.
Hence, the relationship between uncertainty and expectations is asymmetric. More
unfavorable expectations generally go along with higher uncertainty, but more so for
low expectations. Column 4 shows that the coefficients of low and high business situ-
ations are both negative and highly significant. While the coefficient of the subsample
of bad situations is larger in absolute terms, a Wald test cannot reject the null of equal-
ity at the 5%-level (p-value is 0.055). I conclude that a simple linear model captures
the relationship between uncertainty and the business situation in the pooled sample
with reasonable accuracy.
To isolate the within-firm variation in the panel, I subtract the firm-specific means
from the firm-time values of uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation. I
do so for a subsample of firms for which at least ten observations are available. More
than 92% of the pooled sample remains. Columns 5 and 6 show OLS regressions with
these demeaned variables, which produce the same results as fixed effect regressions.
Similar to columns 1 and 2, columns 5 and 6 indicate negative and highly significant
coefficients for both expectations and the business situation. Magnitudes are also sim-
ilar.
To examine asymmetries in the within-variation, I define values at or above a firms’
mean as “high” and all remaining values as “low”. Columns 7 and 8 present results
from piecewise linear regressions with the demeaned variables and a break at the firm-
specific mean of expectations and the business situation, respectively. Technically, I
estimate
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where x̃li,t = x̃i,t I(xi,t<x̄i), x̃
h
i,t = x̃i,t I(xi,t ≥ x̄i), I(·) is again the indicator function, x̄i is
the mean of expectations or the business situation of firm i, and x̃i,t = xi,t − x̄i denotes
the demeaned expectations or the business situation of firm i at time t. ũncit is the
analogously demeaned uncertainty variable.
Column 7 again points to an asymmetry in the relationship between uncertainty and
expectation values that are above or below the firm mean. The difference in the coef-
ficients is significant at the 1%-level. For the average firm, an increase in expectations
by 10 points above its mean on the visual analogue scale goes along with a decrease in
uncertainty by 2.7 points. A decrease in expectations of the same magnitude below the
mean coincides with an increase of uncertainty by 4.1 points. Column 8 demonstrates
the difference between the coefficients of above average and below average business
situations is also statistically highly significant. However, the difference is somewhat
smaller than that in expectations.
Based on plots similar to Figure 3.1, Appendix 3.C shows that the stylized facts con-
cerning the negative bivariate relationships between uncertainty and expectations,
and between uncertainty and the business situation, also hold for the indirect uncer-
tainty measure diff_pred. I conclude that, first, uncertainty is negatively correlated to
a firms’ cyclical position relative to its trend, which is measured by the business sit-
uation. Second, business expectations and the perceived uncertainty regarding these
expectations are not only conceptually related. They are also clearly dependent with a
negative relationship at the micro level.
The second finding recalls the stylized fact from the finance literature that conditional
volatility is negatively correlated with expected returns at stock markets (see, for in-
stance, Bekaert and Wu 2000 and Hibbert et al. 2008). However, it is unclear a priori
whether managers’ subjective uncertainty and expectations about their future busi-
ness behave similarly to financial market outcomes. The new survey evidence sug-
gests that this it indeed the case.
3.4.2 Uncertainty and Combinations of Situation and Expectations
Table 3.1 establishes negative bivariate relationships between uncertainty and busi-
ness expectations as well as between uncertainty and the business situation. I now
take this analysis one step further by asking what degree of uncertainty respondents
perceive for combinations of their business situation and expectations. Overall, re-
spondents’ expectations and their assessment of the current business situation are pos-
131
CHAPTER 3. UNCERTAINTY, EXPECTATIONS, AND FIRM BEHAVIOR
itively related. The correlation coefficient is 0.63 in the pooled sample. However, there
are numerous cases in which they differ.
Two cases are of particular interest: On the one hand, a firm can be in a good business
situation, but its expectations are unfavorable. Is the uncertainty of such a business
high, as the negative relationship between the uncertainty and expectations would
suggest, or is its uncertainty low, since the business is still in a good situation? On the
other hand, a business can be in a poor condition but have positive expectations. Does
this go along with high or low subjective uncertainty?




















Notes: The bar chart illustrates the mean values of uncertainty (unc) by the nine combinations of the
categorical responses to the trichotomous questions about the business situation and business expecta-
tions. Each mean is based on at least 889 firm-time observations.
Figure 3.2 presents the relationship between uncertainty (unc) and combinations of ex-
pectations and the business situation. To facilitate the comprehension of this trivariate
relationship, I draw on the categorical responses to the trichotomous questions about
expectations and the state of business in ifo’s business cycle survey. The height of the
bars illustrates the mean values of uncertainty for the nine combinations of the busi-
ness situation assessed as good, satisfactory, or bad, and the expectations reported as
favorable, unchanged, or unfavorable. Each combination is based on more than 880
firm-time observations.
The main result is that the respondents perceive high uncertainty if either their expec-
tations are unfavorable or the assessment of their business situation is bad, or both. If
expectations are unfavorable, respondents perceive high uncertainty even in a good
business situation. If the situation is assessed as poor, uncertainty is high despite
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favorable expectations. Generally, the relationship between uncertainty and expecta-
tions is state-dependent: it is weaker in bad times. Given the bivariate relationships in
figure 3.1, it does not come as a surprise that uncertainty is at its lowest if the business
situation is good and expectations are favorable.
Appendix 3.C presents results of regressions of uncertainty (unc) on dummies for
combinations of the categorical business situation and expectations (corresponding
to figure 3.2). The case of a good situation and favorable expectations constitutes the
baseline. Replicating this estimation using fixed effects allows me to confirm that the
main results also hold for the within-firm time variation. Moreover, in Appendix 3.C
I demonstrate that the stylized facts regarding the trivariate relationship between un-
certainty, expectations, and the business situation are qualitatively the same for the
uncertainty measure diff_pred.
As an alternative to the three-dimensional bar chart in Figure 3.2, Appendix 3.C presents
the trivariate relationship between uncertainty, expectations, and the business situ-
ation also in a more continuous version, similar to figure 3.1. Instead of one non-
parametric regression line which illustrates the relationship between uncertainty and
the business situation, three lines represent the answer options of the trichotomous
question about business expectations. Again, it becomes clear that uncertainty is high
if expectations are unfavorable, irrespective of the business situation. If expectations
are unchanged or favorable, uncertainty is lower the better the situation. An analo-
gous continuous illustration of diff_pred instead of unc confirms this pattern.
From an aggregate perspective of a stylized business cycle, these micro-level findings
tentatively suggest that subjective business uncertainty is elevated from the begin of
a downturn to the end of a recovery. In a good state, uncertainty starts to rise early
when expectations worsen. In a recession, better expectations do not immediately
lower perceived uncertainty. Rather, uncertainty prevails until the situation improves.
What may be reasons for this pattern? A starting point can be the asymmetry of the
business cycle (or firm cycle), which implies that the distribution of a firms’ growth
rates is typically negatively skewed.15 This implies that firms, in absolute terms, can
expect the average negative shock to be larger than the average positive shock. Sup-
pose a firm is in a good business situation and holds unfavorable expectations. Un-
certainty perceived as risk then concerns the magnitude of the negative shock. It can
be large due to the fat left tail of the demand shock distribution. This could explain
why managers are more uncertain if they expect the business situation to deteriorate
15 Evidence for asymmetry in aggregate and firm-level growth is presented, for instance, by Salgado
et al. (2020) and Ilut et al. (2018).
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than when they expect an improvement. Orlik and Veldkamp (2014) provide a similar
reasoning. They show how tail risks arising from negatively skewed growth rates can
explain an increase of a forecasters’ macroeconomic uncertainty in recessions.
A complementary intuition for low uncertainty in a good business situation with fa-
vorable expectations can be based on strong signals of high demand in that case.
Knowledge about orders and being (temporarily) constrained by fix capacities can
make it relatively easy for managers to predict future sales and profits.16 Conversely,
in case demand is perceived as weak, decision makers lack knowledge about future
sales and profits. Hence, uncertainty is high in the case of unfavorable expectations
or in a bad business situation. If an unfavorable business situation is a rather rare
event for a firm, managers may also be uncertain since they are unfamiliar with that
situation. Uncertainty in a bad situation may also originate from the question whether
a realized negative shock is temporary or permanent (Bernanke, 1983). In case of a
temporary shock, expectations eventually turn favorable. However, then again the
potential magnitude of the expected positive change is large. This can make forecasts
quantitatively difficult. High upward risk could explain the empirical finding of high
perceived uncertainty in an unfavorable situation with positive expectations. Noisy
estimates of the recovery can have the same effect (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp,
2006). Moreover, in the presence of increased risk aversion in a bad situation, there
may be doubts about the reliability of positive demand signals.17
3.4.3 Uncertainty and Components of Situation and Expectations
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the variables of business expectations and business situa-
tion are holistic concepts. For the purpose of robustness and traceability, in this section
I study whether factors that might feed into these measures correlate with uncertainty
in a similar way. Figure 3.3 relates uncertainty to six specific variables of business ac-
tivity from the ifo Business Survey that reflect the situation and expectations of firms.
The upper panel of figure 3.3 illustrates measures that are likely to be related to the
business situation: capacity utilization in %, the profit situation, and the assessment of
the stock of orders. The bottom panel presents expectations about production, prices,
and the number of employees of the firm over the next three months. ifo elicits the
16 In related research, Kuhn and George (2019) provide theoretical evidence that firms’ capacity con-
straints can prevent them from fully exploiting positive demand shocks. They use this rational to
explain the asymmetry of business cycles.
17 Guiso et al. (2018) provide survey evidence that risk aversion was substantially elevated during the
period of low activity in 2009, after the shock of the Great Recession.
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capacity utilization in a respondent’s business at the time of the survey by providing
discrete answer options which range from 30% to 100%. The other five variables are
based on questions with categorical answer options.


















































Notes: The top left plot displays a non-parametric kernel regression line of degree zero with shaded
95% confidence bands for the relationship between the within-firm time variation in uncertainty (unc)
and the within-variation of capacity utilization. The unit at the x-axis is percentage points. I exclude
values below the 1%-percentile and above the 99%-percentile for better visibility. The figure further
presents bar charts illustrating coefficients from separate fixed effect regressions of uncertainty (unc) on
categorical variables from the ifo Business Survey, as denoted in the titles of the subplots. In particular,
the regressors are dummies based on two categorical answers (labels at the x-axes). Thus, each bar
corresponds to a coefficient relative to the middle category, which is “unchanged” in case of all variables
except the stock of orders and the profit situation. For the latter two variables, the middle categories
are labeled “sufficient” and “satisfactory”, respectively. The whiskers at the bars are 95% confidence
intervals. Capacity utilization is available once a quarter, the profit situation biannually, and all other
variables in monthly frequency.
For capacity utilization, I show a non-parametric regression line in the top left plot.
The bars in the other plots correspond to coefficients of fixed effect regressions on
dummy variables for the categories indicated on the x-axes, with the middle category
serving as the baseline. I focus on the within-firm time variation of uncertainty, but
results are similar for the total variation in the pooled sample (see appendix 3.C). The
within-variation is indicated at the y-axes of all plots. Technically, I take out firm fixed
effects before analyzing the relationships between uncertainty and the firm variables.
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I find negative relationships between uncertainty and all six factors. Lower capacity
utilization in a firm, a worse profit situation, and a lower stock of orders are all con-
nected to higher uncertainty. A linear regression using fixed effects shows that, on
average, a 10 percentage points lower capacity utilization goes along with 3.6 point
higher uncertainty on the visual analogue scale. A change in a firm’s assessment of its
profit situation from “good” to “bad” is associated with an increase of uncertainty of
almost 15 points, on average. The discrepancy between a situation with a “too low”
and a “relatively high” stock of orders is similar in magnitude. Respondents with
less favorable expectations about production, prices, and employment are also more
uncertain.
To sum up, I establish robustness of the results in Section 3.4.1 by showing that the neg-
ative relationships between uncertainty and expectations, and between uncertainty
and the business situation also hold for specific variables that are likely to feed into
these holistic measures.
3.5 Subjective Uncertainty in the Aggregate
In this section, I exploit the time series dimension of my sample, which extends over
31 months from July 2017 to January 2020. From an expansionary phase in the second
half of 2017, the German manufacturing sector fell into a recession that started in mid
2018 and lasted until the end of the sample period.18 Hence, the data allows me to
study aggregate fluctuations of subjective uncertainty.
Since the Great Recession, many time series of proxy measures of uncertainty have
been developed. For a recent overview, see Cascaldi-Garcia et al. (2020). With the new
ifo data, however, I am among the first to construct a time series that is based on micro
data on subjective uncertainty: it provides information on the uncertainty perceived
by actual decision makers in firms.19 The second key advantage of using survey data
about businesses is that I can construct a time series of expectations from the same
18 To put this development in context, Appendix 3.D displays a time series of seasonally and calendar
adjusted gross value added of the German manufacturing sector for a longer time series, namely
since 1999. In the sample period, quarter-on-quarter growth rates dropped from a maximum of 1.7%
in Q3 2017 to a minimum of -1.7% in Q2 2019. Annual growth was 3.8%, 1.3%, and -3.4% in 2017,
2018, and 2019, respectively.
19 Glocker and Hölzl (2019) present a time series of uncertainty for the Austrian economy that is based
on micro data. Altig et al. (2019) develop time series of firms’ uncertainty and expectations based on
firm-level data from the Survey of Business Uncertainty administered by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta. Leduc and Liu (2016) use a time series of the uncertainty of households about purchasing
a vehicle.
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respondents. This allows me to compare micro-based time series of perceived uncer-
tainty and expectations. Moreover, I relate these series to respondents’ assessment
of the business situation. Given the micro evidence presented in Section 3.4, I ask
whether subjective business uncertainty is negatively related to expectations and the
business situation also in the aggregate.
Figure 3.1 presents time series for the manufacturing sector of subjective uncertainty
(unc) as well as of business expectations and the business situation. They are com-
puted as unweighted averages of the firm-level responses. Appendix 3.D shows that
weighting these observations by firm size produces very similar time series and that
the average business situation closely follows the two official series of industrial pro-
duction and gross value added in manufacturing.












Notes: The figure presents time series of unweighted means of subjective uncertainty, business expec-
tations and an assessment of the respondents’ current business situation. These measures are based on
the firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. The labels at the vertical axis are numbers
from a visual analogue scale that ranges from 0 to 100.
The first observation from Figure 3.1 is that firms’ subjective uncertainty is counter-
cyclical: uncertainty increases as the assessment of the business situation deteriorates
and the manufacturing sector slides into recession in mid-2018. In the short sample,
uncertainty and the business situation are highly negatively correlated, with a cor-
relation coefficient of -0.96. This confirms earlier findings based on proxy measures
of uncertainty and the time series of subjective business uncertainty for Austria pre-
sented by Glocker and Hölzl (2019).
A second, and novel, observation is that the subjective uncertainty of businesses ap-
pears to be a mirror image of business expectations for most of the sample period:
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when expectations decrease, uncertainty increases, and vice versa. In fact, uncertainty
and expectations are almost perfectly negatively correlated (-0.98). Revisiting the styl-
ized fact of countercyclicality, I note that uncertainty already increases in the first half
of 2018, that is, before the business situation declines. This early increase in uncertainty
goes along with a deterioration in expectations. As a third observation, I note that
if the situation at the end of the sample period is unfavorable, expectations increase
while uncertainty remains essentially unchanged.
The second and third observations imply that the results from the micro level inves-
tigation in Section 3.4.2 also seem to hold for the time series: uncertainty is higher
when either expectations or the situation are more unfavorable, or both. While the
economy is still in a good state, along with deteriorating expectations, uncertainty al-
ready increases in the first half of 2018. In the rather bad state at the end of the sample,
uncertainty remains at a high level despite an increase in expectations.
Next, I divide the sample into three firm size classes and construct unweighted time
series for each of them.20 The results are displayed in Appendix 3.D. I find that the
relationship between uncertainty and expectations as well as the business situation is
similar in the aggregate series. In general, the patterns of an increase in uncertainty
and deteriorating expectations and business situations between July 2017 and January
2020 are fairly consistent across all size classes.
To analyze whether the aggregate increase in uncertainty is subject to variation across
industries in the manufacturing sector, Appendix 3.E presents an analysis of the time
variation for subsectors between 2017 and 2019. I find that uncertainty did not rise
evenly across industries. In line with the micro evidence and the time series result,
uncertainty increased more in industries that experienced a larger decline in expecta-
tions and in the business situation.
Is the negative relationship between uncertainty and both expectations and the busi-
ness situation in the time series specific to the German manufacturing sector and the
sample period between July 2017 and January 2020? To broaden the scope of the anal-
ysis and to test the validity of the results, I proceed by studying subjective uncertainty
and expectations during the COVID-19 crisis.
20 Based on the number of employees, I define three size classes of firms. Following the definition of
the German Federal Statistical Office, small firms have less than 50 employees, medium-sized firms
between 50 and 249 employees, and large firms 250 or more employees.
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3.6 Case Study: COVID-19 Crisis
The COVID-19 crisis constitutes an unprecedented disruption of economic activity
worldwide. Shutdowns imposed by governments triggered severe recessions that un-
folded at high speed. These characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis differ considerably
from the gradual and rather moderate economic downturn in the German manufactur-
ing sector in Germany in 2018 and 2019. Hence, the COVID-19 crisis provides fertile
grounds for testing the robustness of the time series results from the previous sec-
tion. This constitutes the first part of this case study. In the second part, I exploit
cross-sectional differences in changes in managers’ uncertainty and expectations at
the beginning of crisis to investigate their role for decisions about investment and em-
ployment.
3.6.1 Time Series during the COVID-19 Crisis
In this section, I test the robustness of the new stylized facts about the relationship
between subjective uncertainty and expectations by extending the sample until July
2020. In this way, I include the COVID-19 crisis. To establish the stylized facts in the
first part of the paper, I have focused on data from the manufacturing sector in the
time period from July 2017 to January 2020. To analyze time variation in uncertainty, it
is most interesting to study. The reason is that, during this time, compared to the other
major sectors and the economy overall, the manufacturing sector exhibits the largest
fluctuations in economic activity.
With the longer sample that includes the COVID-19 crisis, I present time series for
subjective uncertainty (unc), expectations, and the business situation for the German
economy as a whole. As for all other time series in this section that are based on ifo
data, I use the ifo weighting procedure described in Sauer and Wohlrabe (2020) to
aggregate firm-level data.21
To further test the validity of the stylized facts, I broaden the time series analysis by
considering additional measures of subjective business uncertainty. First, I present a
monthly time series of diff_pred that starts in April 2019.22 Second, since my previous
results could be exclusive to the measures of subjective uncertainty unc and diff_pred,
21 Firm-level responses are first aggregated to the 2-digit level of the WZ08 classification using firm size
weights, and then aggregated to the level of the total economy by using value added weights from
the German Federal Statistical Office.
22 To compute a balance statistic for diff_pred, I assign the values -1, -0.5, 0.5, and 1 for the answer options
"easy", "rather easy", "rather difficult", and "difficult", respectively.
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I present a quarterly time series of a third measure of subjective uncertainty. It is
calculated as the difference between the quantitative quarter-on-quarter sales growth
expectations in the best and the worst case in percentage points. The underlying data
stems from a survey supplement to the ifo business cycle survey, which is conducted
in the first month of a quarter. It also contains a question on expected sales growth in
the most likely case. See Bachmann et al. (2018) for a detailed description. This time
series is based on ifo survey data from firms in manufacturing, retail and wholesale
trade, and services. For all of these sectors, it is available starting in April 2019.
Third, I compare the time series for Germany with time series on subjective uncer-
tainty and expectations for the United States. In particular, I draw on the monthly
quantitative survey results on firms’ uncertainty and expectations about twelve-month-
ahead sales growth from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The survey elicits five
sales growth scenarios from best to worst in percentage points and asks the respon-
dents to assign probabilities to these scenarios. Uncertainty is computed as the stan-
dard deviation and the expectation as the mean of the resulting five-point distribution.
The survey design is documented in detail by Altig et al. (2019).23
Conceptually, I note that the four measures of uncertainty and expectations differ in
several ways: unc and diff_pred are based on qualitative data and refer to the business
development over the next six months, while the other measures are quantitative and
refer to quarter-on-quarter and twelve-month-ahead sales growth. The four time se-
ries of subjective uncertainty and business expectations are displayed in Figure 3.1.
The uncertainty measure diff_pred is depicted jointly with the balance statistics from
the categorical questions on business expectations and the business situation in the
top left plot. In the plots in the top row for unc and unc_pred, I also include the busi-
ness situation.
Despite the differences in the construction of the series, the evidence from the four
plots is very similar. I make two observations. First, during the COVID-19 crisis
the developments of perceived uncertainty and expectations are almost perfectly in-
versely related. From March 2020 onward, the sharp decline in expectations, followed
by a recovery, is mirrored by a sharp increase in uncertainty and a subsequent de-
crease. Appendix 3.F shows that this pattern is also present for the time series of all
major sectors of the German economy. Based on admittedly rather short time series,
these findings support the stylized fact of the negative relationship between uncer-
23 The time series for subjective business uncertainty and expectations of US firms goes back to
January 2015 and are available online at https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/surveys/business-
uncertainty.
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tainty and expectations from the micro data and the time series of the manufacturing
sector.
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US: 12-month-ahead sales growth
Notes: The plot in the top left presents size-weighted time series of subjective uncertainty (unc), ex-
pectations, and the business situation elicited using visual analogue scales. The uncertainty (diff_pred)
series in the top right plot is a size-weighted balance statistics constructed from the responses to ques-
tion 4 described in Section 3.2.2. The other series in the top right plot are balance statistics from ifo’s
categorical questions on expectations and the business situation described in the same section. The
plot in the bottom left shows size-weighted time series of quantitative expectations and uncertainty
about q-o-q sales growth. Uncertainty is computed as the difference between best and worst case ex-
pectations as described in Bachmann et al. (2018). The data stems from a survey supplement to the
ifo business cycle survey and is elicited from firms in manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and
services. It is available for all of these sectors since Q2 2019. The plot in the bottom right shows busi-
ness uncertainty and expectations with respect to twelve-month-ahead sales growth from the Atlanta
Fed/Chicago Booth/Stanford Survey of Business Uncertainty. For comparability, the x-axis ranges from
July 2017 to July 2020 for all plots.
Second, after the COVID-19 spike in April 2020, for all measures the increase in ex-
pectations is larger than the decrease in subjective uncertainty. For instance, the top
left plot in Figure 3.1 shows that from April to July 2020 business expectations recover
80% of the initial drop from February to April, whereas unc only recovers 36%. This
difference in the recovery rate is even more pronounced for the series in the other two
plots for Germany. While only based on few data points, this second observation sup-
ports the previous microdata-based result—and the findings from the time series of the
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manufacturing sector before the COVID-19 recession—that the relationship between
uncertainty and expectations is weaker in bad times. For Germany, low economic ac-
tivity in mid-2020 is indicated by an unfavorable business situation in the aggregate.
At this time, uncertainty remains elevated even though expectations improve.
To sum up, the stylized facts from the micro data and the time series of the manufac-
turing sector are also manifest during the COVID-19 crisis. They are robust to different
measures of perceived uncertainty, they hold for different sectors of the German econ-
omy, and they apply both for Germany and the US.
An implication of this finding is that, when using time series econometric analyses, it
may be difficult to disentangle possible effects of subjective business uncertainty on
macroeconomic variables, such as investment and GDP, from the effects of expecta-
tions. As an alternative approach, in the next section I use micro data to empirically
study the predictions of a theoretical channel that links uncertainty to firm behavior.
3.6.2 Uncertainty, Expectations, and Corporate Decisions
When examining the effect of uncertainty on firms’ economic decisions, one promi-
nent theoretical channel is centered around “real options” (Bernanke, 1983; Brennan
and Schwartz, 1985; McDonald and Siegel, 1986).24 When decisions in firms cannot
be easily reversed (or it is costly to do so) and when they affect the profitability of ac-
tions taken later, managers confronted with high uncertainty may prefer to “wait and
see”. More specifically, in such a case, it can be optimal for a business to postpone in-
vestment projects and to stop hiring and firing until the outlook becomes clearer. Due
to the lack of suitable measures of subjective uncertainty at the firm level, empirical
evidence on such behavior is scarce.
Perceived uncertainty seems to fluctuate most around recessions. Section 3.6.1 has pro-
vided evidence that the onset of the COVID-19 crisis was accompanied by a massive
increase in uncertainty, while expectations plummeted. Based on the theoretical con-
siderations above, in the presence of an uncertainty shock alone I would expect firms
to postpone investments and to leave the number of employees largely unchanged.25
24 Other possible theoretical channels include precautionary behavior, borrowing constraints due to
higher risk premia, and a loss in confidence caused by ambiguity aversion. Growth options and the
Oi-Hartman-Abel effect constitute theoretical mechanisms that can explain positive investment and
growth effects from uncertainty. Bloom (2014) provides an overview of these channels.
25 According to the “real options” channel, uncertainty can lead managers to postpone investments if
they are at least partially irreversible. Indeed, Guiso and Parigi (1999) find stronger negative effects of
uncertainty on investment the more difficult or costly firms assess the possibility to resell investment
goods after they were acquired. Surveying Swiss firms, Dibiasi et al. (2018) present evidence that 70%
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A negative first moment shock is also likely to make firms defer investments. How-
ever, we would expect them to reduce employment as a consequence. The actual ef-
fect of each of the two shocks is unclear. Therefore, it is interesting to use micro data
to study the relationship between uncertainty and firms’ actions while the aggregate
economy simultaneously experiences a first and a second moment shock.
In this case study, I exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity in changes of subjective
uncertainty and expectations between German firms in the onset of the COVID-19 cri-
sis. I use the aggregate variation to find out whether differences in the impact of this
shock on the subjective uncertainty of managers relates to differences in their invest-
ment and employment decisions.
Sample
To address this question, I use the micro data that underlie the top left plot in figure
3.1 in the previous section. The relevant sample comprises the February, March, and
April waves of the ifo Business Survey from 2020 and contains responses from firms in
the manufacturing industry, construction, retail and wholesale trade, and the service
sector.26 Based on this data, I relate subjective uncertainty (unc) and business expecta-
tions in March to subsequent self-reported information in April about whether firms
have postponed investment projects and whether they have reduced employment, re-
spectively, because of the COVID-19 crisis. Appendix 3.F contains a translation of the
special question in the April wave of the ifo Business Survey which asks firms about
measures taken in response to the pandemic.
While the March wave of the ifo Business Survey was conducted from March 2 to
March 24, I base my analysis on the subsample of firms that submitted their question-
naires in the nine days from March 16 to March 24.27 Appendix 3.F shows that this
group of respondents is representative for the entire sample of firms that responded in
March. Selecting this subsample ensures that managers are well-informed about the
gravity of the crisis, and especially about the shutdown. As a result, I can exploit the
of the respondents consider their investments to be highly or fully irreversible; 94% view them as at
least somewhat irreversible. The degree of irreversibility seems idiosyncratic to firms as the authors
cannot predict it by observable characteristics such as size and sector. Given that almost all firms in
the Swiss sample report at least some degree of irreversibility of their investments, I find it reasonable
to assume that the “real options” theory would predict that also firms in my sample “wait and see”
if they are confronted with high uncertainty.
26 I follow the data cleaning and harmonization procedure described in Link (2020).
27 Appendix 3.F presents a histogram of the submission dates in March. Information on this date is
missing for 12% of all participants. I exclude these observations from all further analyses. Of the
participants for which a submission date is available, 21% responded between March 16 and 24.
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full aggregate variation of the shock to uncertainty and expectations. Using data from
the beginning of March would blur the within-variation of the aggregate shock as id-
iosyncratic changes in uncertainty and expectations are likely to dominate changes in
beliefs due to the COVID-19 crisis.
Descriptive Evidence
To further motivate why I focus on the firms that responded between March 16 and
24, I present a series of descriptive evidence. Table F.1 in Appendix 3.F presents a
short time-line of events during the onset of the COVID-19 crisis in Germany. Due to
the unprecedented character of the crisis, the negative consequences of the pandemic
for the economy only became apparent gradually: on March 10, many federal states
canceled mass events with more than 1,000 participants. On March 13, schools and
childcare facilities were closed in most federal states. On March 16, the first day of
the subsample period for the analysis, Germany closed its federal borders and the
government announced the closing of shops and public facilities.
Along these events, subjective uncertainty (unc) increases and business expectations
deteriorate.28 Figure 3.2 divides the respondents of the March wave of the ifo sur-
vey into three groups and displays the change of their subjective uncertainty, expec-
tations, and assessment of their business situation against the corresponding values
from their responses in February. The first group of respondents who submit their
survey responses before March 9, record an increase in uncertainty of 5.9 compared
to February. For the second group, with a submission date between March 10 and
March 15, it is 9.6 points. The third group, that responds between March 16 and 24,
shows the largest increase: on average, these firms report an increase in their per-
ceived uncertainty of 19.2 points on the visual analogue scale. The aggregate increase
between February and April 2020 is likewise about 20 points on the visual analogue
scale. Hence, by using the responses from the third group of firms, I can exploit the
full variation of the aggregate shock. Figure 3.2 further indicates that the decrease in
expectations is of a similar magnitude as the increase in uncertainty. The assessments
of the current business situation also worsen, but the decline is less than the change in
expectations.29
28 Buchheim et al. (2020b) have first documented this shift in firms’ expectations and uncertainty.
29 The month-over-month changes in the three variables for the three weeks of the survey in March
2019 are tiny; they are all smaller than one point on the visual analogue scale in absolute terms. This
suggests that there are no shifts in firms’ perceptions that regularly occur during the month of March.
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Notes: The figure presents changes in subjective uncertainty (unc), business expectations and the busi-
ness situation between three periods in March 2020 (indicated on the horizontal axis) against the av-
erages of the responses from the same groups of firms in February, respectively. These measures are
based on the firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. The labels at the vertical axis
are numbers from a visual analogue scales that ranges from 0 to 100.
In the analysis, I use the variation between firms with respect to changes in their per-
ceived uncertainty and expectations between February and March. The aim is to cap-
ture the variation that is due to the aggregate shock of the COVID-19 crisis, as opposed
to idiosyncratic changes. Figure 3.3 presents distributions of changes between Febru-
ary and March in subjective uncertainty (unc) and expectations, respectively, for the
three groups of firms identified above. The changes for all firms in January and Febru-
ary compared to the previous month, respectively, are also displayed as a reference.
They are centered around zero. Thus, these changes are not driven by a common ag-
gregate shock but reflect idiosyncratic variation at a lower level.
While the kernel density estimate for the first group of firms that responded between
March 2 and 8 shows only minor deviations from the distributions of the changes
in January and February, the kernel density estimates for the second group of firms
(March 9-15) differ more. For the third group (March 16-24), the distribution is much
wider and clearly positively skewed in case of the changes in uncertainty and neg-
atively skewed for changes in expectations. This reflects the aggregate shock to un-
certainty and expectations triggered by the events at the beginning of the COVID-19
crisis. Considering only the third group of firms, that responds between March 16
and 24, should allow me to mostly capture this variation. Moreover, I observe ample
heterogeneity between firms: while on average, respondents become more uncertain
and pessimistic, these changes in beliefs are more pronounced among some managers
compared to others.
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Notes: The figure shows kernel density estimates for month-over-month changes in subjective uncer-
tainty (unc) in the left plot and month-over-month changes of expectations in the right plot for all firms
in January and February, respectively, as well as for three groups of firms in March, split by the date
of submission of their questionnaire. The density estimates are obtained using an epanechnikov kernel
and the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth (Silverman, 1986). The measures for uncertainty and expectations
are based on the responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. The horizontal axes depict changes
based on numbers from visual analogue scales that range from 0 to 100.
Econometric Model and Estimation
I exploit this between-firm variation to estimate the relationship between uncertainty
(unc) and corporate decisions. As the baseline econometric specification, I choose a
probit model of the form:
yit = β0 + β1∆ui,t−1 + β2ui,t−2 + β3∆ei,t−1 + β4ei,t−2 + β3∆si,t−1 + β4si,t−2 + γ′xi + εit
where yit denotes a dummy variable for firm i’s decision at time t, which can be either
to postpone investments or to reduce employment. ∆ui,t−1, ∆ei,t−1, and ∆si,t−1 are
changes in uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation between periods t−
2 and t − 1. ui,t−2, ei,t−2, and si,t−2 are the levels of these variables in period t − 2,
respectively. xi captures time-invariant firm characteristics, namely size and sector,
and εit is an error term.
For the estimation, I use survey data from February, March, and April 2020, which
refer to t − 2, t − 1, and t above. Unconditionally, 43% of the firms that responded
between March 16 and 24 report in April that they have postponed investments and
16% state that they have reduced employment because of the COVID-19 crisis.30 For
the baseline regressions, I use the uncertainty measure unc, as well as business expec-
tations and situation elicited with a visual analogue scale. These variables are based
30 The responses of the April survey were collected between April 1 and April 23.
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on questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. To control for the size of the firms, I define
dummy variables for three size classes based on the number of employees: small firms
have less than 50 employees, medium-sized firms have between 50 and 249 employ-
ees, and large firms have 250 or more employees. This categorization is in line with the
official definition of the German Federal Statistical Office. To take out sector-specific
effects, I include dummies for sectors at the two-digit level of the German WZ08 classi-
fication, which is closely related to the European industry classification system NACE
Rev. 2.
The econometric model contains both levels in period t− 2 as well as changes in uncer-
tainty, expectations, and the business situation between t− 2 and t− 1. The levels in
February control for heterogeneity between firms before the aggregate shock. This is
especially advantageous in view of the boundedness of the visual analogue scale. It
allows me to compare changes between firms with the same level in February. As I
want to relate changes of uncertainty caused by the aggregate shock of the COVID-19
crisis to managers’ investment and employment decisions, my primary focus is on the
coefficient of the change in uncertainty, β1.31
Results
Table F.5 presents average marginal effects from ten probit regressions. The dependent
variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy for firms’ decisions to postpone investment, in
columns 6 to 10 the dependent variable is a dummy for the decision to reduce employ-
ment.
From the regressions in columns 1 to 5, I find that there is a weak positive relationship
between changes in uncertainty and the probability that firms postpone investments,
when controlling for the base level of uncertainty. However, the coefficients are not
significant at the 5%-level and they seem to be dominated by other variables. The
level of uncertainty before the aggregate shock of the COVID-19 crisis appears to be a
much better predictor of firms’ decisions to postpone investments. Column 2 shows
that, unconditionally, both the base level and the change in expectations are strongly
31 Given the negative relationships of uncertainty and expectations as well as uncertainty and the busi-
ness situation documented in Section 3.4.1, there might be a concern of multicollinearity. Table F.3 in
Appendix 3.F shows that the main regressors in levels and changes are indeed correlated. However,
none of the pairwise correlation coefficients exceeds 0.53. The R-squared from an OLS regression of
∆ui,t−1 on the level of uncertainty in t− 2, as well as level and change variables of expectations and
the business situation is 0.33. This leaves room for independent contributions of the regressors. Table
F.3 also shows that individual firms seem to experience the aggregate uncertainty and expectation
shocks quite differently: the correlation between changes in uncertainty and changes in expectations
is merely -0.21.
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negatively related to the dependent variable. The coefficients are quantitatively impor-
tant: a decrease in expectations by ten points on the visual analogue scale goes along
with an increase of the likelihood to postpone investments by roughly five percentage
points. In the joint regression of levels and changes in uncertainty and expectations
in column 3, the level of expectations becomes insignificant. When adding variables
for the level and change of the business situation in column 4, only the change in
the situation is significant. These results are robust to including firm size and sector
dummies in column 5. To sum up, changes in expectations and the business situation
triggered by the COVID-19 crisis are related to a higher likelihood to postpone invest-
ments, while changes in uncertainty are not. Moreover, firms with a higher level of
uncertainty before the aggregate shock more often defer investments because of the
crisis.
Columns 6 to 10 show that changes in uncertainty are not related to the decision to
lay off employees. In case of a “freeze” of employment, I would have expected a sig-
nificant negative coefficient. With higher uncertainty, firms would be less likely to lay
off personnel. However, the coefficients in all specifications are quantitatively small
and statistically not significant. In contrast, column 7 illustrates that the relationship
between changes in expectations and the decision to reduce employment is strong.
The more pronounced the deterioration in expectations, the more likely respondents
downsize their workforce. The levels of uncertainty and expectations in February in
columns 6 and 7 are also connected to a higher probability to lay off employees. In the
joint regression in column 8, the level and change in expectations drive out the level
of uncertainty. Including levels and changes in the business situation in column 9,
as well as size and sector dummies in column 10, emphasizes the role of pre-existing
differences between firms for their decisions to lay off staff. Moreover, changes in the
business situation seem most important as a transmission channel from the aggregate
shock to the decision to reduce employment.
These results suggest that the first moment shock at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis
dominates the effects that we expect from a pure uncertainty shock. I do not find
evidence that firms postpone investment or “freeze” employment following changes
in uncertainty. In contrast, negative changes of expectations and of the assessment of
the business situation are significantly related to these corporate decisions. Moreover,
perceptions and the business situation before the aggregate shock also predict firms’
reactions to the crisis. This is in line with previous findings by Buchheim et al. (2020a).
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Appendix 3.F presents additional regressions for two related managerial decisions:
the cancellation of investment projects and the implementation of short-time work.
I use dummies for these actions as dependent variables in otherwise unchanged re-
gressions. The data stems from the same special question in April as the data on the
decisions to postpone investments and to reduce employment. Unconditionally, 19%
of the firms that responded between March 16 and 24 report to have canceled invest-
ment projects, and 49% indicate to have introduced short-time work. In principal,
uncertainty could also affect these decisions via precautionary behavior. However,
this does not seem to be the case: once expectations are controlled for, again I find that
only first moment changes—and pre-existing business conditions before the aggregate
shock—are related to these investment and employment decisions.
Robustness
Did managers anticipate the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis before
March 2020? News about the COVID-19 epidemic in Asia could have affected uncer-
tainty and expectations of respondents in February. However, Buchheim et al. (2020b)
show that there was basically no such effect. Instead, respondents of the ifo Business
Survey only changed their beliefs once domestic policy imposed measures to contain
the epidemic in March. The spread of the disease in Italy only became known on
February 21, the last day of this month’s survey wave. Hence, information about the
outbreak in Europe is also unlikely to affect the results.
Appendix 3.F presents several robustness checks for the baseline regression results
above. First, instead of computing marginal effects from probit regressions, I estimate
linear probability models. The results are almost exactly the same. Second, I estimate
the baseline regressions excluding firms from the manufacturing sector. Due to the
relatively poor performance of this sector relative to the other major sectors before the
COVID-19 crisis, it may drive some of the results. However, this is not the case: the
main regressions results are robust to excluding manufacturing firms from the sample.
Third, to account for possible measurement error in the variables for uncertainty, ex-
pectations, and the business situation, I apply the Obviously Related Instrumental
Variable (ORIV) approach proposed by Gillen et al. (2019). To this end, in the sample
from February to April 2020, I first regress the uncertainty variable unc on diff_pred
and use the predicted values, as well as changes of the predicted values, as alternative
regressors ∆ui,t−1∗ and ui,t−2∗. These new variables capture the common variation in
unc and diff_pred and are free of independent and identically distributed measurement
error. By regressing expectations and the business situation measured using visual
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analogue scales on their categorical counter-parts, I analogously obtain predicted val-
ues for these variables, in levels and in changes. Table F.7 in Appendix 3.F shows that
the main results are robust to re-estimating the baseline regressions with these mod-
ified variables. A difference is that the coefficients of expectations and the business
situation are substantially larger using the ORIV approach. This suggests the presence
of an attenuation bias in the baseline regressions. As a consequence, in the regressions
with the modified variables, uncertainty in February is driven out by expectations
and the situation. In contrast to the baseline regressions, using the ORIV approach the
level of uncertainty before the aggregate shock does not predict firms’ investment and
employment decisions anymore.
As another robustness test, Table F.8 replicates the baseline regressions in Table F.5
using the uncertainty measure diff_pred as well as the categorical variables for ex-
pectations and the business situation. This requires the definition of several dummy
variables. Regarding diff_pred, I join the sparsely populated category “Easy” with the
category “Rather easy” and create indicator variables for the resulting three levels of
the difficulty to predict the future business development in periods t − 2 and t − 1.
Based on these uncertainty states, I define dummy variables for positive and negative
changes from t− 2 to t− 1. Moreover, I use the trichotomous variables on expectations
and the business situation to create dummies for the levels in t− 2 as well as positive
and negative changes between t− 2 and t− 1, respectively. In the regressions, I define
the lowest uncertainty level as well as the middle categories of expectations and the
business situation as the baseline. The baseline for the variables in changes are the
cases of no change, respectively.
The regression results in Table F.8 confirm the main findings from above. Unfavorable
expectations in the level as well as negative changes in expectations drive out the
effect captured by the dummy for increases in uncertainty. This holds true for both the
decision to postpone investments and the decision to reduce the number of employees.
In regressions with only uncertainty and expectation variables, the level of uncertainty
in February is also significantly related to the outcome dummies. However, it turns
insignificant once I control for levels and changes of the business situation.
3.7 Conclusion
The uncertainty of firms and households is inherently subjective. As for expectations,
a good way to measure it is to ask actual decision makers about their perceptions.
Based on data from a large and representative German business survey, this paper
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presents a novel direct measure of firms’ subjective uncertainty about the development
of their businesses. It appears to be a sensible measure since it contains essentially the
same information as a second measure of perceived uncertainty that asks managers
to assess the difficulty to predict their future business development. The collection of
more data of this kind can facilitate research concerned with the effect of subjective
uncertainty on decision making and the business cycle.
While conceptually closely related, there is little empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between subjective uncertainty and expectations. I contrast managers’ perceived
uncertainty with their business expectations and an assessment of their business situ-
ation and find strong negative relations at the micro level and almost perfectly inverse
relationships in the time series. Moreover, the relationship between uncertainty and
expectations is state-dependent: in bad times, this relationship is weaker, since uncer-
tainty is generally high. The new evidence highlights the simultaneity of movements
in subjective uncertainty and both expectations and business activity in the aggre-
gate. This impedes the identification of aggregate uncertainty shocks using time-series
econometric methods. As an alternative approach, the availability of micro data of
managers’ perceptions allows me to analyze the impact of uncertainty on firm behav-
ior.
Exploiting the between-firm variation at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, I investigate
the relation of uncertainty and expectations to firms’ decisions to postpone investment
projects and to reduce the number of employees. I find that changes in uncertainty
during the aggregate downturn do not predict “wait and see” behavior. By contrast,
first moment changes are related to the deferral of investment and a reduction of the
workforce. These results may be particular to the sharp economic downturn in March
2020, which was extraordinary in many respects. More research should be devoted
to examine the link between perceived uncertainty and corporate actions. Of particu-
lar interest could be the business cycle stage of an early recovery, when expectations




Figure A.1: Online questionnaire with questions using visual analogue scales
Notes: In the original German, the screenshot shows the section of the online survey questionnaire that
elicits an assessment of the business situation as well as expectations and subjective uncertainty about
the future business development using visual analogue scales. They correspond to questions 1, 2, and
3 in Section 3.2.2.
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Table A.1: Representativeness of online participants in the ifo Business Survey
(1)
Dep. variable: dummy for online participation probit
Dummy medium sized firms 0.0177
(0.0455)
Dummy large firms 0.250∗∗∗
(0.0591)
capacity utilization in % 0.0107∗∗∗
(0.00171)
Dummy production vs previous month: more 0.00133
(0.0409)
Dummy production vs previous month: less 0.0996∗∗
(0.0431)
Dummy production vs previous month: no production -0.101
(0.239)
Dummy order vs previous month: higher 0.0405
(0.0428)
Dummy order vs previous month: lower 0.0266
(0.0418)
Dummy demand vs previous month: higher 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0431)
Dummy demand vs previous month: lower 0.0287
(0.0406)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: increase -0.0107
(0.0418)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: decrease -0.158∗
(0.0804)
Dummy capacity utilization, appraisal: more than enough -0.0580
(0.0582)
Dummy capacity utilization, appraisal: not enough 0.0564
(0.0481)
Dummy state of business: good -0.0330
(0.0454)
Dummy state of business: bad 0.0680
(0.0598)
Dummy expected commercial operations: favourable 0.0404
(0.0435)
Dummy expected commercial operations: unfavourable -0.00589
(0.0428)
Dummy orders, appraisal: relatively high -0.0433
(0.0529)
Dummy orders, appraisal: too small 0.0924∗
(0.0550)
Dummy foreign orders, appraisal: relatively high -0.0271
(0.0643)
Dummy foreign orders, appraisal: too small -0.0382
(0.0611)
Dummy foreign orders, appraisal: no fexport -0.372∗∗∗
(0.0689)
Dummy expected domestic prices: increase 0.000872
(0.0387)
Dummy expected domestic prices: decrease 0.0599
(0.0691)
Dummy expected number of employees: increase 0.0171
(0.0520)
Dummy expected number of employees: decrease 0.0184
(0.0528)
Dummy stock of inventories: too little 0.0141
(0.0705)
Dummy stock of inventories: too much 0.0272
(0.0578)
Dummy stock of inventories: no stock-keeping 0.103∗
(0.0584)




No. of observations 17432
No. of firms 3182
Pseudo R-squared 0.035
Notes: Probit regression of a dummy variable
that identifies online participants—vs. mainly
paper-based respondents—in the manufactur-
ing part of the ifo Business Survey on firm
characteristics and variables of business ac-
tivity. The underlying sample spans from
July 2017 to January 2020. Standard errors in
parentheses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.B Comparing Two Measures of Subjective Uncertainty
Figure B.1: Determinants of business situation and expectations from meta survey
Notes: The bar chart presents the results of two questions in a meta survey about the ifo Business Survey
conducted in fall 2019. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of a list of variables for their
assessment of the business situation and business expectations using numbers from 0 (unimportant) to
6 (very important).
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Table B.3: Summary statistics of situation, expectations, and uncertainty (unc)
Variable No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. P1 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P99
Business situation 46413 56.1 20.7 6 30 45 53 71 85 99
Business expectations 46394 51.2 16.5 8 30 45 50 59 73 95
Uncertainty: unc 46740 55.2 19.9 5 28 47 53 69 81 97
Notes: Summary statistics of the responses from questions 1, 2, and 3 in section 3.2.2 for the manufac-
turing sector. The sample ranges from July 2017 to January 2020.
Table B.4: Summary statistics of uncertainty: diff_pred
No. Obs. Share
Easy 277 0.02
Rather easy 3,282 0.20
Rather difficult 10,053 0.62
Difficult 2,499 0.16
Total 16,111 1.00
Notes: Distribution of the responses to
question 4 in section 3.2.2 for the manu-
facturing sector. The sample ranges from
April 2019 to January 2020.

























Easy Rather easy Rather difficult Difficult
indirect uncertainty question (diff_pred)
Notes: The box plot illustrates the distribution of the responses of the direct uncertainty question 3 in
Section 3.2.2 (unc) for each of the answer options of the indirect uncertainty question 4 (diff_pred).
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3.C Subjective Uncertainty at the Micro Level






































Notes: This figure shows non-parametric kernel regression lines of degree zero with shaded 95% confi-
dence bands as well as fitted linear regression lines for the relationship between uncertainty (diff_pred)
and business expectations in the left plot, and between uncertainty (diff_pred) and the business situation
in the right plot. The assessment of the business situation, expectations, and uncertainty are based on
questions 1, 2, and 4 in section 3.2.2, respectively. The categorical values of diff_pred “Easy”, “Rather
Easy”, “Rather difficult”, and “Difficult” are coded as -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, and 1.5, respectively.









































Notes: The figure shows two plots with non-parametric kernel regression lines of degree zero with
shaded 95% confidence bands for the relationship between uncertainty and the business situation, for
three subsamples according to the respondents’ business expectations being unfavorable, unchanged,
and favorable. The vertical axis of the left plot depicts the uncertainty measure unc that is based on
question 3 in Section 3.2.2; for the right plot it is diff_pred that is based on question 4 in Section 3.2.2.
The assessment of the business situation is based on question 1 in Section 3.2.2. The categorical values
of diff_pred “Easy”, “Rather Easy”, “Rather difficult”, and “Difficult” are coded as -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, and 1.5,
respectively.
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Notes: The bar chart illustrates the mean values of uncertainty (diff_pred) by the nine combinations
of the categorical responses to the trichotomous questions about the business situation and business
expectations described in Section 3.2.2. Each mean is based on at least 527 firm-time observations. For
this illustration, the categories of diff_pred “Easy”, “Rather Easy”, “Rather difficult”, and “Difficult” are
coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The underlying sample from the spans from April 2019 to January
2020.
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Table C.1: Uncertainty by interaction dummies of business situation and expectations
(1) (2)
POLS FE
Situation good and expectations unchanged 6.677∗∗∗ 4.629∗∗∗
(0.774) (0.409)
Situation good and expectations unfavorable 22.35∗∗∗ 14.49∗∗∗
(1.054) (0.677)
Situation satisfactory and expectations favorable 10.01∗∗∗ 8.992∗∗∗
(0.899) (0.544)
Situation satisfactory and expectations unchanged 13.21∗∗∗ 11.70∗∗∗
(0.834) (0.506)
Situation satisfactory and expectations unfavorable 22.43∗∗∗ 16.89∗∗∗
(0.953) (0.601)
Situation bad and expectations favorable 19.93∗∗∗ 17.63∗∗∗
(1.274) (0.821)
Situation bad and expectations unchanged 20.57∗∗∗ 19.09∗∗∗
(1.325) (0.740)




No. of obs. 46248 46248
R-squared 0.14 0.55
Notes: Results from OLS and fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is un-
certainty (unc). The regressors are are based on the categorical questions on expec-
tations and the business situation described in Section 3.2.2. In both regressions, the
baseline category is a dummy for a good situation and favorable expectations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Notes: The top left plot displays a non-parametric kernel regression line of degree zero with shaded 95%
confidence bands for the relationship between uncertainty (unc) and capacity utilization in percent. I
restrict the x-axis to the inter-decile range of capacity utilization for better visibility. The figure further
presents bar charts illustrating coefficients from separate pooled OLS regressions of uncertainty (unc) on
categorical variables from the ifo Business Survey, as denoted in the titles of the subplots. In particular,
the regressors are dummies based on two categorical answers (labels at the x-axes). Thus, each bar
corresponds to a coefficient relative to the middle category, which is “unchanged” in case of all variables
except the stock of orders and the profit situation. For the latter two variables, the middle categories
are labeled “sufficient” and “satisfactory”, respectively. The whiskers at the bars are 95% confidence
intervals. Capacity utilization is available once a quarter, the profit situation biannually, and all other
variables in monthly frequency.
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3.D Subjective Uncertainty in the Aggregate






2017m7 2018m1 2018m7 2019m1 2019m7 2020m1
Uncertainty (unc) Uncertainty (unc) weighted
Expectations Expectations weighted
Situation Situation weighted
Notes: The figure presents weighted and unweighted aggregate time series of subjective uncertainty,
business expectations and an assessment of the respondents’ current business situation. These measures
are based on the firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. The labels at the vertical axis
are numbers from a visual analogue scale that ranges from 0 to 100. The weighted series are computed
following the standard aggregation approach at ifo described in Sauer and Wohlrabe (2020). Weighting
occurs in a two-step procedure: in the first step, observations are aggregated to the 2-digit WZ 08 sector
level using firm size weights. In the second step, gross value added weights based on data from the
German Statistical Office are used to aggregate from the 2-digit sector level to total manufacturing. The
unweighted series are based on simple averages.
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2017m7 2018m1 2018m7 2019m1 2019m7 2020m1
business situation
gross value added (index)
Notes: The left plot shows the unweighted average of the assessment of the business situation by man-
ufacturing firms described in Section 3.2.2 and a monthly index of seasonally and calendar adjusted
industrial production in the manufacturing sector from Eurostat. The right plot depicts the unweighted
average of the business situation from manufacturing firms with a quarterly series of seasonally and
calendar adjusted gross value added in constant prices for the manufacturing sector, provided by the
German Federal Statistical Office.





















1999q1 2003q1 2007q1 2011q1 2015q1 2019q1
Notes: The figure depicts a quarterly index of seasonally and calender adjusted gross value added in
manufacturing from Q1 1999 to Q4 2019. The sample period from Q3 2017 to Q4 2019 is marked in
yellow. Note that the sample also includes January 2020. However, due to the impact of the COVID-19
crisis in March 2020, I leave out the value of the gross value added series for Q1 2020.
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Notes: The figure presents time series of unweighted means of subjective uncertainty, business expec-
tations and an assessment of the respondents’ current business situation. These measures are based on
the firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. I categorize firms in three size classes
based on the number of employees, following the definition of the German Federal Statistical Office:
small firms have less than 50 employees, medium-sized firms between 50 and 249 employees, and large
firms 250 or more employees.
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3.E Variation in Uncertainty and Sectoral Performance
Industries in the manufacturing sector are typically affected differently by an eco-
nomic downturn. More cyclical sectors such as vehicle production or machinery tend
to contract more than industries with rather stable demand, such as the food or phar-
maceutical industries. The aim of this appendix is to better understand the drivers
of the aggregate increase in perceived uncertainty. Does uncertainty increase fairly
evenly in all sectors, or are different sectoral paths in the economic downturn related
to sectoral heterogeneity in uncertainty?
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change in situation betw. 2017 and 2019
non-parametric regression
Situation
Notes: The left plot of the figure presents a scatter plot and a non-parametric kernel regression line
of degree zero with an epanechnikov kernel and the “rule of thumb” bandwidth for the relationship
between the change in average uncertainty (unc) and the change in average business expectations be-
tween 2017 and 2019 at the 2-digit WZ08 sector level. In particular, for each sector, I take averages of
uncertainty and expectations over two periods, respectively: July through December in 2017 and July
through December in 2019, before computing the time-differences between these averages. The right
plot replicates the left plot, but replaces business expectations with the assessment of the business situ-
ation. For both plots, I exclude sectors 12, 15, 19, 30, and 33, for which I have less than 10 observations
in at least one month of the two time periods. The assessments of the business situation, expectations,
and uncertainty are based on questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3.2.2. Responses are elicited using visual
analogue scales that range from 0 to 100, respectively.
To answer this question, I compare uncertainty (unc), expectations, and the business
situation for a time period of low aggregate uncertainty in the beginning of the sample
with a time period of high aggregate uncertainty in the end of the sample. For each
2-digit sector from the WZ08 classification, I compute averages of the three variables
for the six months from July to December 2017, and from July to December 2019, re-
spectively.32 Taking differences of these averages allows me to compare changes in
uncertainty to changes in expectations and changes in the business situation at the
industry level. These comparisons are illustrated in Figure E.1.
32 The German WZ08 classification, short for “Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige 2008” is closely re-
lated to the European industry classification system NACE Rev. 2.
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As expected, the two scatter plots show a sectoral heterogeneity in the change in expec-
tations and the change in the assessment of the business situation between the second
half of 2017 and the second half of 2019. This is the variation along the horizontal
axes of the two plots, respectively. For instance, cyclical sectors, such as the industries
producing motor vehicles and electrical equipment, underwent a large decline of their
business situation by approximately 14 and 20 points on the visual analogue scale, re-
spectively. The food and pharmaceutical sectors, on the other hand, reported a decline
of only one and six points, respectively.
As the main result of this exercise, I find that uncertainty increased more in indus-
tries that experienced a larger decline in expectations and in the business situation.
The negative correlations are high: the coefficient between changes in uncertainty and
changes in expectations is -0.83; for changes in uncertainty vs. changes in the busi-
ness situation the coefficient is -0.87. Thus, uncertainty did not rise evenly across all
industries. Heterogeneity in sectoral performance is reflected in heterogeneity in un-
certainty. This implies that the aggregate increase in uncertainty in the sample period
was driven by industries whose situation and expectations deteriorated the most.
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3.F Case Study: COVID-19 Crisis



















































Notes: The figure presents size-weighted time series of subjective uncertainty (unc), expectations, and
the business situation for five major sectors of the German economy. The survey responses are elicited
using visual analogue scales as described in Section 3.2.2.
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Notes: The figure shows size-weighted time series of uncertainty (diff_pred) for five major sectors of the
German economy. They are constructed as balance statistics using the responses to question 4 described
in Section 3.2.2. The weights are -1 for the answer option "easy", -0.5 for "rather easy", 0.5 for "rather
difficult", and 1 for "difficult". The other series are balance statistics from ifo’s categorical questions on
expectations and the business situation.
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Note: The figure shows size-weighted time series of quantitative expectations and uncertainty about
quarter-over-quarter sales growth for four major sectors of the German economy. Uncertainty is com-
puted as the difference between expectations in the best and in the worst case, as described in Bach-
mann et al. (2018). Its unit for uncertainty at the vertical axis is percentage points. The data stems from
a survey supplement to the ifo Business Survey. It is available for all four major sectors since Q2 2019.
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Below is the author’s English translation of a special question in the ifo Business Sur-
vey from April 2020. For the baseline analysis in section 3.6.2, I use the responses on
whether or not businesses reduced employment and whether or not they postponed
investment projects. Additional regressions use the responses on short-time work and
the cancellation of investment projects.
Which measures has your firm taken in response to the Corona pandemic?
Operations:
2 Intensified use of working from home
2 Short-time work
2 Reduction of time accounts and leave days
2 Reduction of employment (e.g., lay-offs, desist from extensions)
2 Plant closure, stop of production
2 Increased stock-keeping
2 Change of suppliers / diversification of supply chains
Finances / Investment:
2 Use of existing credit lines
2 Acquisition of new credit lines
2 Application for public liquidity facilities
2 Postponement of investment projects
2 Cancellation of investment projects
171
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Table F.1: Selected events in the onset of the COVID-19 crisis in Germany
Date Event
March 2 The German Robert Koch Institute raises the threat level for the population
to “moderate” because of COVID-19.
March 6 The German Health Minister rules out “any measure leading to restrictions
on travel” within the European Union.
March 8 Recommendation of the German Health Minister to cancel events with more than
1000 participants.
March 9 Second death because of COVID-19 in Germany; more than 1,200 verified infec-
tions.
March 12 Federal and State governments recommend to avoid gatherings and social contacts.
March 13 Schools and childcare facilities close in almost all federal states.
March 16 German federal borders are closed; start of shutdown
in which most shops and many public facilities are being closed.









02mar2020 09mar2020 16mar2020 23mar2020
Note: Histogram of the submission dates of the questionnaires of the ifo Business Survey in March
2020. It was conducted from March 2 to March 24.
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Table F.2: Representativeness of subsample of firms responding from March 16 to 24
March 2 to 15 March 16 to 24
Mean N Mean N
Firm characteristics
Dummy small firms 0.557 4,767 0.546 1,269
Dummy medium firms 0.297 4,767 0.284 1,269
Dummy large firms 0.143 4,767 0.164 1,269
Dummy manufacturing 0.319 4,767 0.251 1,269
Dummy construction 0.093 4,767 0.128 1,269
Dummy wholesale & retail trade 0.245 4,767 0.199 1,269
Dummy services 0.342 4,767 0.422 1,269
Responses in February 2020
Situation (visual analogue scale) 53.5 3,367 54.7 809
Expectations (visual analogue scale) 51.2 3,370 52.0 806
Uncertainty (unc) (visual analogue scale) 55.4 3,367 54.5 804
Dummy situation bad 0.157 4,251 0.136 920
Dummy situation good 0.335 4,251 0.370 920
Dummy expectation unfavorable 0.213 4,251 0.192 920
Dummy expectation favorable 0.178 4,251 0.184 920
Dummy uncertainty (diff_pred): easy or rather easy to predict 0.343 4,224 0.357 908
Dummy uncertainty (diff_pred): rather difficult to predict 0.532 4,224 0.537 908
Dummy uncertainty (diff_pred): difficult to predict 0.125 4,224 0.106 908
Responses in April 2020
Dummy investment postponed 0.405 4,248 0.426 1,004
Dummy employment reduced 0.151 4,248 0.161 1,004
Dummy investment canceled 0.196 4,248 0.187 1,004
Dummy short-time work 0.471 4,248 0.488 1,004
Notes: The table presents means and the number of observations for a list of variables for two subsam-
ples: firms the responded between March 2 and March 15, and firms that responded between March 16
and March 24. The top panel of the table presents the shares and frequencies of the responses from three
size classes and four major economic sectors, respectively. The second panel considers past responses of
the firms from February 2020 about the business situation, expectations, and uncertainty. The last panel
shows the firms’ subsequent responses in April 2020 about investment and employment decisions.
Table F.3: Correlation of regressors, levels and changes
∆Unc. in t− 1 Unc. in t− 2 ∆Exp. in t− 1 Exp. in t− 2 ∆Sit. in t− 1 Sit. in t− 2
∆Unc. in t− 1 1.00
Unc. in t− 2 -0.53 1.00
∆Exp. in t− 1 -0.21 0.05 1.00
Exp. in t− 2 0.18 -0.32 -0.46 1.00
∆Sit. in t− 1 -0.23 0.19 0.47 -0.24 1.00
Sit. in t− 2 0.31 -0.49 -0.20 0.53 -0.36 1.00
Notes: Pairwise correlations of main regressors in Table F.5: uncertainty (unc), expectations,
and business situation as levels in February (t − 2) and as month-over-month changes in
March 2020 (t − 1). These variables are based on the responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 in
Section 3.2.2
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